Volume 2 — Disney's Superior Court Reports (Ohio)

Special Term. — T'his was an action to recover $411.49 upon a promissory note, and upon a judgment; an order of attachment had been issued and garnishees served with process. A motion was made for a rule against the City Insurance Company, of Cincinnati, and the Washington Union Insurance Company, of Cleveland, to show cause why an attachment should not issue to compel answers to the interrogatories filed against them as garnishees.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered against the plaintiffs, at special term in May, 1857.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered against the plaintiff, at special term in June, A. D. 1857, by Spencer, J. The action was tried at special term on submission. It was founded on a promissory note for $1,250, dated Covington, Kentucky, March 7, 1854, made by Chas. Leggitt, and payable to A. EE. Smith and M. A. Einch, or order, in one year, at the Ohio Life Insurance aud Trust Company, in Cincinnati.

Special Term. — Proceeding to obtain a judicial construction of the will of Warren Hartshorne, deceased.

Special Term. — An action, under the watercraft law, to recover for supplies furnished on board the boat. The items were: 1st. For bill heads used in the making out of the boat’s bills of freight; 2d. Bills of fare, used for table purposes; 3d. Bills or notices to consignees of the arrival of freight; 4th. Cards, intended for distribution on the boat; 5th. Large bills, or posters, for advertising her time of starting, etc.; 6th.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. The plaintiff is the assignee of William Y. Barr, and seeks to recover upon a contract entered into between Barr and the defendants, dated May 24,1848, by which, in consideration that he (Barr) should pay said defendants five hundred dollars, in cash, and certain notes given by the defendants and others to Joseph Taylor for the purchase of a tract of land in Yirginia, they would convey to Barr one-third of the land.

<p>The defendant, a minor, and her mother, with whom she lived, resided in Dayton, Montgomery county, Ohio. The relator, the father, sued out a writ of habeas corpus, from the circuit court of the United Sates, for the southern district of Ohio, sitting in Cincinnati, by which the defendant and her mother were compelled to attend at the sitting of that court. That writ was dismissed; and before the defendant and her mother could return, and while detained here, the relator obtaining an interview with his wife, pretended to be, with a view to an amicable settlement of the controversy, caused a writ of habeas corpus to be issued from this court. The parties being served, attended, and an arrangement was then entered into, to extend the time for filing a return to the writ, until the next term — Held:</p> <p>1. That this court had acquired j urisdiction to proceed with the hearing and determination of the controversy.</p> <p>2. But that, under the circumstances it was a matter of discretion, whether it would proceed in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and would be iuflueneed in that discretion, by a consideration of the rights and interests of the child.</p> <p>3. That the facts showed an abuse of the process of this court, which should be corrected by dismissing the writ; but without costs, since the day upon which the writ was returnable.</p>

General Term. — The defendant in error filed her petition in special term, setting forth that Hannah Hahn, her intestate, while covert with Emanuel Hahn, the intestate of the plaintiff in error, was possessed, in her right, of a promissory note, for one thousand dollars, given to and held by her before her marriage, and was her separate property; that, after her marriage, suit was brought upon the note, in the name of her husband and herself, and judgment recovered against…

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of the special term of June, A. D. 1856, rendered against plaintiff in ei;ror. The facts are sufficiently stated in the decision.

General Term. — On motion of defendant for a new trial reserved from special term. The decision states the facts sufficiently.

Special Term. — On a demurrer of the plaintiffs to one of the defenses of the defendant, and on a demurrer of the defendant to a reply of the plaintiff to the other grounds of defense.

General Term. — An action to recover damages for a malicious arrest and prosecution on a charge of arson. On motion for a new trial and reserved to general term.

Special Term. — The plaintiffs claimed to recover of the defendant a balance alleged to be due to them as his factors. The account between them was made up of merchandise consigned by the defendant, and advances made by the plaintiffs. The amount alleged to be due was $1,641.45, for which, it was admitted, the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment, unless the defendant’s counter-claim was allowed. This counter-claim arose upon the following state of facts: ^ 1.

