2 Hay. & Haz.
Volume 2 — Hayes & Hazard's Vermont Reports
75 opinions
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 1Wilkinson v. Williams (1850)
Action of Debt. Where a party takes bank notes in payment for goods sold upon the understanding that he should return the notes to the purchaser if they turned out to be incurrent, Held, that the… Held: that the seller could not maintain his action for the price of the goods, unless he return or offer to return the notes before action brought.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 9Greenhough v. Keyworth (1850)
Suit on two Promissory Notes. Where a note payable to the plaintiff or order was endorsed over to a bank for collection, and the bank was unable to collect it, the endorsor may bring his action against the maker without regard to the endorsee for collection, and may erase the cashier’s or endorsor’s name from the note without affecting his right to recover as against the maker.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 13Armstrong v. Johnson (1850)
Where an issue from the Orphans’ Court is pending in the Circuit Court, as to whether a paper is the last will and testament of the deceased or not, and the question to he decided as to which of two papers is the last will and testament of said deceased, the Orphans’ Court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question as to whether another paper is the last will of the deceased, as the Orphans’ Court had divested itself of the jurisdiction of that question.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 21Ellsworth v. Gunton (1850)
Suit on a Promissory Note. In an action against a bank on a promissory note taken for collection, the burden of proof rests with the bank to show that the notary made tbe proper demand on tbe maker of the note, either at his place of business or at his residence.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 24Caldwell v. Winder (1850)
Scire Facias under Lien Law. 1. Under the lien law no extra work not completed within three months preceding the filing of the claim in the Clerk’s Office is covered by the lieu. 2. Under the rule that payments made by a debtor should be applied to the debt least secured.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 35Tyler v. Walker (1851)
Action of Assumpsit. 1. That under the sixth section of the Act of Congress of August 23rd, 1842, allowing certain officers, while commanding separate posts, double rations, among being the… Held: that the marine station at the Navy Yard in Washington was a permanent or fixed post garrisoned by troops, and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to the rations allowed by said act. 2. That this Court had jurisdiction over this case. 3.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 44In the Relation of Mount (1851)
The Act of Maryland of 1798, Ch. 101, Sub. Ch. 12, Section 10, allowing the guardian to sell a part of the Real Estate of the infant does not authorize the Court setting in Chancery to decree,the sale of the whole of the said real estate,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 47Patriotic Bank v. Webster (1851)
<p> Suit on a Promissory Note. </p> <p>In a suit against the endorsors on a promissory note, the defendant answering interposed the plea of the statute of limitation, to which the plaintiff replied that the defendant was beyond seas during the time covered by the defendant’s plea, and the defendant rejoined, that he was within the jurisdiction of the Court for four days during the time, to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendants’ rejoinder was held bad.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 49United States v. Buete (1851)
<p>Writ or Error to the Criminal Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p> Indictment for Perjury. </p> <p>1. In a trial for perjury it is proper to admit the affidavit of another party to be read to the jury, for the purpose of showing what the prisoner swore to. The evidence showing that it was on the same sheet of paper, and the prisoner’s affidavit referred to the former affidavit in these words: “well acquainted with the within named Brown, who signed and swore to the within declaration.”</p> <p>2. The testimony of the Marshal, that a party named Brown evaded criminal process, without showing its connection with the prisoner’s case, ought not to have been admitted, as it was not relevant to the issue, and may have injuriously prejudiced the case of the prisoner in the view of the jury.</p> <p>On tbe following indictment:</p> <p>District of Columbia, County of Washington, to wit:</p> <p>Tbe jurors of the U. S., for the county aforesaid, on their oaths present that Henry Buete, late of the county aforesaid, laborer, falsely intended to defraud the U. S., and wickedly and maliciously contriving and intending to aggrieve and inj ure the heirs and legal representatives of one William Brown, deceased, on the 5th day of February, 1849, at the county aforesaid, came in his proper person before one, Samuel Grubb, the said Samuel Grubb being a Justice of the Peace, and for the County aforesaid, duly qualified and commissioned, and then and there in due form of law was sworn and took his corporal oath on the Holy Evangely of Almighty God, and then and there falsely swore on the Holy Evangely of Almighty God, (the said Samuel Grubb then and there having a lawful and competent power and authority to administer such oath) that one George F. Brown was the brother of William Brown, who was a first sergeant in Co. G, 3rd regiment of Artillery, in the Army of the United States, and that the said William Brown was never married, and left no father or mother, brother or sister other than the said George F. Brown, whereas in truth and in fact the said George F. Brown was not the brother of the said Wm. Brown.</p> <p>And the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths aforesaid, further present that the oath so taken falsely as aforesaid by the said Henry Buete was material, in order to enable the said George F. Brown to obtain from the government of the U. S. certain county land, to which the said Wm. Brown, the deceased, was entitled, and that the said oath so taken falsely as aforesaid was taken in support of a claim against the U. S.