The appellee, King, brought his bill in equity in the district court of the third judicial district of the territory of New Mexico, within and for the county of Grant, against the appellant, Warrington, to have the deed therein mentioned, declared a mortgage, and for redemption of the same. The bill charges and the answer admits that the deed, although absolute on its face, was given as a mortgage to secure the payment of the sum of $110 due from King to Warrington. According to the plaintiff the property was to be redeemed at any time within five. years, according to the defendant, two years, which would expire in September, 1879, and which was fixed as the time. Both parties agree in the statement that Warrington was to do the assessment work necessary to hold the property under the mining laws of the United States.

Warrington sets up in his answer and testifies that he after-wards extended this time to December 15, 1879, and says that he then told King that if he did not pay the money by that time he might not get the property. This is what the defendant calls the “new contract.” On December 3, 1879, $100 was paid Warrington by King, towards the extinguishment of the debt. Prior to the filing of his bill King caused the sum of $500, which was in excess of the amount due to Warrington for the original loan and for advances made by Warrington for annual assessment work on the mine, to be tendered to Warrington, who refused to accept the same, claiming that he owned the mine absolutely. There was a decree for the complainant, and Warrington appeals.

I. The deed, though absolute in its terms, but given simply as security for the payment of money, is a mortgage with all the incidents of that instrument, and the rights and obligations of the parties are the same as if the deed had been subject to a defeasance expressed in the body thereof or executed simultaneously with it: Odell v. Monbross, 68 N. Y., 499; Perry on Trusts (3d ed.) vol. 1, foot note 5, p. 272; Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 2, p. 202, sec. 1018; