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2 Johns. Ch. 511

Livingston v. Hubbs

New York Court of Chancery

Decided July 8, 1817

New York Court of Chancery · decided 1817-07-08

THE bill charged, that Daniel Baldwin, in his lifetime, procured a deed from the plaintiff, of a house and lot, in Brooklyn, by fraudulent representations and practices; and that the defendant Hubbs was concerned with Baldwin in the fraud; and that, immediately after the deed was so procured, Baldwin confessed a judgment to Hubbs for 839 dollars, which Hubbs, shortly thereafter, assigned to the defendant Bobbins, and, as the bill charged, with knowledge of the fraud.

Cited by 3 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 1864

2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1817-07-08

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The Chancellor.

¶1*512[ * 513 ]

¶2*511The allegation of fraud is abundantly established; and the only point admitting of any real discussion is, how far Bobbins, who appeared to be a purchaser of the judgment for a valuable consideration, and to whom no charge of fraud could be imputed, was to be protected in his lien on the land. Bobbins purchased the judgment subject *512to all the equity of the plaintiff against it, while it existed in the hands of Hubbs; and as the title of Baldwin was infected with gross fraud, it was *null from the beginning. The fraudulent judgment, therefore, created no valid subsisting lien. The title to the land never passed from the plaintiff; and there is no rule of law, or equity, to protect the judgment in the hands of Bobbins, though he may be an assignee for a valuable consideration, without notice of the fraud, for he took the assignment of the judgment at his peril. He took it subject to all the existing rights of the debtor; and these rights could not be varied, or affected, by the assignment, though, perhaps, the right of a third person, depending upon a secret trust, might be affected. (Murray & Winter v. Lylburn and others.) The judgment was not an article of ordinary commerce, and it would be repugnant to justice and sound policy, to permit fraud to be successful by such a contrivance.

¶3The land, therefore, must be decreed to be reconveyed to the plaintiff, discharged of the judgment, and a perpetual injunction awarded against the execution of the judgment upon that land.

¶4Decree accordingly.

¶5Ante, 441.

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