<p>1. When a promissory note is deposited with a banker for collection,.he becomes the agent for its collection, and must use the ordinary legal means to effect that object; and if he omit any duty necessary to be performed, whereby the holder loses his security, he is responsible to the holder.</p> <p>2. As a general rule, an agent intrusted with the transaction of business for his principal, is bound to know the duties required of him by law, as well as the legal principles by which they are restricted. This must, necessarily, depend upon the nature of the business to be done, and the usual means to be employed in doing it.</p>

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered by Gholson, J., at special term for plaintiff, upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. The action below was brought by the defendant in error to recover the balance alleged to be due upon a promissory note, bearing date November 2, 1855, executed by J. P. Washington, in favor of the plaintiffs in error, for the payment of $878 in six months after date and b'y them duly indoi’sed.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. Suit on an undertaking in attachment.

General Term. — The plaintiff'as assignee of a judgment rendered in this court in favor of Henry Albro and against William and John H. Schergens, made his motion to amerce the defendant, attorney for Albro, for not paying over money collected by him on the judgment of Albro v. Sehergens. The motion was reserved to general term, to determine the questions of law arising upon the facts presented. They are thus stated: 1.

Special Term. — The plaintiff obtained an attachment against the property of defendant, and on February 3,1858,, caused Clayton & Jenkins to be summoned as garnishees. On the same day they file an answer, showing that Gayle is in their employ at the weekly wages of $18, which had been paid up to the previous Saturday night.

Special Term. — Proceeding for the correction of a mistake in the deed of a married woman. The decision states the facts sufficiently.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. The plaintiff claims to subject certain real estate in the city of Cincinnati, to the satisfaction of certain debts due by the defendants to him, individually, and as trustee for other parties. He sets up a lien upon the property, which he asks to be enforced, and that a sale may be deci’eed, for the benefit of all interested in the common fund.

Special Term. — Action to recover possession of certain lands in the city of Cincinnati.

General Term. — The defendants in error, a corporation by the law of Massachusetts, issued a life policy on the 22d of February, 1855, by which, in consideration of $90.40, paid to them by Geo.

General Term. — The petition in error sets forth “that the defendants, at the January term of the court, 1857, commenced an action against the plaintiff in error for the recovery of the hire of a barge, and on the trial of the case it was found by the judge, who held the term, as matters of fact, as follows : “ That a barge, owned by the defendants, was hired by them to Logan, the master of the steamboat, above described, for the purpose, as understood by both parties, of…

General Term. — This action was brought to recover the amount of a number of certificates issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. The certificates specify as the rate of interest to ,be paid, three per cent. It was claimed that the plaintiff was limited to that rate, not only up to the time of the rendition of the judgment, but that the judgment should also bear that rate of interest.

Special Term. — Action of replevin. The rights of the parties depend upon considerations connected with a contract for the sale of a quantity of butter, made between the present plaintiffs andE. Brown & Son, under whom the defendant claims, as a mortgagee or assignee.

G-enbral Term. — Reserved for decision of the questions arising upon a motion for a new trial, made by tlie defendant. The action, as originally commenced, would have been, before the adoption of the code, in the form of a common law action, founded upon a policy of insurance, to recover for a loss sustained within its terms.

Special Term. — The plaintiff' shipped on board the steamboat Quaker City, two boxes of merchandise, to be transported from Cincinnati to St. Louis. By the bill of lading given by the clerk, the property was to be delivered to the plaintiff on its arrival, but no place in St. Louis was designated, and no person named to whose care it was addressed, if the consignee should be absent.

Special Term. — On motion to set aside a verdiet rendered against the defendant. The decision states the facts sufficiently.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered at special term, upon a submission of the facts of the case to the court. It appears that a note for $330, made by C. T. Jessup, payable to W. D. Ludlow, or order, six months after date, was dated, by mistake, on the 1st January, 1855, instead of the 1st January, 1856. The case at special term is reported in vol. 1, p. 580.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered at special term of November, a. d., 1857, and reported in vol. 1, page 520.

General Term. — This case was reserved from special term for the opinion of all the judges, on the following facts.

