Volume 2 — Maryland Appellate Reports

FALSE PRETENSES — <italic>Three-Year Sentence Held Proper</italic>. Where appellant, who had given a forged check for $85.30, was indicted for forgery but pleaded guilty to a count in the indictment charging false pretenses, a sentence of three years was within the penalty prescribed by statute. Code (1957), Art. 27, sec. 140. p. 130 PROBATION AND PAROLE — <italic>Imposition Of Suspended Sentence Held</italic><italic>Proper</italic>. Where appellant had been sentenced to six months in jail and such sentence had been suspended and appellant had been placed on probation for two years, imposition of the suspended sentence to begin beyond the two-year period was held proper where a violation of probation occurred within the two-year period and appellant had entered a plea of guilty at the hearing on his violation. Charter and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, sec. 279. pp. 130-131 POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE — <italic>Guilty Plea Constitutes Waiver Of</italic><italic>Nonjurisdictional Defects</italic>. A guilty plea, freely and intelligently made, operates of itself as a conviction of the highest order and constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects. p. 131 POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE — <italic>Illegal Arrest As Grounds For</italic><italic>Relief</italic>. An illegal arrest, plus the use of evidence obtained through the arrest, may in some circumstances afford grounds for post conviction relief. p. 132 POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE — <italic>Case Remanded To Permit Lower</italic><italic>Court To Make Finding Upon Contention Raised Below</italic>. Where the lower court failed to make any finding as to applicant's contention as to the admission of illegal evidence, application for leave to appeal was granted and the case remanded in order to<page_number>Page 128</page_number> permit the lower court to pass upon such contention and to clarify its reasons for denying three additional contentions raised in applicant's original petition. Rule BK 45 b. p. 133 <italic>Decided September 29, 1967</italic>.

PAROLE AND PROBATION — <italic>Right To Counsel — Case Remanded</italic><italic>Where Probationer Lacked Counsel At Revocation Hearing And State</italic><italic>Was Represented By Counsel Who Had Defended Probationer At</italic><italic>Original Trial</italic>. Where an indigent probationer was not represented by counsel at a revocation hearing wherein the order suspending his original sentence was rescinded, and the State was represented by the same counsel who had represented probationer at his original trial, it was held that the totality of circumstances was so offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness as to amount to a denial of due process; and probationer's case was therefore remanded for a full evidentiary hearing upon this specific aspect of the revocation hearing. pp. 160-162<page_number>Page 160</page_number> <italic>Decided September 29, 1967</italic>.

ARREST — <italic>When Arrest May Be Made Without Warrant — Existence</italic><italic>Of Probable Cause — Police Broadcast May Furnish Probable</italic><italic>Cause</italic>. An arrest and search may be made without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has in fact been committed, and that the arrestee committed it. pp. 427-428 Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious person in believing that a felony has been committed by the person arrested. p. 428 A report of a felony and a description of the perpetrators broadcast over a police radio may furnish probable cause for an arrest. p. 428 Where police officers, although their action in stopping appellant's automobile amounted only to an accosting to determine the identity of the vehicle's occupants, observed inside the automobile a jacket which had been described over the police broadcast as that worn by a robbery suspect, they were justified, in light of other information in their possession, in arresting appellant and his companion. p. 428<page_number>Page 425</page_number> <italic>Decided November 16, 1967</italic>.