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2 Johns. 181

Felter v. Mulliner

New York Supreme Court

Decided February 15, 1807

New York Supreme Court · decided 1807-02-15

The return to certiorari in this, cause stated, that Mulliner in the court below, declared against Felter, for that his horse had killed the plaintiff’s mare, through the negligence of the defendant s servant. The defendant pleaded a former judgmént in his favour, in the same cause of action, before another justice.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1807-02-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1932

13 state decisions — followed in 10 states

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Per Curiam.

¶1The verdict in the former cause, was equivalent to a verdict for the defendant. The intention of the jury was manifest and beyond doubt. They found the issue against the plaintiff, and though the verdict was faulty in point of form, the justice ought to.have entered it according to the substantial finding. We are to overlook matters of form, and to regard proceedings before justices of the peace according to the merits. Being a verdict for the defendant, it was a bar to a farther prosecution by the plaintiff below for the same cause. Nemo debet bis reocari pro eadem causa. The omission by the justice to render judgment according to the verdict, did not prevent it from being a bar to a new suit. The justice was bound to render a judgment thereon, according to the finding. He had no discretion. The reason of the rule, that the verdict of postea is no evidence, until the entry of final judgment, does not apply to the case, because we know that the justice has no authority to arrest a judgment, or award a new trial.* The entry of judgment was a thing of course; and in justice and sound policy, the verdict ought to be equally conclusive against a further litigation between the same parties, on the same matter, as if the formal entry of judgment had been made.

¶2Judgment reversed.

¶3Laws of N. Y. vol. 1 p. 491—502.

¶4 2 Burr. 698. 4 Comyns, 89. Evid. A. 5.

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