Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

2 Ill. 131

Harmison v. Clark

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided December 15, 1834

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1834-12-15

This is an action of trespass instituted by Harmison against the above named defendants, together with Hiram Clark and Abraham Clark. Upon the two last no service of process was had, nor was there any appearance entered by them.

Decided 1834-12-15

Wilson, Chief Justice,

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court:

¶2In this cause two trials were had in the Court below. Upon the first trial, judgment was rendered in favor of two of the defendants, and judgment by default was taken against Jacob Clark, sen. and Lucy his wife, two other defendants. At the same term, the Court, upon the application of Jacob Clark, sen., set aside the default against him and his wife, and granted a new trial as to all of the defendants.

¶3During the progress of the first trial, several exceptions were taken by the plaintiff to the opinion of the Court, but these exceptions are not now available. To have enabled him to avail himself of them, he should have renewed them on the last trial (if the same ground of exception again occurred,) as that was a trial de novo, and the judgment rendered on that trial is the only final judgment in the cause.

¶4Upon the second trial, a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of all the defendants.

¶5From this statement of the case, the only assignment of error that can be noticed by the Court, is that which questions the correctness of the order of the Court below, setting aside the default of two of the defendants, and granting a new trial, as to all of them. It has been repeatedly decided, that an application to set aside a judgment by default, or to grant a new trial, is addressed to the discretion of the Court, and that the decision of the Court upon such application, cannot therefore be assigned for error.(1) It is however contended that this case is not within this general rule, because a new trial was ordered as to two of the defendants who were acquitted, and who did not join in the application made by the others for that purpose. This position might well be assumed by those defendants who were acquitted on the first trial, had they afterwards been convicted; because the effect of the order was to impose upon them the costs of another trial, and to subject them to another chance of conviction. But the same reason that would, under this state of the case, authorize them to assign this decision of the Court for error, precludes the plaintiff from doing so. The decision was to his advantage, by multiplying his chances of success. He therefore has no reason to complain, and cannot assign that for error which was for his benefit. The judgment must be affirmed with costs.

¶6Judgment affirmed.

¶7 See note to last case.

/2/ill/131 · .json · Public domain