<p>1. Absence from one’s home for years, where the party left with the intention to return, if, in the meanwhile, that intention to return is not destroyed by some unequivocal act signifying a purpose to change the domicil, does not defeat this right to claim his former residence, as if it had never been interrupted by his absence. On no other principle would it be secured to officers in the army and the navy, on duty, public officials abroad, and travelers in foreign parts, to enjoy on their return the privilege of voting where they had always resided, or claim the protection of their property from unlawful seizure in their absence.</p> <p>2. The court will require the party who pursues an extraordinary remedy whether by attachment or injunction, to make out a clear case to authorize judicial interference.</p> <p>3. If the affidavit in attachment sets forth no legal ground to sustain the process ; or, if the facts stated are untrue, it is the duty of the court upon inspecting the affidavit in the one case, and after hearing the testimony of the defendant in the other, to dismiss the order ; and this is the right of the defendant which continues without limitation or qualification until final judgment.</p> <p>4. And it would, therefore, seem, that if no jurisdiction attached by a failure to comply with the code, or a false representation of a fact, without which the order could not issue, all subsequent steps are alike unauthorized. If there is no legal power to attach, there can be no legal right to take a bond from the debtor, and, for the same reason there can be nothing predicated upon the fact that it was given to estop the defendant from the ordinary privilege of moving the court to dismiss the process. It is a proceeding inrem, and the debtor only comes in to save his property; it is not a case where there can be any such thing as a technical appearance. The object to be attained by the debtor in releasing the property from seizure, is the immediate possession of his personal chattels, or the removal of any lien upon his estate, to prevent his ordinary business being interrupted, and save the expense necessarily attending the storage of the articles, as well as the injury they might sustain by removal, etc. ,</p> <p>5. The order of attachment is now only a provisional remedy, to be allowed after the suit is commenced, and thenceforward, at anytime, until judgment is entered; and the act of receiving security as an equivalent for the property attached, is ministerial rather than judicial.</p> <p>6. When the defendant is a non-resident, and can not be reached by process, the order of attachment, when executed by the seizure of property, alone, gives the court jurisdiction.</p> <p>7. If the court has not obtained jurisdiction in the mode authorized by the statute, the appearance of the debtor, even can not be construed to affix the right of a creditor to his provisional remedy ¡ it can only be an admission of service in the action. Consent never confers jurisdiction, though it may take it away.</p>

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. Proceeding to foreclose a mortgage to pay interest -due on railroad bonds. The plaintiffs are the trustees of a corporation, formerly known by the name of the Western Railroad Compauy, and now known as the Cincinnati and Chicago R. R. Co., the former corporate name having been changed in the mode required by law.

General Term. — The plaintiff sued as treasurer of Symmes township, averring that as such treasurer he deposited with defendants, in April, 1857, $2,365 of the township moneys, which was to be repaid with six per cent, interest, in sums as required by plaintiff to meet the demands upon him in his official capacity; that part of said moneys have been repaid, but that there is a balance still due' from defendants of $1,065, with, interest, which defendants have refused to pay…

Special Term. — The plaintiffs, as administrators of Nicholas T. Horton, deceased, seek to recover from defendants a balance alleged to be due for work done upon a block of buildings in Cincinnati. It consisted of iron stairways, and railing and grates, constructed of iron. The balance admitted by the parties was $826 07.

General Term. — Reserved from special term upon the questions of Jaw, arising upon a motion praying that a judgment be entered on an award.

Special Term. — Action by a street contractor to recover in damages the value of work and labor in grading High street, from Parsons street to Springhill avenue, for causes alleged. 1st. That the city council could not issue a valid assessment. 2d. That the city council had failed to issue any assessment. ■The municipal act of March 16th, A. D., 1839, (city ordinances, 1850, p. 38) empowered the city council, either with or without petition of the property owners, to grade,…

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. A suit on a judgment rendered in New York. Dean & Co. demurred, because the petition did not contain a transcript of the judgment record.

Special Term. — On demurrer to cross petition making new defendants. In this case the plaintiff sues on a promissory note against defendants, McKenzie, Sterrett, Keys & Maltby.

Special Term. — On motion to set aside a sheriff’s sale. At the January term, A. D; 1858, the plaintiff obtained a decree of foreclosure and sale of certain leasehold premises in the city of Cincinnati.

General Term. — Reserved from special term on exceptions to a report of referees.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of the special term of March, A. D. 1858, rendered by Gholson, J., against the plaintiff in error. The errors claimed were that the finding of the court was against the law and the evidence. The action below was in the nature of replevin, to recover possession of certain goods and chattels. Both parties claimed under a common source of title, viz: Goodloe Pendery and wife.

