2 Barb. Ch. 165 - Buchan v. Sumner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 2 district · 40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A taking possession doés not withdraw a parol contract from the statute of frauds. The possession taken under such a contract must not only be notorious and distinct, but it must be exclusive of the vendor. Receiving a parol vendee into joint possession with his vendor is*not equivalent with the ancient feudal investiture, for which the statute of frauds intended to declare a writing should be the only substitute. The notoriety and significance of an entry into common possession is much less than when an owner leaves and another person takes the sole and exclusive enjoyment. Hence it has been held that a tenant in common in possession cannot pass his title to his cot'enant in possession by parol, because there cannot be, in such a case, that distinct transfer of possession which equity regards equivalent to a written contract. To constitute a valid parol sale under the statute of frauds, tire possession must be exclusive of the donor. * * * The mischief against which the statute was designed as a guard is greater in cases of parol transfers to partnerships than in any other case. * * * When partners intend to bring real estate into partnership, their intention must be manifested by deed or writing placed on record, that purchasers and creditors may not be deceived. * * * Undoubtedly a partnership may hold real estate, and they may have a resulting trust, where the partnership funds have paid for land. Erwin’s Appeal, 39 Pa. St. 535 . So there may be a constructive trust in f”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McKinnon v. McKinnon

2. “The general lien of a judgment creditor upon the lands of his debtor is subject to all equities which existed against such lands in favor of third persons at the time of the recovery of the judgment. And the court of chancery will so control the legal lien of the judgment creditor as to restrict it to the actual interest of the judgment debtor in the property, so as fully to protect the rights of those who have a prior equitable interest in such property or in the proceeds thereof.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 52 N.J. Eq. 697 - Harney v. First National Bank of Jersey City