2 Ill. 2d 246 - Wright v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis
1954
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 33 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently June 2023 · most notably 67 Ill. 2d 544 - In Re Stephenson (1977), 81 Ill. 2d 349 - In Re Estate of Wilson (1980)
2 federal appellate · 33 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Kane v. Johnson · Spina v. Spina · Craven v. Craven · Jones v. Koepke · Lutyens v. Ahlrich
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A resulting trust, characterized as an ‘intent enforcing’ trust, [citation] is created by operation of law and has its roots in the presumed intention of the parties. [Citations.] A court of equity will raise a resulting trust where land is bought with the money of one person and title is taken in the name of another. [Citations.] It may be paid directly or indirectly to the grantor, and by or for the resulting trust claimant. [Citation.] A resulting trust arises, if at all, at the instant legal title is taken and the title vests. [Citations.] Acts subsequent to the taking of title by the alleged trustee have no bearing upon the question whether a resulting trust was raised. [Citations.]” 2 Ill. 2d 246, 250-51 , 118 N.E.2d 280, 283 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is recognized that the payment of money by a transferee may constitute a loan to another for whose benefit a resulting trust will be raised. 3 Scott on Trusts, sec. 448, says: “If a person pays the purchase price for a conveyance made to himself, it would seem at first blush as if there would be no ground for imposing a resulting trust. But suppose that the payment is made not for himself but for another. Suppose that B lends money to A in order that A may purchase land from X, but B pays the purchase money directly to X and takes title in his own name. It is true that in that case the money which was advanced by_B never actually belonged either legally or equitably to A. Just before B paid it over to X, the money belonged to B; just after B paid it over to X, the money belonged to X. There were not two separate transactions in which B first lent the money to A, and A subsequently paid it over to X, in which case it would have been clearly A’s money which was paid to X. The courts have rightly held, however, that it is immaterial that the loan to A and payment to X constitute a single transaction. A loan may be made in other ways than by handing the money over to the borrower. It may be made by paying it to another at the borrower’s request. Hence although B pays the purchase money directly to X, yet in substance it is A’s money, being lent to A by B. There is therefore a resulting trust for A. B, however, having taken the title as security for the repayment of the loan to”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Summarized, the situation is that plaintiff desired to buy the property in order to continue operating it as a rooming house. Unable to finance its purchase, she asked her son to obtain a loan from the Veterans’ Administration. He agreed upon the express understanding that while title would be taken in his name his mother would make the payments on the loan. Defendant was not interested in buying the house or in making the necessary payments on the mortgage indebtedness incurred to finance the purchase. Apart from title being taken in defendant’s name the transaction differs but little, if at all from the typical situation in which one person advances the funds for the purchase of property and title is taken in another. Defendant was the purchaser in name only. Uncontradicted evidence establishes that at no time during the negotiations incident to the sale and conveyance was there any intention manifested by either plaintiff or defendant that the latter should have any beneficial interest in the property. Indeed, defendant never challenged his mother’s ownership until domestic discord developed five years later. The mother initiated the negotiations with [the seller] and pursued them to a conclusion. Title was taken in the son’s name for the convenience of his mother and for her sole benefit. Economic necessities motivated the form of the transaction; without the G.I. loan, the property could not have been purchased. Title was taken in defendant’s name and he signed the contr”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.