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2 Johns. Ch. 144

Wiggins v. Armstrong

New York Court of Chancery

Decided June 12, 1816

New York Court of Chancery · decided 1816-06-12

[ * 145 ] THE bill stated, that the defendant Doty, on the 24th of October, 1815, purchased of the plaintiffs goods to the value of 1,262 dollars and 55 cents, on a credit of six months, which sum was now due. That the defendant Doty, in 1815, gave the plaintiffs his note for 1,255 dollars, for other goods sold, and which note was due, and a balance thereon unpaid of 609 dollars and 18 cents.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The reason of the rule seems to be, that until the creditor has established his title, he has no right to interfere, and it would lead to an unnecessary, and, perhaps, a fruitless and oppressive interruption of the exercise of the debtor's rights.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Grupo Mexicano Desarrollos v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc

“unless he has a certain-claim upon the property of the debtor he has no concern with his frauds.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Scott v. Neely

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1816-06-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2016 · most notably Grupo Mexicano Desarrollos v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc, Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. (1999)

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 16 state decisions

70181618201830184018501860187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

The Chancellor.

¶1[ *146 ]

¶2This is the case of a creditor on simple contract, after an action commenced at law, and before judgment, seeking to control the disposition of the property of his debtor, under judgments, and executions, upon the ground of fraud. My first impression was in favor of the plaintiffs; but upon examination of the cases, I am satisfied that a creditor at large, and before judgment and execution, cannot be entitled to the interference which has been granted in this case. In Angell v. Draper, (1 Vern. 399.) and Shirley v. Watts, (3 Atk. 200.) it was held, that the creditor must have completed his title at law, by judgment and execution, before he can question the disposition of the debtor’s property ; and in Bennet v. Musgrave, (2 Ves. 51.) and in a case before Lord Nottingham, cited in Balch v. Wastall, (1 P. Wms. 445.) the same doctrine was declared, and so it is understood by the elementary writers. (Mitford, 115. Cooper, Equ. Pl. 149.) The reason of the rule seems to be, that until the creditor has *established his title, he has no right to interfere, and it would lead to an unnecessary, and, perhaps, a fruitless and oppressive interruption of the exercise of the debtor’s rights. Unless he has a certain claim upon the property of the debtor, he has no concern with his frauds. On the strength of settled authorities, I shall, accordingly, grant the motion for dissolving the injunction.

¶3Motion granted.

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