Special Term. — Action upon a policy of insurance alleged to have been assigned to plaintiff; defendant states that it has no knowledge of such assignment, and therefore denies that such assignment was made. Blaintiff files a motion to strike the allegation and denial from the answer.

Special Term. — Action to quiet title to certain real estate in Cincinnati, in favor of the plaintiff as general assignee, for the benefit of creditors as against certain mortgagees. The ease was submitted to the court for decision upon the facts set forth in the petition and answers, and agreed upon at the hearing.

Special Teem. — Action to recover the, val ue of lost baggage. .

Special Term. — This was an action brought to recover damages for a breach of contract, as common carrier. In the month of May, 1855, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendants 500 cases of tobacco, to be carried from points along the defendants’ road to Philadelphia, at sixty cents per one hundred pounds.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. Suit on a policy of insurance.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. This is an action brought for a foreclosure and the sale of mortgaged premises, the mortgagor having deceased. The administrator and heirs are the parties defendant. A demurrer has been filed to the petition by the administrator.

Special Term. — On demurrer to answer. This was an action brought upon an agreement of the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton Railroad Co., to subscribe to the stock of the Cincinnati, Logansport & Chicago Railway Co. The action is brought by the plaintiff to enforce an assignment, in trust of the money due on the subscription, made by the Cincinnati, Logansport & Chicago Railway Co. The object of the action is to compel a specific execution of the agreement, and thereby relieve…

General Term. — Reserved from special term on a motion to fix the amount of an undertaking to be entered into for the purpose of securing a second trial, according to the provisions of an amendment of the code, passed April 12,1858.

Special Term. — Action brought by the plaintiffs, devisees and heirs at law of John Roberts, Sr., deceased, against the defendants, William Goodall and John Preston, his executors, for an account of certain property which, under the provisions of his will, have come under the executors’ control.

Special Term. — Several cases of a similar nature were consolidated for trial in this particular case. This suit was brought by the plaintiff Robert McGregor, as administrator of the estate of Robert McLean, deceased, against Rowland Ellis and William Sturges, late partners as Ellis & Sturges, Yachel Worthington, W. S. Woodward and Wm. B. Wood, James McO. Lea and Rowland Ellis, Jr., partners as Wood, Lea & Co., and Rowland Ellis and Wm.

Special Term. — On motion by plaintiff for a new trial. The plaintiff’ had sued out his writ of replevin for 300 bags of salt, which, he alleged, to have been stored in defendant’s warehouse, who refuses to deliver it. The defendant answered that he had a lien for storage which ought to be paid ; and a portion of the merchandise having remained in the warehouse for several months, was destroyed by rats, who ate the covering, whereby the salt was spilt and rendered useless.

Special Term. — This is an action to rescind an executed agreement, in pursuance of which the plaintiff on May 20, A. D. 1854, obtained from the defendant $2,820 in stock of the railroad company at par, and conveyed a tract of seventy and a half acres of land, valued at $40 for each acre. The defendant, at the time the agreement was made and executed, was an incorporated railroad company, under the general law of Ohio, acting by a president and directors.

General Term. — Reserved from special term upon the pleadings and testimony. The plaintiff being a judgment creditor of the Cincinnati and Whitewater Canal Co., filed a creditor’s bill to subject a fund which, it is alleged, was deposited in the Mechanics’ and Traders’ Rank, in Cincinnati, and held therefor the use of the Cincinnati and Whitewater Canal Co., in reality, though standing in the name and to the credit of Clement Rare.

Special Term. — On demurrer to answer. The plaintiffs recovered a judgment against Reeder & Bates — the first as principal debtor, the second as surety; and execution has issued, and the sheriff returns, “ that he can find, no personal nor real property of Reeder, whereon to levy,” Whereupon an other execution has been levied upon what is charged to be the real property of Bates, the surety, but which it is stated, is incumbered by liens and conveyances that involve the…