</p> <p>And the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths aforesaid, further preseut that at the time of his taking the oath aforesaid, the said Henry Buete well knew that the said George F. Brown was not the brother of the said Wm. Brown.</p> <p>And so the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths aforesaid, do say that the said Henry Buete, on the 5th of Feb., 1849, at the county aforesaid, before the said Samuel Grubb, Justice of the Peace as aforesaid, (he, the said Samuel Grubb, then and there having such powers and authority as aforesaid) by his own act and consent, and of his own most'wicked and corrupt mind, in manner and form aforesaid, feloniously, falsely, wickedly, willfully and corruptly, did commit willful and corrupt perjury, and feloniously, wickedly, willfully and corruptly did swear falsely in support of a claim against the U. S., to the great displeasure of Almighty God, in contempt of the United States and their laws, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and government of the U. S.</p> <p>The exceptions to the rulings of the Judge of the Criminal Court are given in the opinion.</p> <p>The jury brought in a verdict of guilty, and the defendant was .sentenced to imprisonment, at labor in the penitentiary of the District of Columbia, for the period of four years.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 54McGuire v. Briscoe (1851)
x. Where a demurrer to the bill is overruled,or is sustained in part, the Court declined to allow costs to either party, remarking that this Court has no recollection of requiring the payment of five pounds, required by the statute of Maryland. 2. Where one has knowledge of the insolvency of a party, an agreement to pay him a part of the purchase money of property, held by an assignee under the insolvent laws is void as to creditors. 3.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 72United States v. Derringer (1851)
Action of Debt on a Contract. 1. When the Clerk of the House of Representatives made a contract with the defendant to deliver wood at a given price and… Held: that the clerk could not rescind the contract for non-delivery of the wood until the expiration of the time agreed upon for its delivery. 2. Where the defendant had contracted with the Clerk of the House of Representatives to furnish the government with wood, without an appropriation from Congress to pay for the same.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 86Lucasey v. United States (1852)
Writ of error to the Criminal Court. Indictvient for receiving stolen goods. 1. Held: to be voluntary and permissible in evidence, Indictment.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 89United States v. Gardiner (1853)
Indictment for False Swearing. 1. It is not necessary in a case of perjury or false swearing that there should be positive evidence that the paper was sworn to by the prisoner; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. 2. Papers filed by the prisoner to sustain the allegations contained in the original paper, if they tend to establish the charge made in the indictmeut, as to guilty knowledge, will be admitted in evidence. 3.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 114Clarke v. Clarke (1853)
For an Injunction and Distribution of Funds in the Treasury, in the Defendant’s Name. 1. Where a claim was presented and prosecuted by attorneys in the name of a bankrupt, who had purchased it at a sale made by his assignee in bankruptcy, but which sale was subsequently declared void. An assignment in a power of attorney of so much of the fund as the attorneys were to receive as compensation for their services will be carried out. 2.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 119United States v. Woodward (1853)
<p> Indictment for Murder. </p> <p>1. Insanity caused by drunkenness, where the party is not intoxicated at the time of the commission of the offence charged, excuses as much as any other form of insanity contracted involuntarily.</p> <p>2. Where a prisoner has been for a long time so far of unsound mind, frequently if not uniformly, as to be wholly unconscious and irresponsible for his acts: Held, That the knowledge of the above, after conviction, will not be a reason for granting a'new trial.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 122Smoot v. Corporation of Washington (1853)
<p>The power of grading and regrading the public streets of Washington must be considered as a continuing power in the Corporatiou, to be exercised whenever and as often as the health, improvement and prosperity of the city makes it necessary.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 124Dermott v. Fowler (1853)
Action of Debt. Where the defendant uses a party-wall iu the erection of his adjoining store, and is put to necessary expense in making the party-wall fit for his use, the jury in assessing the damages may take in consideration such extra expense, unless the party or those under whom he claims waived the defects.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 126Baldwin v. Wylie (1853)
<p> Appeal from the Orphans’ Court. </p> <p>1. I11 order to make a will effective it must first receive the probate of the proper Court.</p> <p>2. Where the executrix in a will gives a power of attorney to receive and control any fund of the estate in her individual name, as widow, and not as executrix and guardian, such power is without authority.</p> <p>3. The appearance of an attorney in a cause is received as evidence of his authority, and no additional evidence is required.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 132McKnight ex rel. Gideon v. McKnight (1853)
<p>1. The control of a guardian of the real estate of his ward constitutes a sufficient entry to invest the ward with actual seizin; and on the marriage of the ward the authority of the guardian ceases, so far as the right of the ward is concerned.</p> <p>2. A wife, unless .she be entitled to a sole and separate estate, can bring no suit without the union of her husband in relation to her property or interests, either real or personal, legal or equitable.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 136Bell v. Lewis (1853)
<p> For an Injunction. </p> <p>The convention created for the settlement of claims between Brazil and the United States, held in the case of the American Brig Caspian, condemned and sold as a prize of war at Montevideo, that the proof of an assignment of a claim for indemnity for the loss of personal property by the pilot of the brig, which had been mislaid or lost, could not be supplied by parol proof or by a copy of the same, but required the original to he produced, in order to establish the claim in the assignee.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 140United States ex ul. Goodrich v. Guthrie (1853)
Petitioyifor a Writ of Mandamus. The petitioner, Aaron Goodrich, was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for the full term of four years.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 146Judson v. Corcoran (1853)
For an Injunction. A previous assignment will not be allowed where the assignee'has through laches allowed his claim to go by default, especially where he has given no notice as required by law to establish his claim, thereby allowing his assignor to perpetuate a fraud by reassigning the same to another,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 149In re the Will of Kelby (1854)
1. From 1676, -when the act of 29 “Charles II” was enacted, no nuncupative will can, under any circumstances, pass real estate. 2. That by the 29 Charles II, Ch. 3, Sections 19, 20 and 221 and the act of Md. of 1798, Ch. iox, Sub-Ch. 2, Section 13,2 in force in this District, there must be not less than three witnesses to a nuncupative will, where the amount of personal property exceeds thirty pounds.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 151United States ex rel. Tucker v. Seaman (1854)
Rule to show cause why a writ of mandamus shall not issue as prayed. 1. By the terms of the Act of Congress of August the 26th, 1852, the Superintendent, as public printer, is subject wholly to the control of the joint committee on printing, provided by said Act. 2.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 155Richardson v. Cameron (1854)
For the enlargeme7it of the Administrator’s Bond. I. Where a large sum of money may be appropriated by Congress, the administrator should give a bond sufficiently large to cover the amount that is in equity due to the representatives, 2. The Orphans’ Court has no jurisdiction over the conflicting powers of attorney. It belongs to another tribunal.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 156United States ex rel. Wallach v. McCormich (1854)
For a mandamus tb compel the Register to receive the relator’s vote. 1. In addition to the qualification to vote under the Act of 1820, that of 1848 supperadded the payment of a school tax. 2. Where every qualification was shown to be complete, the citizen possessing them is entitled to vote. 3. The evidence of qualification afforded by the registry is not exclusive; other testimony may be admitted, although registration is convenient and proper.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 160United States v. Jones (1854)
On a case stated. 1. Money received by a naval officer for a special designated purpose, and accompanied by instructions from the Secretary of the Navy, is not covered by the specified allowances enumerated and prohibited in Section 2, of the Act of Congress of March 3rd, 1835. 2.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 173Moore v. Hoffman (1854)
<p> Appeal from the Orphans' Court. </p> <p>An adopted child cannot inherit property in this District, unless by will,</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 175Werner v. Corporation of Washington (1854)
1. The law of the Corporation of Washington, passed on the 8th of October, 1854, is null and void so far as it prohibits the sale of liquors to be drunk on the premises in ordinaries, taverns or inns. 3. A keeper of a licensed ordinary, tavern or inn, has the right to sell liquors at his bar for the use and the entertainment of his guests; and that his right to sell liquors extends to his guests as well at their meals as at the bar. 3.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 185Rogers v. May (1855)
Where a creditor had been appointed administrator he will not be removed on the petition of a cousin, or next of kin to the deceased,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 187In re Wells (1855)
<p> For a writ of Habeas Corpus. </p> <p>1. The President of the United States has the power to grant a conditional pardon for a capital offence.</p> <p>2. That the penitentiary, although especially for the purposes enumerated in the statutes, yet as it was built by and under control of the United States, the President has the right to use it for the purpose of imprisonment, when the sentence has been computed from hanging to imprisonment for life.</p> <p>It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder at the December term of the Criminal Court, 1851, and was sentenced to behung for murder April 23d, 1852, on which day the President of the United States granted him a pardon, upon the condition that he be imprisoned during his natural life. Wells, in the conclusion of his petition, says: “being duly informed by counsel, learned in the law, that the said pardon is absolute and the condition invalid, he prays that the writ of habeas corpus may issue to bring him before the Court, and if it is found that his confinement is illegal and contrary to law, he may be discharged from his imprisonment.”</p> <p>The case was argued by Mr. Jones for the petitioner and Mr. Key for the United States.</p> <p>Mr. Jones alluded to a similar case in Pennsylvania, but said authorities might be found in the statutes or in precedents at common law, but he contended that the President of the United States had nothing to guide him but the Constitution and laws of the Republic.</p> <p>Mr. Key contended that the President of the United States has power to commute the sentence of death to imprisonment for life.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 189United States ex rel. Green v. McCommick (1855)
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. 1. The 5th Section of the Charter of the City of Washington of 1848 cannot be construed so as to make the qualification of a resident of the city to vote, that he must be a citizen of the United States one year next preceding the day of election. 2. It is the duty of the assessors to register the name of all white male residents of the City of Washington, who are subject to a school tax, whether they are foreigners or not. 3.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 198In re Biddle (1855)
On a Writ of Habeas Corptis. i. It is not in the power of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia to revise or correct the error of a court martial if any exists. The appeal must be to the President who confirmed the sentence. 2. The Circuit Court can not look beyond the record of the court martial; it has no power or jurisdiction to examine the proceedings under a writ of error; it cannot therefore usurp power or jurisdiction by a writ of habeas corpus.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 200Dove ex rel. Hallack v. Blair (1856)
Motion in Arrest of Judgment. . A motion in arrest of judgment will be dismissed if made after judgment is rendered and execution issued thereon.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 202Gormley v. Smith (1856)
<p> Action for Work and Labor. </p> <p>On a contract with the defendant to haul all the stone which the defendant had contracted to supply for the Capitol extension, the plaintiff hauled about one-half, and was forbidden by the defendant to proceed further.</p> <p>In an action on the contract it was held: That the plaintiff is entitled to the contract price for the stone he had hauled, and the gain or profit he would have made if he had been allowed to complete the contract.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 205United States ex rel. Herbert v. Marshal of the District of Columbia (1856)
<p> On a Writ of Habeas Corptis. </p> <p>On testimony given in Court on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, if it is clear to the mind of the Judge that a conviction for murder should not take place, lie will order the prisoner to give bail for his appearance,</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 207Easby v. Easby (1856)
<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court.</p> <p>An executor could renounce his right as executor after acting as such, and be relieved from responsibility.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 208McVeight v. McKnight (1856)
To Satisfy Executions. The husband of the defendant was insolvent, and largety indebted to sundry judgment creditors, who sued out attachments against him and levied them upon the defendant’s share in the sale of certain real estate left by her father, and now in the hands of Commissioners appointed by the Court to make partition.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 210United States v. Herbert (1856)
<p> Indictment for Murder. </p> <p>I. In a trial for homicide the Court held: That the moment a man is bound to retreat, is that in which the danger becomes ap. parent, up to that time there is nothing to retreat from, he is obliged to retreat if he can safely; but if by reason of the fierceness of attack, he is prevented from moving away, the law does not require it of him; but he is excused in the same manner as if he fled. If, under these circumstances, he gives his assailant a mortal wound it is a case of justifiable homicide.</p> <p>2. The Court is not bound to grant an abstract instruction; that in answering a prayer the judge gives an opinion when he modifies the instruction asked for on an abstract point of law it is error.</p> <p>3. The Criminal Court should not instruct the jury that upon the whole evidence the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 220Smith ex rel. Cushing v. Corporation of Washington (1856)
Action for Damages. The Corporation of the City of Washington has power to regrade the streets of the city under its charter, without making compensation for individual injuries, unless in exercising the power given it acted corruptly or with a design to injure; the power is a continuing power, to be exercised whenever deemed proper.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 222Hines v. Gordon (1856)
Issue from the Orphans’ Court. 1. I11 the absence of consent on tlie part of her husband, a wife cannot dispose of her personal property by will during his lifetime. 2. Held: that where a husband voluntarily abandoned his wife and neglected to provide for her, she may dispose of any property she may have subsequently acquired in such manner as she may please.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 226United States ex rel. Rush v. Watson (1856)
On a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Under the act of Congress of March 2, 1837, Section 1, a minor of the age of 18 can enlist in the Navy, without the consent of his parents or guardian,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 228Hickerson v. United States (1856)
<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court.</p> <p> Indictment for an Assault on a Slave. </p> <p>1. It is an indictable offence to inflict punishment on a servant or slave, to the annoyance or nuisauce of citizens, whose pleasure or business carry them near the scene of infliction,</p> <p>2. The question of nuisance or no nuisance is one of fact exclusively for the jury to decide,</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 230Walker v. Smith (1857)
<p> For an Injunction. </p> <p>Where the defendant has paid a large and valuable consideration, without any notice of the complainant’s claim, has made his proofs, and has had the decision of the General Land Office in his favor, he has obtained an advantage of which a Court of Equity will not deprive him under the circumstances.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 241Miller v. Mayor of Washington (1857)
Action of Debt. 1. There is no difference in the meaning of the word occur in the charter of the City of Washington, and the word happen in the Constitution of the United States. 2. The clause in the charter of the City of Washington, referring to the nominations to be made by the Mayor, and confirmed by the Board of Aldermen, was modelled after the Constitution of the United States, and was intended to accomplish the same object.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 256Fields v. Crawford (1857)
Action of Replevin. 1. An officer leaving property-levied on in the hands of the defendant, subjects it to be seized upon by subsequent creditors of the defendant. 2. An officer of another State forfeits any lien he may have on property levied on, by allowing it to be taken out of the jurisdiction of the State. 3.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 258Johnston v. Clarke (1857)
