Volume 2 — Nevada Reports

<p>If one locates a mining claim for himself and others, and then enters into a contract for himself and on behalf of the co-locators to give a part of the ground for developing the mine, can the parties whose name he has used in the location accept of their interest in the mine without also ratifying the contract for developing the mine ?</p> <p>In such case, if the acting locator draws up a contract with prospectors, which shows on its face that it was intended to be executed, not only by the party preparing the instrument, but also by others, whose names were attached without their knowledge to the notice of location, these latter are not bound until they sign the contract. The acting locator does not, in such case, profess to act for his associates.</p> <p>An agent cannot bind his principal by a wn-itten instrument, unless it appears from the instrument itself he was acting for the principal.</p> <p>After notices of location were posted and recorded, and the limits of the mine determined, all the locators became tenants in common. The acting locators could not dispose of the interests of their co-tenants.</p> <p>If a contract between prospectors and the several locators of a mine is drafted, and signed by part only of the locators, if the prospectors go on to work, it is at their own risk. Those not signing or consenting to the contract are not bound.</p> <p>If, however, all had been consulted and agreed to the contract, and permitted the prospectors to go on with the work, probably they might have been compelled to a specific performance, although some of them had neglected to sign the contract. But the contract could not be enforced against one who never assented to it.</p>

Appealed from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Hon. S. H. Wright presiding. Facts stated in the opinion. Opinion by Beattt, J., full Bench concurring. The Court below erred in setting aside judgment by default. There was no evidence showing the judgment by default was “ taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” The Court failed to impose the payment of costs as a condition precedent to setting the judgment aside.

<p>In cases of doubtful' construction, the debates of a Legislative body may bo resorted to, to determine the meaning of a law. But this only in cases where the language of the law is so ambiguous as not clearly to show the meaning intended to be conveyed.</p> <p>In interpreting doubtful statutes, the primary object is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.</p> <p>This intent is to be gathered, first, from the language of the statute, next from the mischiefs intended to be suppressed, or benefits to be attained.</p> <p>If one clause of a statute is ambiguous, the whole Act is to be examined to explain or remove that ambiguity.</p> <p>Considering the form in which the 158th section of the Stamp Act passed the Lower House of Congress ; the amendment and proviso added thereto in the Senate; the effect which that amendment was admitted to have, both by its friends and opponents; the subsequent amendments of the law by an Act which gives a legislative interpretation to that section; and the general object and intention of the law — it seems more reasonable to construe the terms “ such instrument” in the latter part of that section as referring to all unstamped instruments, rather than as being confined to those which were left unstamped with a fraudulent intent to evade the revenue.</p> <p>The former opinion of this Court on this point is hold erroneous, and it is held that notes issued under the Act of June 3d, 1864, not properly stamped, were void.</p>

Richard S. Mesick, presiding. The facts are stated in the opinion. First — The Court had no power to set aside the verdict and its judgment after the adjournment of the term. (Baldwin v. Kramer, 2 Cal. 588 ; Morrison v. Bapman, 3 Cal. 255 ; Shaw v. Me Gregor, 8 Cal. 521; Robb v. Robb, 6 Cal.. 22; Suydan v. Pitcher, 4 Cal. 281; Castro v. Richardson, 25 Cal. 49.) Second — It is not competent for a Court to supply the deficient acts of parties by an order nunc pro tunc.

<p>RESPONSE TO PETITION EOR RE-HEARING.</p> <p>A Court of Chancery, by a proper proceeding and in a proper case, may set aside a judgment rendered by a Common Law Court; but relief is granted on the very ground that the Law Court has lost jurisdiction of the case, so that it cannot afford the proper remedy.</p>

Caleb Bukbanic presiding. This was an action on a promissory note for $1500 and for $800 loaned without note. The note was alleged to have been executed in April, 1864, and the money loaned without note in May, 1864. The answer denied the execution of the note and the borrowing of the money. On trial, it appeared that in January, 1864, plaintiff had loaned defendant $5000, on mortgage.

S. H. Wright presiding. The facts are stated in the opinion. The judgment is in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, and under that stipulation there can be no decree for sale of mortgaged premises.