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of the special term, rendered in favor of Lowden for $3,000. The action was founded on an agreement in writing between Lowden and Grasselli. Certain averments are made in the petition showing the position of the parties before and at the time the agreement was made. Grasselli had erected, and was conducting, on premises owned by him, a chemical laboratory.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. The petition sets forth that the plaintiff is in possession of certain premises in Cincinnati, and has a legal title thereto; that he purchased the property at sheriff’s sale; that the sale was made under proceedings of foreclosure, on a mortgage of the premises executed by one Lohman, on the 14th of July, 1852; that other mortgages were on the same property; that defendant Eeldkamp had a mortgage thereon executed in 1855; that…

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. The petition states “ that on the 25th day of July, 1857, the plaintiff was the sheriff of Hamilton county, Ohio; that on that day the said defendants caused to be issued out of the clerk’s office of the court of common pleas, a writ of attachment against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of George Overaker; that said writ was returnable to the 3d day of August, 1857, to the superior court, and was numbered 6,812 of the…

Special Term. — On motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. An action brought by Charles E. Spinning and Charles Brown, partners, as Spinning & Brown, j udgment creditors of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, asking the appointment of a receiver of the assets and effects of said company.

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. The petition sets forth “ that the defendants, on or about the 21st day of June, A. D. 1858, commenced an action against them in the court of common pleas, in the county of Jackson, and State of Missouri, and in said cause filed their petition against these plaintiffs, and among other things, averred that these plaintiffs were merchants trading at Cincinnati, Ohio, under the name of Springer & Fries; that they did not know the first…

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse an order of the court at special term dismissing an attachment. The question involved is the sufficiency of an affidavit to authorize an order of attachment, under the code.

Special Term. — This is an action by Thomas Dunlap and others to foreclose a mortgage given by John A. Wiseman. Charles Stewart and Thomas Webb, executors, etc., of John Walker, deceased, are made parties, and they set up in their answer a mortgage on the same premises, from Wiseman to Walker.

Special Term. — Action to recover fifty thousand dollars damages, claimed to have been incurred by the plaintiff, by the breakage and overflow of a sewer. The plaintiff', a corporation organized, under the laws of the State of Ohio, for manufacturing purposes, became, in the year 1854, the owner of certain leasehold premises, situate on the west bank of the Miami and Erie canal, about sixty-one feet north of Front street, in the city of Cincinnati.

Special 'Teem. — On demurrer to petition. The petition in this case states that Jacob W. Piatt, late of Boone county, Kentucky, died, leaving the plaintiff, Martha, his widow, seven children, who are minors, and for whom the plaintiff sues as curator, and two children, John IP. Piatt, Caroline O. Jenkins, late Piatt, who are adults, and who are made [defendants.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment of the special term, rendered against William Wood. Pearce brought his action at special term, to recover the balance due by Wood on a promissory note, made by him to the treasurer of the Dayton & Cincinnati Railroad Company, or order, for $800, dated June 1, 1855, and payable in two years. After it became due, $400 were paid to the company, and indorsed on the note.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to .reverse a decree of the special term. The facts exhibited by the record in this case, are as follows : . On the 15th of December, 1857, Calvary Morris, as trustee for A. B. Smith and wife, filed his petition, at special term, to foreclose a mortgage made by West to him, as such trustee.

Special Term. — On demurrer to an amended petition. The original petition was filed December 1, A. D. 1855. The petitioner claimed an indebtedness against John A. Wiseman, for work performed in 1841-2 and 8. In his lifetime Wiseman filed an answer, denying, first, the indebtedness generally; and, secondly, alleging that the cause of action did not accrue at any time within six years before the suit was commenced.

General Term. — Proceeding-in error to reverse a judgment rendered in special term against the plaintiff in error.

Special Term. — Action brought by the plaintiff as owner and indorsee of a bill of exchange for $5,000, drawn by the defendant, JohnP. Barger, at Chillicothe, Ohio, on E. Ludlow, cashier of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, at New York city and indorsed by the defendant, the Marietta and Cincinnati Railroad Company, by its treasurer, J. R. Crawford.

Special Term. — On motion to amend bill of exceptions. It appears that in framing a bill of exceptions in this ease, a mistake, or clerical error, occurred. The bill of exceptions states that a certain paper, which is still found in the file of the case, and as to the identity of which there can be no doubt, was attached as part of the bill of exceptions, and marked with the letter A.; but, in fact, it was not done.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a decree of the special term, rendered in favor of the several defendants in error. John Webb, Jr., as assignee of James Todd, brings his action against James P. Williams, .administrator of the estate of Frank S. McClure, deceased, and sundry lien holders, to enforce a mechanic’s lien.