<p> For an Injunction. </p> <p>A number of persons enter into mutual agreement to subscribe and pay into a common fund by regular instalments, say $i per month for each share a member may take, until the fund has accumulated so as to divide $200, or any given amount, to a share; at which period the partnership is to cease; and to secure punctuality, each member neglecting his monthly payments is subjected to a fine, say of 10 cents upon every dollar he fails to pay at the regular monthly meetings. The period of distribution is hastened, and the common fund made productive by authorizing any member to make a composition sale of his interest in the ultimate distribution, to the other members of the association. Thus, whenever there are funds enough in the treasury for the purchase of one or more shares at any regular meeting of the association, the member who bids the highest premium, or in other words, agrees to take the lowest price, is paid the price so bid by him for his ultimate share. He remains, however, a member of the society until the close, paying thenceforth a double instalment on his shares, $2 per month on each, instead of $1, and subject to all the regulations of the society, liable to attend its meetings and to do any duties which might be devolved upon any other member, and liable to the regulated fines, in default of punctual payment of monthly contributions or any other default under the rules. To secure a compliance with his contract to the company, the member making such composition of sale executes his bond in the penalty of the ultimate value of the share sold, conditioned for the faithful payment of the monthly dues thereafter to accrue, and all fines and forfeitures which may under the rules be imposed on him for any defaults. He also executes a deed of trust, conveying real estate, to secure a compliance with the condition of the bond. There is in the bond and deed no stipulation for the return of the principal sum advanced to the member, nor is it at all in the power of the society to compel its return if he fulfill the conditions of the bond and deed of trust.</p> <p>Held: i. Such stipulations entered into are not, on their face, a device to cover a usurious loan; and such a transaction is not usurious upon its face.</p> <p>2. This was a dealing with the partnership funds, in which the complainant had an interest in common with the members of the society, and was not a loan; the complainant was interested in the money when it was advanced and when it was repaid.</p> <p>3. An injunction to restrain a sale under the deed of trust ought to he refused.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 278Blagden v. Broadrup (1857)
On a Writ of Certiorari. Where a case has been improperly taken out of the hands of a magistrate through a writ of certiorari, on a motion presented to the Court by waj- of a writ of error cum nobis, the Court will issue a writ of procendendo.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 280United States v. Stewart (1857)
Indictment for Riot. 1. The 15th clause of the 8th Article of the Constitution of the United States, which confers upon Congress the power to provide for the calling forth of the militia to execute the laws of the United States and the Act of Congress of Feb. 28, 1795, (1st Statute at Rarge, p. 424) apply to the States. 2.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 290Cross v. United States (1857)
Writ of Error to the Criminal Court. Indictment for Assault with an intent to Kill. Where a defendant has knowledge that the officers of justice are in pursuit of him for an offence committed by him against the law, he will not be justified in resisting such officers, even though such officers do not exhibit to him the warrant or inform him of the particular cause of his arrest,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 293United States ex rel. Castro v. Hendricks (1858)
<p> For a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Commissioner of the General Land Office to issue a United States Patent of Land. </p> <p>1. A mandamus will not lie to compel the Commissioner of the General Land Office to issue a patent to the petitioner for more land than, in the judgment of the Commissioner, he was entitled to, the quantity of land to which petitioner was entitled being a question to be determined by the Commissioner upon all the evidence and facts.</p> <p>2. The decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office ordering a further examination, on the ground that the return of a survey made by the Surveyor General of California represented the tract as containing more than the quantity sold and confirmed was a proper exercise of the duties of his office.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 302Corporation of Georgetown v. United States (1858)
<p>Writ of Error from the Criminal Court.</p> <p>On an Indictment for a Nuisance in not repairing a highway, &c.</p> <p>1. A municipal corporation has no authority to take upon itself the burden of repairing a road or turnpike, in which the public as well as the Corporation are interested, when the same is outside the limits of said Corporation.</p> <p>2. Where it is the duty of the Levy Court to keep in repair all the roads in the County, outside the corporate limits of Georgetown. An ordinance passed by the Corporation, stipulating that the Corporation should repair a certain road leading to said Corporation, does not make the Corporation liable on an indictment for not repairing said road, neither would it be the case where the Act of Congress of 1826 makes the Corporation liable for one-half of the expense of keeping the County roads in repair. In other words the Corporation has no authority for any purpose beyond its own limits.</p> <p>The object of this prosecution being to ascertain judicially whether the Corporation of Georgetown is bound to keep in repair the road mentioned in the indictment, and there being no dispute about the matter of fact, but only in matter of law, touching the obligation to repair and liability to this indictment, the case is submitted to the Court under the statute, subject to the opinion of the Court, as to the liability of the Corporation upon the following facts agreed.