S. H. Wright presiding. W. C. Wallace, for appellants, made the points that the judgment was not in conformity to the relief sought in the complaint, to wit: the return of the property and damages for the taking and detention. And also that a number of the instructions given were erroneous. The instructions were not passed on by the Court, and are therefore not noticed more fully here.

<p>A judgment which is personal against the tax-payer, and in rem against real estate, is a debt within the purview of the Act of Congress, which makes certain United States notes a legal tender for debts.</p> <p>A debt is a legal obligation or liability to pay a sum certain, and may arise from contract as from some liability imposed by law, and not arising out of contract in its more limited sense. Per Beatty, J.</p> <p>If a more extended definition is given to the term contract so as to include all judgments within that term, then it must also include the liability to pay taxes. Per Beatty, J.</p> <p>All judgments for money, and all taxes payable in money, and for which an action might be brought against the delinquent, are debts. Per Beatty, J. The State may impose taxes payable in gold, where no debt is created.</p> <p>She may impose stamp duties and not part with the stamps until the purchaser pays gold for them. She may require license to be taken out and not issue such license until it is paid for in gold. But all judgments in favor of the State are debts, and may be paid in paper. Beatty, J.</p> <p>Taxes are not debts within the purview of the Act of Congress referred to. Per Brosnan, J.</p> <p>But if the State goes into Court and obtains a judgment for these taxes against the person of the tax-payer, this personal judgment becomes a debt, and- like other debts may be discharged in paper. Per Brosnan, J.</p>

<p>The Act creating a sinking fund for Douglas County, and regulating the mode of advertisement for and receipt of bids “ until the next regular meeting of the Board of County Commissioners of said county thereafter,” does not authorize the receipt or consideration of a bid filed with the Treasurer on the day of the next regular meeting, but at a time subsequent to the meeting and adjournment for that day.</p> <p>The Board of County Commissioners is not a Court, as Courts are defined in the Constitution. And such bodies may lawfully meet and transact business on the first day of January.</p>

Wm. IlAYDON’presiding. The declaration in this case alleges that plaintiff is, and for a long time has been, the owner of, and in possession of, a certain water right and mill site, situate in Gold Canon, Silver City, and bounded as follows: Here follows description of corners, lands, courses, distances, etc., embracing a small tract of land over which a small mountain stream flows.

<p>An agreement between some of the parties to a suit in equity cannot be the founda. tion for a decree, when there is nothing in the pleadings on which to base such decree. ,</p> <p>When there was litigation between Low, on one side, and a widow and her infant daughter on the other, as to the ownership of certain property, and it was agreed to compromise the litigation by first perfecting the title in Low, upon which he was to convey a part of the property to the widow. This will not authorize a decree declaring the widow has no title, and then requiring Low to convey, as per terms of compromise. Such a decree does not dispose of the infant’s claim.</p> <p>Low would not be bound to convey whilst the claim of the infant remains unadjusted, nor until after his title was perfected.</p>

<p>APPLICATION EOR A WRIT OE PROHIBITION,</p> <p>An Order of Prohibition may issue from this Court in a proper case to arrest the progress of a trial. But such order should not issue when there is other and adequate remedy.</p> <p>The office of such writ is not to correct errors, but to prevent Courts transcending the boundaries of their jurisdiction.</p> <p>When, in an action of ejectment, the defendant, in addition to its legal defenses, sets up also an equitable defense, and asks affirmative relief, to wit: to declare that the deed under which plaintiff claims is only a mortgage, and this equitable branch of the case is tried separately from and disposed of before trying tlie legal defense : Held, that an order made and entered up in the form of a decree declaring that the instrument was not a mortgage, but a valid deed, conveying title to plaintiff, is not a final judgment from which defendant can appeal. There cannot be two final judgments in the same action.</p> <p>When there are two distinct defenses, it is not the proper practice to impannel one jury to try the equitable defense, and another the legal defense. It is, however, proper to keep the two defenses separate. The Judge, himself, may first hear and determine the equitable side of the case; or, if in doubt, he may submit special issues to the jury who are to try the law side of the case.</p> <p>Upon this writ of prohibition we cannot review an interlocutory order made in the Court below. That can only be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment.</p>

R. S. Mesick presiding. Respondent waived any objections there might be to the taking of the deposition in this form by appearing and proposing cross-interrogatories, without objecting.