Special Term. — Submitted on petition and answer. The petition sets forth a transaction in which it appears that there was a settlement by which the defendants became possessed of certain drafts for £600, and £355, 11s. and 8d., in which the plaintiff was interested to the extent of $1,170, that in the collection of said drafts, to the extent of plaintiff’s interest, the defendants acted as the agent of the plaintiff, that the first draft was collected by the defendants, in…

General Term. — Reserved on motion to dismiss an attachment. The plaintiff, at the request of the defendants, and solely for their. accommodation, became surety and indorser on certain bills of exchange and promissory notes. Of these a part had become due before the commencement of the action, and the others had not. Both those due and those not due were held by third persons, none of whom were made parties in the action.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a decree rendered by Storer, J., at special term of January, A. D. 1858, reported page 15. Proceeding to obtain a judicial construction of the will of Warren Hartshorne, deceased.

Special Term. — The petition is filed to obtain a legal construction of a clause in the will of David Lee.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment at special term, rendered against Durrell et al.,upon the verdict of a jury, in an action for the 'wrongful taking and conversion of certain personal property. The error alleged is, the allowing the plaintiff in the action to remit a part of the damages, and, thereupon, overruling a motion for a new trial.

Special Term. — On motion to retax costs. In this case, the plaintiff held a mortgage executed by the defendant Creager, upon a leasehold estate, having connected with it, a right of privilege to purchase the fee. The lease was only for five years, and the inference is, though not stated in the pleading, that the privilege to purchase only continued with the lease. The plaintiff' brought his action to realize upon his security.

Special Term. — The plaintiffs, holding a judgment against an Indiana corporation by the name of The Cincinnati and Chicago E. E. Co., filed a petition to subject to the payment of that judgment certain bonds in the hands of Smith and Gilbert, alleged to belong to their judgment debtor.

<p>Special Term. — On suggestion as to attorney’s fees.</p>

Special Term. — On demurrer to petition. The plaintiffs sought to recover the arrears of rent due upon the covenants in a lease; and asserting a forfeiture of the term, by the defendants, in consequence of the non-payment of rent, prayed that the plaintiffs may be restored to the possession. The lease was for five years, nearly two of which had already expired.

<p>A certificate “subscribed and sworn to before me” is sufficient in form for a jurat.</p>

Special Term. — This action is brought by the plaintiffs, wbo are wholesale dealers in dry goods, doing business in Dayton, against the defendants, residents of Cincinnati, who are alleged to have been a firm doing a general retail dry goods and grocery business in Greenville, Darke' county. The claim of the plaintiffs is for goods sold and delivered.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment at special term rendered against Raught. The action was brought by indorsees against the indorser of a promissory note. The defense was a discharge, by the giving of time to the maker. To meet this defense, a waiver or a promise to pay, after being informed of the fact of the time being given, was relied upon. The contract of indorsement was made in Pennsylvania, but the note was made in Ohio.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered at special term against A. Fatman & Co. It appears by the bill of exceptions, that Thompson & Taaffe, a mercantile house in Cincinnati, sued Fatman & Co., tobacco dealers, for damages sustained by them, in the purchase of 64f boxes of 10-lb. lump tobacco, at 25 cents per pound, for which they paid, in the aggregate, $1,898 25.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment given in favor of the defendant’s testator against the plaintiffs in error, at special term, upon the following facts, as stated in the bill of exceptions filed in the case: On the 18th of August, 1857, B. F. Elder, acting as the agent of Noble, was in possession of two bills of exchange, the one drawn on the 8th of August, at Leavenworth, Kansas Territory, by Isett Brewster & Go., on J ohn Thompson, New York, payable…

Special Term. — Motion to compel sheriff to pay over moneys, with interest. A motion is filed in behalf of Peter Douglass, one of the defendant lien holders, for an order on Richard Mathers, late sheriff, to pay over certain moneys, with interest, which had been, by a former decree of distribution of the court, ordered to be paid to Douglass, by the sheriff] from a fund arising from a sale of certain mortgaged premises.