</p> <p>On the 2nd of March, 1833, Congress passed and approved an Act to improve the navigation, &c. (4 Statute at Uarge, 646.)</p> <p>The Corporation passed the following ordinances of March 11, 1833; of 19 and 20 March, 1833; of May 11, 1833; of 19 June, 1833, and of September 16, 1833.</p> <p>It is agreed that a majority of the voters of Georgetown did, at the election referred to in the ordinance of Sept. 16, 1833, duly declare their preference for making such “free turnpike road from some point of the upper part of the town, &c.,” but no application was made to Congress in that behalf.</p> <p>And afterwards the said Corporation passed the following ordinances, to wit: the ordinances approved March 15, 1834, June 7, 1834, October 21, 1834, February 21, 1835, April 16 and 18, 1835, May 16 and 23, 1835, and also the following ordinances, to wit: the ordinances approved November 9, 1835, December 22, 1835, April 23, 1836, June 15, 1836, and October 1, 1836, and afterwards passed the following ordinances, to wit: the ordinances approved December 4, 1838, November 22, 1839, February 12, 1840, and July 18, 1840.</p> <p>And it is agreed that the road mentioned in the indictment was contracted by the Corporation under the contract approved by said ordinance of April 16, 1835; and that the said road is the same road which is referred to in the said ordinances as ‘1 the Upper Route ’ ’ of the free turnpike road aforesaid, and which enters the said town at 7th Street.</p> <p>It is agreed that the road mentioned in the indictment, and was aforesaid constructed by the Corporation, has and is from the time of constructing the same, and hitherto a public highway, convenient for the interests of the “Upper” or Northern section of the town, and lies without the corporate limits of the said town, and wholly within the County of Washington, District of Columbia, extending from 7th street in said town; and has been, from time to time, repaired and kept in repair by the Corporation from the time the same was contracted until within two years last past, since when the Corporation has not kept the same in repair or in a condition fit for a public highway; but the same has been and is wholly unfit for travel, and by reason of the decay and delapidation of certain culverts, part thereof, and by reason of the condition of the roads generally, the same is a public nuisance, as being impassable as a public highway, and as causing damage by overflow, &c., to the private property bordering thereon.</p> <p>It is agreed that if upon the whole case the Court shall be of opinion that the Corporation is bound to keep the said road in repair, and is indictable for the nuisance created by the failure to do so, judgment shall be entered accordingly, or such form (either upon plea of guilty or otherwise) as may be deemed regular by the Court; but if the Court shall be of the contrary opinion a nolle prosequi shall be entered, the object of the prosecution being to determine judicially the right of the matter.</p> <p>Phil. Barton Key,</p> <p>J. M. Carlisle,</p> <p>Robert Ould.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 312Wilson v. Leiberman (1858)
Action for Trespass. I. On the resurvey of property it was found that the dividing wall of nine inches was built wholly nine inches or more on the defendant’s lot.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 315In re Will of Benton (1858)
Motion to Appoint an Executor. Notwithstanding the renunciation of an executor, under the Maryland statute of 1798,1 Chap. 101, Sub. Ch. 3, Sec. 7, he can come into Court and take the responsibility by complying with the law at any time before letters of administration had been granted to another,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 316Dixon v. Walker (1859)
<p> For the Distribution of the Estate of a Naturalized Citizeti, who died Intestate. </p> <p>1. Under the Maryland Act of December,1791, Section 6, no alien can take by descent the real estate of an alien or naturalized citizen, but they can take real estate by deed or will.</p> <p>2. The personal property of an alien or naturalized citizen dying intestate will be distributed according to the law of the domicil of the deceased.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 319United States v. Sickles (1859)
<p> Indictment for Murder. </p> <p>1. The burden of rebutting the presumption of malice by showing circumstances of alleviation, excuse or justification rests on the prisoner, and it is incumbent on him to make out such circumstances to the satisfaction of the jury, unless they arise out of the evidence produced agaiust him.</p> <p>2. The law does not require that the insanity which absolves from the crime should exist for any definite period, but only that it exists at the moment when the act occurred with which the accused stands charged. The time when the insanity is to operate is the moment when the crime charged upon the party was committed, if committed at all.</p> <p>3. Every one is presumed to be sane who is charged with a crime, but when evidence is adduced that a prisoner is insane, conflicting testimony makes it a question for the jury, and raises a reasonable doubt which should avail a prisoner on a defence of insanity as to any other matter of fact.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 329Darrell v. Brooke (1859)
Issue from the Orphans' Court. It is not necessary to the validity of a will of personal property that it should have a date, or that it should be in the handwriting of the testator or signed by him, or - have any subscribing witness; provided it was drawn at his request and according to his dictation, he being then of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract, which the Court held was a question for the jury to decide,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 332United States ex rel. Jones v. Seldon (1859)
For a Writ of Mandamus to command the Marshal to pay the petitioner witness fees. A writ of mandamus will be refused to command the Marshal of the District of Columbia to pay the petitioner, an attorney of this Court, witness fees. Especially will it be the case when the judge of the Criminal Court decides the petitioner is not entitled to the same.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 334Wilson v. Taylor (1859)