<p>Section 8, Article VIII, of the Constitution, requiring the Legislature to pass a general law for the organization of cities and towns is inoperative until acted upon by the Legislature.</p> <p>Such sections, if standing alone, and not qualified by any other section of the Constitution, might raise a strong implied prohibition against the Legislature passing any special laws on the same subject.</p> <p>Section 1, Article VIII, by much stronger implication, seems to reserve to the Legislature the power to pass special laws in regard to municipal corporations : that is, to create them; or, at least, to confer special and additional powers after they are in existence.</p> <p>The City of Virginia was a municipal- corporation when the Constitution was adopted, and has never ceased to be a corporation.</p> <p>The law amending the charter is, therefore, constitutional.</p> <p>The products of mines are personal property, and as such subject to taxation for municipal purposes.</p> <p>All property within the municipality is subject to one annual taxation, and it makes no difference that it is removed beyond the corporate limits before the amqunt of tax is specified; or the mode of collecting established.</p> <p>The Constitution requires that all ad valorem taxes shall be as nearly equal as may be. We cannot see that the mode of assessing the products of mines violates that principle of equality.</p> <p>The municipal authorities of the City of Virginia may add a penalty for refusing to give the Assessor proper information to enable him properly to assess the products of a mine.</p>

Richard Rising presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. It is error to enter judgment for gold coin.

<p>On Appeal from the First Judicial District, Hon. Richard Rising presiding.</p>

<p>On Appeal from the Eirst Judicial District Court, Hon. Richard Rising presiding.</p>

<p>Appealed from First District Court, Hon. Richard Rising presiding.</p>

Richard Rising presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The District Court having control of its own process, had jurisdiction to entertain and grant this motion. (8 Cal. 134; 14 ibid. 158, ibid. 177 ; 16 ibid. 202, Nash. Dig. Ohio, pp. 285, 286; paragraphs 2-5; 4 Scam. 374; 14 Cal. 667.) Execution sales made under an irregular judgment which has been modified or revised, will be set aside.

<p>A judgment for gold coin is erroneous.</p> <p>The cost bill was filed within two days after “the decision of the Court.”</p>

E. F. Dunne presiding. The testimony that the constable’s return was false should have been admitted. (Baker v. McDuffie, 23 Wend. 289 ; Crocker on Sheriffs, p. 27, Sec. 45 ; Phil, on Ev., Cow. & Hd. 2 Pt., p. 296; Dubois v. Dubois, 2 Wend. 418, 3 Monroe, 349; Serrón v. Sughes, 25 Cal. 563.) The return may be attached even between the parties when the whole proceedings are void.

Richard S. Mesick presiding. The facts, so far as they relate to points decided, are fully stated in the Opinion. First — The Court adopted an erroneous rule in estimating damages. There being no proof before the Court of the value of stock at the time of trial, there was no basis for a judgment. (Smith v. North American Co., 1 Nevada, 442.) Second — The judgment for damages could only be alternative, on failure to deliver stock.

D. Virgin presiding. The facts of this case are fully stated in the Opinion given in the case. Pirst.

Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District, Hon. C. O. Goodwin presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained. It was defective in these particulars: . It does not show the attachment in case of Bowers v. Atkinson was based on a sufficient affidavit and undertaking filed, in that case. Nor that the case was one in which such writ might legally issue.

Richard Rising presiding. The facts in the case are sufficiently stated in the Opinion. The District Court had no jurisdiction of this case, because it had been appealed to the Supreme Court, and no -remittitur from this Court had been filed in 'the District Court. The remittitur consists of a copy of the judgment and opinion of this Court. A copy of the judgment in this Court not accompanied by the opinion is not a remittitur.

<p>A direction in a foreclosure decree to sell mortgaged property for gold coin only', is injurious to one holding a subsequent lien, and such subsequent lien-holder may appeal from the judgment and have it reversed.</p> <p>There being nothing in the record on which this Court could act in setting aside the alleged sale under an erroneous judgment, the appellant must seek his remedy by motion in the Court below.</p>

This was a petition for Mandamus from this Court directed to the Hon. S. H. Wright, District Judge of the Second Judicial District. The facts are fully stated in the Opinion.

Richard Rising presiding. The demurrer should have been sustained to the original action, because it was brought by a part only of the tenants in common.

Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial District, Hon. R. S. Mesick presiding. The Court below erred in holding that the right of a miner is merely equivalent to a license to extract the precious metals from the earth. They have a right to the possession of the soil. (Watts v. White, 13 Cal. 324; Merrill v. Judd, 14 Cal. 64; Hughes v. JDevelin, 23 Cal. 501; Q-ore v. McBrayer, 18 Cal. 582; Richardson v. McNulty, 24 Cal. 345.

S. II. Wright presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. 1st. The Court erred in assessing the damage without proof of the value of legal tender notes on the day of trial. The contract, if good for any sum in excess of $2,500, was only so upon proof of the depreciated value of treasury notes at the time of the trial and date of the judgment.

R. S. Mesick presiding. On the twelfth of August, 1863, the owners of certain property in Virginia City, executed to M. Abrams a mortgage to secure the payment of $6,000 and interest. $3,000 were loaned, and note taken at the time the mortgage was executed, and M. Abrams agreed to advance the other three thousand as soon as certain improvements were made on the mortgaged property. In due time the other three thousand were advanced, and a second note executed.

Richard Rising presiding. This was a bill filed by C. L. Low against Alpheus Staples and others, in which the plaintiff alleges that Joseph Brown, one of the defendants, ivas one of the original locators of a mining claim now known as the Crown Point claim; that Brown sold his interest to one Brobant by bill of sale, Brobant to one Robinson, and Robinson to Lindauer and Fleishhacker, from whom plaintiff holds by several mesne conveyances; that Brown’s bill of sale to…

Richard Rising presiding. All the facts necessary to an understanding of the -points decided are stated in the Opinion. The Court erred in permitting the bills to be introduced in evidence. They do not, on their face, purport to be the bills of defendants, and parol evidence is not admissible to prove them such.

S. H. Wright presiding. The facts appear in the Opinion. The Court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to the panel, that the Sheriff had not made his return until the first day of the term. (Statutes 1864-5, p. 137, sec. 3.) The Court erred in overruling the objection to the panel, that the Judge and County Assessor had failed to return the proper certificate of the drawing of the' jury as by law required.

R. S. Mesick presiding. There is no equitable lien in favor of the mortgagees. This equitable lien only arises in marshaling the assets of any insolvent firm, and is worked out by the equities existing between the partners, and not otherwise. (See Story’s Equity, vol. 2, secs. 1,252, 1,253.) The complaint is framed to enforce a mortgage, and not an equitable lien.

Richard Rising presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. There was no immediate delivery of the mules from House to Carpenter. The instructions given by the Court ignore the necessity of such immediate delivery. The change of possession must be exclusive and immediate. (Chitty on Contracts, page 414, 6th American edition; Vance v. Boynton, 8 Cal. 562; Qheeney v. Palmer, 6 Cal. 119.) It must be immediate and continuous.

Richard Rising presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. Cradlebaugh urged the point, that the Territorial Legislature had no -authority to grant the exclusive use of the Carson River to the assignors of the plaintiff. Whitman argued that a corporation can only exercise such powers as are expressly conferred. Here there was no power to collect tolls. The powers of corporations are to be construed strictly. A franchise is not the subject of sale.

Richard Risins presiding. • The facts are stated in the Opinion. When the mining association of Fairfax, Doake & Co. became incorporated for the purpose of more effectually carrying out and executing the original purpose of the association, and the corporation accepted a transfer of all the property of the association, it became liable, primarily, for all its debts.

E. F. Dunn presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The mortgage being executed by one party in California, and at a subsequent time by the other party in this State, did not become an executed instrument until the latter party executed it. Even if the mortgage must be treated as executed by Evans in California, still Edwards executed it in Nevada, and his interest in the property was certainly bound.