Special Term. — The plaintiff, an incorporated institution, by a law of Ohio, seeks to recover the amount subscribed by the defendants’ testator, to endow certain professorships, and extend successfully the knowledge of agriculture, both scientific and practical.

Special Term. — On demurrer and motion to make tbe petition more definite.

Special Term.' — On motion to confirm a sale made by the sheriff of certain real real estate. A fifth order of sale was issued to the sheriff' under date of March 9, A. D., 1859, under which an inquisition was had on March 17, fixing the valuation at $10,750.

Special Term. — On motion by tbe plaintiff for leave to amend his bill of particulars and affidavit, and by the defendant to dismiss for insufficiency; and at the same time three other cases‘with this were submitted on motions to distribute the proceeds of sale of the Steamboat Guiñare. On March 29, 1859, a warrant was issued in this case and executed by the seizure of the boat.

Special Term. — On demurrer to a petition for want of. a sufficient statement of cause of action. The petition contains three counts.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to obtain the reversal of a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in error by Judge Gholson at special term. The action was for special damage, caused by a public nuisance. The petition states that plaintiffs are owners of a line of omnibuses plying between the corner of Main and Fourth streets, Cincinnati, and Corryville, by way of Vine street, making trips every half hour in the day, and twice a day extending their route to Clifton.

Special Term. — On motion to distribute the proceeds of sale. In this case, a sale of mortgaged premises having been made, and the proceeds in part applied to the payment óf costs, and of the plaintiffs’ claim, a surplus remained of some $1,850 to be distributed among other claimants.

Special Term : — This is au action brought to recover for labor and materials furnished in the construction of the steamboat Crescent. There is but a single question, viz : Were the defendants interested in the boat as owners at the time the plaintiff’s debt accrued. It appears that one Holmes, a steamboat captain, desiring to build a boat, applied to the defendants, Parvin, Brown and Anschutz, to join him in the enterprise.

Special Term. — Proceeding by the plaintiff as a judgment creditor of Andrew McMicken, to subject whatever interest or estate McMicken may be entitled to under the will of his uncle, Charles McMicken, deceased. The provisions of the will are sufficiently stated in the decision of the Court.

Special Term. — An action upon two promissory notes, made by tbe defendant, Hobbs, on April 1, A. d. 1853, payable to the order of L. M. Piner, in one and two years after date respectively, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff', Stites.

Special Term. — On demurrers to answers. The petition avers that the plaintiff and Samuel J. Broad-well were seized in fee of a lot at the north-west corner of Fourth and Vine streets, thirty feet in front on the former by ninety-nine on the latter; that they entered into a contract with the defendant, MoElevey, on the 26th of April, 1856, whereby they agreed to lease him this property for ninety-nine years, renewable for ever, commencing May 1, 1856, at an annual rent of…

General Term. — Proceeding in error, by Israel Marienthal, G. Lehman, and Leopold Block, to obtain the reversal of a judgment rendered against them at special term. The error assigned is, that they were not properly made parties to the cause.

General Term. — Reserved from special term on demurrer to an amended petition. This was a petition for partition and other relief under the code. The plaintiff was in possession of the whole property, of one undivided half as the owner in fee simple, of the other by virtue of a lease for years from his co-owner, James Pullan, which would expire in December, 1862. The conditions of this lease are fully stated in the petition.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in error.

Special Term. — Action in the nature of a bill in equity, to enforce a trust, seeking the intervention of the court to give a legal interpretation of its provisions. The facts are these: On February 28, 1858, John Blair Summons, then lying dangerously sick at the Spencer House, in the city of Cincinnati, made his will, by which his whole real estate was devised to his grandchildren, subject to the payment of one-third of the rents to his wife.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered in favor of Cyrus Garrett, at special term, by Spencer, J., in a suit to recover tbe possession of real property. Held: upon the testimony, the plaintiff' was entitled to recover the possession of the premises held by defendant, and judgment was given accordingly. Exceptions were taken to the judgment, and to the refusal of the judge to grant a new trial.

General Term. — Proceeding in error to reverse a judgment rendered by Judge Gholson after a trial by jury at. special term. The errors assigned are these: 1. Exclusion of relevant and competent testimony; 2. Error in the charge; and, 8, Refusal to grant a new trial. The action was for the recovery of the possession of real estate and damages for its detention.