2 Cal. 5th 52 - People v. Landry’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We again conclude that the instruction is 'not unconstitutional for failing to inform the jury that: (a) death must be the appropriate penalty, not just a warranted penalty [citation]; (b) [a sentence of life without the possibility of parole] is required, if it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh those in aggravation [citation] or that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh those in mitigation [citation]; (c) [a sentence of life without the possibility of parole] may be imposed even if the aggravating circumstances outweigh those in mitigation [citation]; (d) neither party bears the burden of persuasion on the penalty determination [citation].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 4 Cal. 5th 485 - People v. Garton · 7 Cal. 5th 561 - People v. Mitchell

2. “the Legislature has determined that death eligibility for life prisoners who commit an aggravated assault that leads to the victim's death is required to 'protect [ ] [their fellow] prisoners ... against the assaults of the vicious, and also to protect the officers who are required to mingle with the inmates, unarmed.' ( [ People v. ] McNabb [ (1935) ] 3 Cal.2d [441,] 458 [ 45 P.2d 334 ] ; accord, [ People v. Superior Court ( Bell ) (2002) ] 99 Cal.App.4th [1334,] 1341, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 .) By imposing more severe penalties on those serving life sentences, 'the Legislature was attempting to deter severely violent crime by those who might otherwise think themselves immune from punishment because they were already lifetime guests of the state penal system.' ( In re Carmichael (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 542 , 546, 183 Cal.Rptr. 206 .) Along with retribution, deterring attacks by life prisoners and thereby promoting the safety of inmates and correction officers are legitimate penal objectives. (See Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407 , 420, 128 S.Ct. 2641 , 171 L.Ed.2d 525 ( Kennedy ) ['punishment is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution'].) These rationales of institutional security, deterrence, and retribution provide a reasonable justification for distinguishing this category of murder from others to which the death penalty does not apply.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2 Cal. 5th 544 - People v. Delgado

3. “Defendant does not cite, nor has our research found, a single judicial decision from any death penalty jurisdiction that has held that the use of custodial status as either an eligibility or a selection factor for the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. Nor has defendant shown that any jurisdiction that reenacted the death penalty following Furman v. Georgia [ (1972) ] 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 , omitted custodial status as either an eligibility or selection factor for purposes of the death penalty. Thus, defendant fails to demonstrate the existence of an historical trajectory supporting a conclusion that the majority, or, indeed, any, of the death penalty jurisdictions has abandoned custody status as a factor for imposing the death penalty.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2 Cal. 5th 544 - People v. Delgado