<p>This Court cannot reverse a judgment for want of sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, unless the record shows that all the material evidence is before us.</p> <p>When a party draws a pistol with the avowed intention of killing another, third parties interfere to prevent the threat being carried out; the pistol goes off, and the party threatened is killed; the natural presumption would be that the defendant had succeeded in carrying out his intention, notwithstanding the interference. If the defendant claims that the pistol went off accidentally in the scuffle with the bystanders who interfered to prevent the shooting, it lies on him to present some proof of that fact.</p> <p>Evidence of threats made by defendant may be proved not only to establish the killing, but when the killing is admitted, for the purpose of establishing motive or deliberation.</p> <p>When a threat is made against a party, unless he will do something which he fails to do, and the threat is afterwards executed, it would seem to be as conclusive as if it had not been connected with a condition.</p> <p>If the threat was made only conditionally, and the party threatened afterwards complied with the condition, this would, to a great extent, rebut the presumption arising from the threat.</p>

W. II. Beatty presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The defendant was not guilty of embracery. He did not attempt to corruptly influence a jury. He was not guilty of any attempt to commit a crime known to the law. He only proposed to another to commit an offense against law. A mere proposal to commit an offense does not amount to an attempt. (March Guivits v. The People, 7 Barb. p. 891; Bouvier’s Law Die., “ Attempt”; People v. Murray, 14 Cal. p. 160.)

C. C. Goodwin presiding. This was a bill filed against the County Commissioners of Washoe County, to restrain them from opening a public highway through the lands of the plaintiff. The grounds relied upon to support the injunction were, that no damages had been assessed for the use of the land dedicated to the public, and no provision made for the payment of any damages that might arise. The District Court refused to grant the injunction, and dismissed the bill.

S. H. Wright, Judge of the Second Judicial District, presiding. The plaintiff took up a piece of land on Desert Creek, for agricultural purposes, and used the waters of the creek for purposes of irrigation. Subsequently the defendants took up a piece of the public land higher up, and on or near the same creek, and also used the waters of the creek for irrigation.

C. C. Goodwin presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. No possession under any statutory provision was proved, and no actual occupation was shown. (Murphy v. Walling sfor d, 6 Cal. 649, and Kile v. Tubbs, 23 Cal. 435.) The verdict was against law, because it was contrary to the instructions of the Court.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Lyon County, Hon. W. Haydon presiding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the Opinion.</p>

Appealed from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Lyon County, Hon. W. Haydon presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The verdict was against the weight of evidence. The proof was of a delivery which, although not made precisely at the time of delivery of bill of sale, was yet immediate, as that term is used in the statute.

R. S. Mesick presiding. Tbe facts are stated in tbe Opinion. cited tbe following authorities to show that a verdict will be set aside merely on tbe ground that it is against tbe weight of evidence: 7 Mass. 261; 18 Mass. 507; 20 Pick. 285-9; 15 Pick. 291; 1 Met. 221; 7 How.

<p>A party holding a mortgage is not barred of Ms right to foreclose the same until four years shall have elapsed from the accruing of the action, although the statute may have barred an action at law on the debt before that time.</p> <p>A party talcing a second mortgage during the period intervening between the time when the statute bars the action at law, and when it bars the proceeding to foreclose, holds his lien subject to the first mortgage.</p>

<p>When a party dies owing a debt not barred by the Statute of Limitations at his death, the holder of the claim has one year after administration granted on the debtor’s estate, within which to bring his action, although the action would have been barred in less than one year, if the debtor had lived.</p> <p>This extension of the-timo within which the action may be brought is subject only to this qualification, that if the claim is presented to the administrator and rejected, suit must be brought thereon within three months after rejection.</p> <p>This twelve months’ extension applies to all classes of cases, as well those debts contracted out of the State, and which are otherwise barred by six months’ limitar tion, as others.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Ormsby County, Hon. S. H. Wright presiding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the Opinion.</p>

S. II. Chase presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The appellant was only a surety or guarantor. The bond given should be held merely as a statutory undertaking to release property under attachment. (Parsons on Contracts, Vol. II, pp. 67-8; McWilliams v. Dana, 18 Cal. 339.) The answer does not show that the execution was stayed by the stipulation between attorneys entered into when judgment was rendered.

This was a writ of certiorari issued from this Court upon the petition of Thomas H. Williams et al., defendants in the suit of H. Gr. Maynard against Isaac Railey et al., to the District Court of the Second Judicial District, requiring that Court to show by what authority certain orders were made in relation to the appointment of a receiver, and the taking possession of certain property.

R. S. Mesick, Judge of tbe First Judicial District, presiding. The facts are stated in tbe Opinion of tbe Court. Tbis Appeal is authorized by Statutes of 1861, p. 486, sec. 469. It is in tbe discretion of tbe Court to exclude a witness from testifying, who has improperly, and in violation of tbe order of tbe Court, come in whilst other witnesses are testifying.

