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2 Ind. 82

Nichols v. Guy

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided May 30, 1850

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1850-05-30

<p>ERROR to the Bartholomew Circuit Court.</p>

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[t]he ground of the action for words of this description is the presumption that the party charged will be wholly or partially excluded from society by reason of the charge”

quoted by 1 later decision, including "F.B.C.", a Pseudonym v. MDWISE, INC., d/b/a MDWISE, MDWISE NETWORK, INC., and MDWISE MARKETPLACE, INC.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1850-05-30

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently April 2019

5 state decisions

1018501860187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Blackford, J.

¶1This was an action of slander brought by Guy against Nichols. The declaration, after alleging that the defendant intended, maliciously and wickedly, to destroy the plaintiff’s character, &c., laid the words as follows :

¶2First — “Silas Guy, (meaning the plaintiff,) had the clap(meaning that the plaintiff had, at the time said words were spoken as aforesaid, a certain foul and loathsome disorder called the clap).

¶3Secondly — “Silas Guy, (meaning the plaintiff,) has the clap(meaning that the plaintiff had a certain foul and loathsome disease called the clap, at the time the words were spoken as aforesaid).

¶4There was’ a demurrer to each set of words.

¶5The demurrer to the Avords first above stated was sustained ; and, we have no doubt, correctly. Those words, being in the past tense, are not actionable. Carstake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473. The inuendo alleging the defendant’s meaning to be, that the plaintiff had the dis*83ease at the time the words were spoken, is not warranted by the words charged.

G. G. Dunn, for the plaintiffH. P. Thornton and J. S. Watts, for the defendant.

¶6The demurrer to the second set of words was overruled.

¶7The defendant pleaded the general issue. He also pleaded, specially, that other persons had spoken the same words of the plaintiff; and that when he, the defendant, spoke the words, he believed them to be true. This special plea was demurred to, but no disposition appears to have been made of the demurrer.

¶8The cause was tried on the general issue, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff.

¶9Motion for a new trial overruled, and judgment on the verdict.

¶10The record shows that the second set of words was proved as laid.

¶11The defendant contends that the words thus proved are not, per se, actionable; but we are of a different opinion. To say of a person that he has the plague, or .that he has the leprosy, is considered to be actionable. 1 Stark, on Sland. 100, 101. So, it has been recently held, that the charging of a person with having got the pox, meaning the French pox, is actionable without proof of special damage. Bloodworth v. Gray, 7 Mann. and Gr. 334.

¶12The ground of the action for words of this description is the presumption that the party charged will be wholly or partially excluded from society by reason of the charge. 1 Stark, on Sland. 99. In the case before us, the imputation contained in the second set of words, if believed, was well calculated to exclude the plaintiff, at least partially, from society; and the words are, therefore, actionable.

¶13The defendant complains of the judgment, because the demurrer to his special plea was not disposed of. But that plea is obviously bad; and, of course, the want of a decision on the demurrer, can be of no injury to the defendant.

Per Curiam.

¶14The judgment is affirmed with costs.

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