<p> Rule to show Cause. </p> <p>An administrator cannot acquire the title to the property of the deceased by paying his debts. The property must be sold and accounted for by him.</p> <p>A summons was served on the administrator to show cause why he does not distribute the balance in his hands as administrator de bonis non of Geo. B. Scott, deceased.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 337United States v. Merryman (1860)
<p>A constable who uses a criminal process behind which to enter forcibly a man’s premises, ostensibly to serve a civil warrant for debt, and for the purpose of taking unlawful possession of property held lawfully as a pledge for a debt, prostitutes the law to the basest purposes, and will be dismissed from office.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 339In re McIntire (1860)
Motion to Admit a Will to Probate. 1. A will to convey land must be perfect, and executed with all the forms and solemnities required by law. No defect in its execution can be aided or supplied by parol proof. 2.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 341Keenan v. United States (1860)
Writ of Error to the Criminal Court. Indictment for Rape, and aiding and abetting, and assisting to commit Rape. The aiding, abetting and assisting others to commit rape is punishable under the Penitentiary Act of March 2, 1831.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 343Turner v. United States (1860)
<p>Writ of Error to the Criminar Court.</p> <p> Indictment for the larceny of a Bank Note. </p> <p>Anything that is said and done by the prisoner and the prosecuting witness at the time of the larceny is directly connected with the transaction, and is not in any sense collateral to the issue. It was intended to explain the motives and intent of the prisoner. The evidence ought to have been submitted to the jury, as they were the proper judges of its weight and credit, and the eSect they would give to it.</p> <p>The jury brought in a verdict of guilty.</p> <p>On a trial of this case the following bill of exceptions was presented and signed by J. Hartley Crawford, Judge of the Criminal Court, viz:</p> <p>On the trial of this cause the United States, to maintain the issue on their part, joined, gave evidence by one A. H. Crogier that on Sunday, the 25th day of April, i860, in the afternoon, he was with some acquaintance in the bar-room of the National Hotel in the City of Washington talking and drinking, when by some means, he does not know how, whether by introduction or not, he got into conversation with the prisoner at the bar, who until then was a stranger to him, and in the course of the conversation they took two or three drinks together; in the course of that conversation the prisoner told witness he was a gambler by profession and had his room close by, for which he paid $1,200 a year rent; that he gave elegant suppers every night, and so on, and after a while invited him, the witness, to go with him to his room, where he would give him a glass of such liquor as he could not get in any public place in the city. This was near six o’clock in the evening. He accepted the invitation, and they went out together and went to the prisoner’s room, where they got some liquor and drank, and the prisoner asked witness if he had any Virginia money, saying he had use for a small sum and would give him gold for it; witness said yes he had a little and took out of his waistcoat pocket a hundred dollar note and some small change, and handed the note to the prisoner who took it, looked at it, and put it in his pocket. After a while witness asked prisoner for the gold and prisoner refused to give it to him; witness then asked him for his note and he refused to give him that, and witness asked him why, and he replied: ‘ ‘ because it is a counterfeit. ’ ’ Witness then said, counterfeit or not, I have eleven mates to it. I know where I got them from and can have it made good, for I got them in Richmond from the Cashier of the Commonwealth Bank. That some words passed between them and the prisoner arose and went to get his hat, and witness asked him what he was going to do, to which he replied: he was going to have him arrested for passing counterfeit money. Thereupon witness left the room, went to the National Hotel, and there stated what had passed; was there advised to have prisoner arrested, and then did go to a justice, procure a warrant, and cause the prisoner to be arrested.</p> <p>On his cross examination the witness said he had not with him at the time the eleven notes he spoke of, that he had previously deposited them with Dr. Jones, the proprietor of the .National Hotel, who counted them when he received them and put them in the safe at the Hotel, and he did not take them out until after the said $100 note had been got from him by the prisoner, and afterwards he had got them from Dr. Jones; that the prisoner fiad stated to him that he had a whole roll of notes at the time and he saw them, and saw him take this note from them; but this was not true, and the prisoner thereupon called Dr. Jones, the person spoke nof by the said witness, for the purpose of contradicting him, and also for the purpose of showing that in point of fact the witness had with him at the time a large roll of similar notes, and thereby increasing the just ground of suspicion in the mind of the prisoner; that witness was circulating counterfeiting money, and that the note so withheld by him was counterfeit, and for other purposes pertinent to the issue, and offered to prove by Dr. Jones that he never saw the witness until the afternoon of the day of the alleged theft, when witness came to him and said that being drunk the night before he had come with a friend and deposited with one of the clerks at the Hotel a large sum of money, which was put up in an envelope with his name on it, and locked up in the safe, and asked Dr. Jones to give it to him, and Dr. Jones having ascertained the facts to be so, did take out the money and gave it to the witness; that witness then went into the bar room, where he remained with others till toward night; that he afterwards heard, that Turner had got some money from him and saw the witness, but witness did not tell him of it, or of any of the facts, and he did not advise him to have him arrested; that the next day witness came to him again, and showed him the roll of money and told him it was the same he had got from him the day before, except a $100 note, which he said Turner had got, and that it was of the same description as the others then shown to him,-which he thinks were ten or eleven one hundred dollar Virginia notes, and witness there deposited the money in the safe at the National Hotel. To all which offered evidence the United States Attorney objects, and the Court sustains the objection and will not permit the same to be given, and the defendant, by his counsel, excepts thereto, and prays the Court to sign this, his bill of exceptions, which is done accordingly. •</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 347Marcus v. United States (1860)
