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2 N.H. 546

White v. Demary

Superior Court of New Hampshire

Decided May 15, 1823

Superior Court of New Hampshire · decided 1823-05-15

Two cannot fee made jointly liable for a tort, unless they did the injury jointly. Where property is bailed to two, a demand on one alone will not subject the other to an action sounding ex delictu. A-demand at the house of one is insufficient, unless under such circumstances as t® raise a presumption of actual notice to him before the commencement of the action.

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently January 1868

2 state decisions

Cited in Bouvier (1914)’s definition of “Is L.R.A”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1823-05-15

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Woodbury, J.

¶1WThen an action sounds in tort, and isa- . gainst more than one person, judgment cannot be had against more than one without, evidence of a joint wrong. A separate wrong by each entitles the sufferer to only a separate action against each. 1 Maule & Selw. 588, Nicoll vs. Glennia.—4 Inst. 317.—2 Phil. Ev. 125.

¶2Here is no pretence of a joint conversion, unless the de - mand on one and his refusal was ipso facto or de jure, a demand and refusal as to both. Had this action been ex con-tractu, a neglect of one would have subjected both. 13 Mass. Rep. 295, Griswold vs. Plumb.

¶3But being ex delictu, the defendants, to be all liable, must all have actually perpetrated the wrong, or directed it to be done. See authorities before, and 13 East 197, May et al vs. Harvey.

¶4Whether the visit to the house of one of the defendants was the time when a demand was made on the other, does not appear ; but had it been so, the visit there with a view to make a demand would be insufficient to render the person absent a tort feazer, however it might subject him to an action on the contract.

¶5A demand to sustain trover, may be sufficient, if left in writing at the defendant’s house; (1 Es. Ca. 22, Logan vs. Houlditch; 32, Thompson vs. Shirley.—Clayton 122.—1 Gow.N. P. 69.—2 Phil.Ev. 120.—1 John. Ca, 406) but as this principle is predicated on the idea that the defendant gets the information and afterwards neglects his duty to restore the property, the demand so made is invalid, unless it was so long before the commencement of the action as to raise a presumption of his return home and of his unwillingness to re-deliver the anieles demanded. 6 East 538, M’Combie vs. Davis.—4 Es. Ca. 112.

¶6Judgment on the Nonsuit,

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