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2 F.3d 214

Docket No. 92-3490.

Wright v. Runyon

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued June 10, 1993.

Decided Aug. 10, 1993.

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1993-08-10

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“We are not without sympathy for employees trapped between their jobs and deeply held religious beliefs. Religious faith is ordinarily consistent with most employment obligations. When the two conflict, Congress has ordered that employers must try to accommodate their employees’ religious practices. Perhaps there were other steps that could have been taken here that would have allowed [the employee] to continue working at [his job] without infringing his religious convictions. We believe, however, that the [employer] has done all that Title VII requires and, therefore, that it is entitled to summary judgment.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 939 F. Supp. 1281 - Favero v. Huntsville Independent School District

“A reasonable accommodation of an employee's religion is one that 'eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Elizabeth Anderson v. Usf Logistics Inc

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 717 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook · Beasley v. Health Care Service Corp. · Ryan v. United States Department of Justice

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Richard Dickson Cudahy · Decided 1993-08-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2021 · most notably Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc. (1996), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Parcel Service (1996)

14 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

1501993200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*215Brian W. Gleason (argued), Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff-appellant.

¶2Mel S. Johnson, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Milwaukee, WI, for defendant-appellee.

¶3Before CUDAHY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ALDISERT, Senior Circuit Judge.

¶6CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

¶7Gordon Wright was an employee of the United States Postal Service (USPS) from October 1971 until May 1987. For most of that time he was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Seventh Day Adventists observe their Sabbath from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday, and during that time they must refrain from any employment activities. Wright contends that he was forced to resign his position because the USPS failed reasonably to accommodate his religious practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General. Wright appeals, and we, reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, now affirm.

¶8Wright began his tenure with the USPS as a letter sorter in the Milwaukee Main Post Office. In 1980, he transferred to a box sorter position in the box unit, which did not require him to work on his Sabbath. On April 29,1987, the USPS sent Wright a letter informing him that his position in the box unit was being abolished effective May 22, 1987. That same letter stated that Wright would have an opportunity to bid for a new *216position in a special “closed bid” procedure.1 Although none of the positions offered in the closed bid process accommodated Wright’s religious practices, four positions were let for bid in the ordinary process that did not require work during Wright’s Sabbath. Wright would have received at least two of these positions, as the senior bidder, had he bid for them.2 Wright, however, bid only for the others and received none of them. He thus became, in USPS lingo, an “unassigned regular,” whom the USPS could assign to any vacant position. And, as it happened, Robert Rudolph, Wright’s supervisor, informed Wright on May 29, 1987, that he had been assigned to a box unit position that required work on Friday evenings.

¶9Wright immediately informed Rudolph that he would have to resign if he were required to work Friday • nights. Rudolph merely reiterated that Wright was assigned to a position with Tuesdays and Wednesdays off and that he would have to report to work that night, which happened to be a Friday. Wright then proceeded to complete a resignation form on which he indicated that he was quitting because of the “United Statesfs] Postal Services[’s] refusal to continue giving me my Sabbath off (Friday Sundown to Saturday sundown).” Wright gave the form to Rudolph who accepted it without much further discussion.3 Rudolph signed the form and presented it to his immediate supervisor, Tom Gapinski, who in turn sent it to the personnel office. Wright’s later request for reinstatement was denied.

¶10Title VII requires that certain agencies of the federal government, including the USPS, make employment decisions “free from any discrimination based on ... religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). “Religion” is defined, however, to include only those “aspects of religious observance and practice” that an employer is able to “reasonably accommodate ... without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The only question before us is whether the USPS failed to accommodate reasonably Wright’s refusal to work, as a matter of religious conviction, from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday.4 We conclude that it did not.

¶11*217[2] A reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religion is one that “eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices....” Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70, 107 S.Ct. 367, 373, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). The district court concluded that “the Postal Service accommodated Wright by inviting him to bid on four open ‘weekends off positions, at least two of which Wright would have received had he bid on them.” Wright v. Frank, No. 88-C-1316, slip op. at 17, 1992 WL 521773 (E.D.Wis. Jan. 21, 1992). We agree. The bidding system enabled Wright to obtain a job the requirements of which did not interfere with his religious practices. Indeed, it allowed Wright to select such a position. This strikes us as a paradigm of “reasonable accommodation.” Wright, in refusing to bid on two “flat sorter machine operator” jobs that would not have required work during his Sabbath, chose not to take full advantage of the bidding system. Wright, not the Postmaster General, is therefore responsible for the consequences.

¶12Wright argues that the bidding system was not a reasonable accommodation because the “flat sorter” jobs were “nonpreferrable positions ... which were not commensurate with his seniority.” Wright’s Br. at 38. Wright does not explain what jobs would have been “commensurate with his seniority,” but he suggests that only his previous (box unit) job, or some position of nearly identical desirability, would fill the bill. Title VII, however, requires only “reasonable accommodation,” not satisfaction of an employee’s every desire. We would be presented with a different question if Wright were a skilled craftsman asked to assume an unskilled position. But, in terms of requisite skills, the flat sorter and box positions are essentially equivalent. A much more searching inquiry might also be necessary if Wright, in order to accommodate his religious practices, had to accept a reduction in pay or some other loss of benefits. But that is not this case. Wright simply had to take a job that most people did not want. When jobs more palatable to Wright’s tastes became available, he could presumably bid on them, his seniority intact following his interregnum in the flat sorter section.5 We have previously stated that “[i]t is difficult for any organization to accommodate employees who are choosy about assignments....” Ryan v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 462 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2309, 119 L.Ed.2d 230 (1992). The facts here tend to confirm that observation.

¶13Finally, Wright contends that even if the bidding system itself was a reasonable accommodation, the USPS still should have done more. To this end, Wright recites a host of other means by which his religious practices might have been at least temporarily accommodated without undue hardship to the USPS. Wright’s Br. at 35-37. The Supreme Court has instructed that “where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternatives would result in undue hardship.” Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68, 107 S.Ct. at 372. The USPS here has taken adequate steps to accommodate Wright’s religious practices. Not only was the bidding process itself a reasonable accommodation, but Rudolph also suggested to Wright that he think about some of his other options before submitting his resignation. The USPS admittedly did not investigate every possible way in which Wright could avoid a conflict between his work requirements and his religious practices. But, by providing at least one reasonable accommodation, the USPS discharged its obligations. Id. at 69, 107 S.Ct. at 372.

¶14We are not without sympathy for employees trapped between their jobs and deeply held religious beliefs. Religious faith is ordinarily consistent with most employment obligations. When the two conflict, Congress has ordered that employers must try to accommodate their employees’ religious prac*218tices. Perhaps there were other steps that could have been taken here that would have allowed Wright to continue working at the USPS without infringing his religious convictions. We believe, however, that the USPS has done all that Title VII requires and, therefore, that it is entitled to summary judgment.

¶15Affirmed.

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