Writ oe Error to the Criminal Court. Indictment for keeping a Faro Bank.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 357Bargie v. United States (1861)
Writ of Error to the Criminar Court. Indictment for False Pretences. i. An indictment under the penitentiary Act of March 2, 1831, need not show whether the prosecutor paid the money on the draft and endorsement or not.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 364Bibbs v. Davis ex rel. Waters (1861)
Where a woman during coverture makes a contract in reference to her separate estate, and subsequently after the death of her husband promises to pay the same, she is liable.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 367Lovering v. Dutcher (1861)
Appealfrom a decision of the Commissioner of Patents. 1. Where a question of interference is decided by the Commissioner of Patents on appeal to the Circuit Court, the question to be decided by the Court under the Act of July 4, 1836, is who is entitled to a patent. 2. Where an invention has been discovered and in public use for two years or more, prior to filing the application for patent as a new discovery in the art, a patent will be denied by this Court.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 374United States v. The British Schooner (1861)
1. Where war exists, the President of the United States has the constitutional authority, as a belligerent right, without any Act of Congress, to institute and declare a blockade. 2. Held: that both vessel and cargo were thereby forfeited. 4.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 386Snowden v. Pierce (1861)
Appealfrom the Decision of the Commissioner of Patents. Under the circumstances of this case it was not necessary for the appellant to go before the Examiner-in-chief under the new law, and then appeal to the Commissioner before appealing to this Court. It would give the Act of March 2d, 1861, a retrospective operation. The principle laid down by the Court in Loveriug vs. Dutcher governs this.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 392United States ex rel. Kiehler v. Marshal of the District of Columbia (1861)
On a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Held: Upon a writ of habeas corpus hearing, that the Act of Congress approved Augusts, 1861, as to the offence of selling intoxieating liquors, conferred the power only… Held: Upon a writ of habeas corpus hearing, that the Act of Congress approved Augusts, 1861, as to the offence of selling intoxieating liquors, conferred the power only upon Justices of the Peace to examine into the charge made and discharge the accused or hold him to bail,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 394United States ex rel. Murphy v. Porter (1861)
<p> Writ of Habeas Corpus on the petition of fohn Murphy for the release of his son fames. </p> <p>In this case President Lincoln liad suspended the writ of habeas corpus, as a military necessity within the District of Columbia, and just prior to such suspension, Justice Merrick had issued the writ upon 1he petition of the father of James Murphy, who had enlisted into the military service of the United States, in the 12th Regiment of New York Volunteers, while under the age of eighteen years, for that reason asking for the discharge of said son from said military service, and made the said writ immediately returnable before him.</p> <p>The Marshal of the District was directed not to execute the writ upon Provost-Marshal Porter, and to make return. That he was ordered by the President of the United States not to serve the same, as the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended as regards soldiers in the army of the United States, within said district, by the order of the President.</p> <p>I11 this case appears the reasons assigned by Justice Merrick for his non-appearance in Court, upon the further consideration of the case and the protests of Judges Dunlop and Morsell against the action of the military authorities in thus interfering with the process of the Court.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 402United States v. Copeland (1862)
Writ of Habeas Corpus, The fugitive slave law of 1850 is as applicable to this District as to any of the States, and as this is a Circuit Court of the United States its authority to appoint Commissioners under that law is clear,
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 404Barney v. DeKraft ex rel. Barney (1862)
1. A personal judgment or decree obtained in any state over a non-resident, who has not been served with process within the state, has no extra territorial validity and does not come within the operation of the 4th Article of the Constitution, declaring the effect within one State of judicial proceedings in another State. 2.
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 417Reed v. Campbell (1862)
<p> Appeal from the Orphans' Court. </p> <p>A widow, after receiving the portion of her husband’s estate, devised and bequeathed to her, cannot claim the surplus remaining in the hands of the executor, after paying the debts and legacies. See Act of Md., of 1798, Ch. 101, sub-chapter 13, Sec. 1, 2 and 3.</p>
- 2 Hay. & Haz. 430Barney v. DeKraft ex rel. Barney (1863)
<p> Overruling a Mandate of the Circuit Court. </p> <p>In all cases where an infant is a Ward of Chancery, no act can be done affecting the person, property or estate of the minor, unless under the direction expressed or implied of the Chancery Court itself,</p>