<p>When a complaint charges a sale and delivery of goods, it is not sufficient for defendant in his answer, to say lie never “had or requested” any goods of plaintiff. There must be a direct and not argumentative denial of the sale and delivery.</p> <p>In Response to Petition eor Re-hearing.</p> <p>When an answer is put in defective only in form, plaintiff should demur, and not move for judgment on the pleadings. He cannot, by moving for judgment on the pleadings, deprive defendant of the right to amend.</p> <p>It is not right to compel the unsuccessful party in this Court to pay the costs of appeal as a condition precedent to making his defense in the Court below.</p>

Appeal 'from a judgment of the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Ormsby County, Hon. S. H. Wright presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. This is a proceeding in rem, and Chapcery has jurisdiction. (21 Cal. p. 24; 9 Cal. 125; 10 Cal. 380-555; 4 John. Ch. Cases, 616 ; 9 Cal. 426.) The section of the Probate Act which prohibits sales except by order of the Probate Court, refers only to sales made by executors or administrators.

Matter of Habeas Corpus on petition of Terence Gr. Smith to the Supreme Court of Nevada. The judgment was void for the reason that an interval of six hours did not transpire, as the statute requires, between the plea of guilty and the sentence passed by the Court. The Warden of the Penitentiary, under the statute, is only authorized to detain a prisoner in custody when he has a copy of the judgment ordering the imprisonment.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Hon. O. C. Goodwin presiding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the Opinion.</p>

Richard Rising presiding. First. — The Court helow erred in allowing Mr. Mitchell, one of the respondents, who was a witness in the cause, to testify as to communications made to him during the transaction of the business out of which this suit has grown.

R. S. Mesick presiding. The facts are stated in the Opinion. The Court in this proceeding could not oust defendant without holding that relator had title to the office. (Laws of 1864-5, p. 165, secs. 7 and 8.) The defendant, having rightfully entered, ivas entitled to hold the office until his successor was legally elected.-- Defendant was entitled to hold until after the election in 1866.

Hon. S. H. Wright presiding. The facts appear in the Opinion. The testimony shows that at the time of the purchase by defendants, Hayt and Hill had a claim to a portion of the property bought adverse to Walter, and that it was known to Walter. That the vendee cannot resist successfully, a suit for the purchase money while in peaceable and quiet possession, or without showing an outstanding paramount title in a third person, need not be controverted ; for that is not the case.

<p>An answer palpably frivolous, or not verified when it should be, may be stricken out on motion, and if, after a reasonable time given to perfect such answer, it is not done, judgment may be rendered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.</p> <p>It being apparent that the appeal was taken simply for delay, five per cent, upon the judgment was awarded to the respondent as damages.</p>

This was a motion made in the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada to correct what was alleged tobe a clerical error in a judgment entered up in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Nevada. The other facts necessary to understand the points decided are stated in the opinion of the Court. This Court is the successor to the Territorial Supreme Court.

<p>PETITION FOR MANDAMUS.</p> <p>The filing of a notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal in a Justice’s Court after the rendition of a verdict by the jury, but before the entry of judgment thereon, does not deprive the Justice of authority to enter up judgment on the verdict.</p> <p>A Justice should enter up judgment immediately on the rendition of a verdict. But if he omits to do so the day the verdict is rendered, still he may complete his record by afterwards entering the judgment.</p>

<p>PETITION FOR MANDAMUS.</p> <p>Sections four and five of the Act of March 12th, 1866, in regard to the consolidation and payment of the debts of Ormsby County, are ambiguous as to one point, and equally capable of either construction, as to whether there shall be paid out on bids for the surrender of County indebtedness, all money in the Redemption Fund when the bidding is closed, or only such money as is in the Fund the day an advertisement for bids is first published. The former construction being most beneficial to the public, will be adopted.</p>

R. S. Mesick presiding. The facts appear in the Opinion. 1st. The section of the statute on which appellant relies is unconstitutional and void; no Court has the power to enter such order as provided by the section — certainly not against the sureties of the Sheriff — they must have their day in Court. 2d. The only ground upon which the section referred to can be maintained is, that the Court may have power over its officer to make such order as that contemplated by the…