1999 Pa. Super. 330 - Commonwealth v. Coleman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “On February 27, 1995, Detective James Comunale and Sergeant William Black swore out an affidavit [of probable cause] that ..., in pertinent part, [sets forth] the following [averments]: (1) “On or about the middle part of February” Sergeant Black supervised a transaction involving a “re liable confidential informant,” an “unwitting informant” and “a person in the residence at the corner of Dix Drive and Tillman Drive;” (2) during the transaction the “unwitting informant” obtained cocaine from the “person in the residence;” (3) Coleman resided at this residence; (4) there were “numerous tips concerning a lot of traffic at the residence, especially in the late . night/early morning hours” and the traffic was described as “a vehicle coming to the residence, the operator and/or passenger of said vehicle going into 300 Dix Drive and returning a short time later to said vehicle and leaving the area;” (5) Detective Comunale had cited Coleman for a traffic violation in the “late 1980’s” during which Detective Comunale “smelled the odor of burned marijuana;” (6) the confidential informant was reliable because he had given information to twp police departments that had resulted in the arrests of other drug offenders; and (7) the confidential informant “will arrange the same scenario as the first transaction” for March 1, 1995. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/27/95. The affidavit requested an “anticipatory search warrant” for Coleman’s residence at 300 Dix Drive to “recover official fund”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2001 Pa. Super. 37 - Commonwealth v. Coleman

2. “In Reviera , the police received a tip from a reliable informant that a man named Jose was storing and selling controlled substances out of a house. An undercover officer went to the house that same day and attempted to purchase an ounce of cocaine from Jose. Jose told the undercover officer that he was waiting for delivery of cocaine that would arrive at 10 P.M. and directed the officer to return after 10 P.M. During this conversation, several other people approached Jose to purchase cocaine and were turned away with the same instructions to return after 10 P.M. Based upon this information, the officer swore out an affidavit of probable cause and requested a search warrant for Jose’s house. The warrant was approved and issued at 9:50 P.M. The police executed the warrant at 10:20 P.M. and seized physical evidence that the defendant later moved to suppress. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and the Commonwealth appealed to this Court. We held that “a magistrate has authority to issue a search warrant where she reasonably concludes that there is a fair probability that evidence of current or past criminal activity will be on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is executed.” Id. at 1255.... Accordingly, we reversed the suppression court’s decision to suppress the evidence because the magistrate’s finding of probable cause was supported by Jose’s statement to the officer earlier that day that cocaine was en route to the house and would be there at 10”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2001 Pa. Super. 37 - Commonwealth v. Coleman

3. “Most importantly, there was no information in the days immediately preceding the issuance of the warrant that would indicate that the March 1st transaction would ever occur. The affidavit states that the transaction would be set up on March 1st. In Reviera , the police were informed that day that cocaine was arriving at the home that same evening. In DiGiovanni , the police had intercepted a package of marijuana en route to the house. In Glass, the defendant had solicited a police informant to sell the defendant marijuana. In all of these eases there was a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that the anticipated event would occur. In the instant case though, it was equally plausible for the magistrate to conclude that the unwitting informant would attempt to purchase cocaine on March 1st and would be turned away from Coleman’s residence for any number of reasons. In this regard, the affidavit simply stated that the “same scenario” “will” be arranged on March 1st. However, “a warrant cannot properly be issued based upon mere speculation that a crime might occur at some future time.” Reviera, 563 A.2d at 1255 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2001 Pa. Super. 37 - Commonwealth v. Coleman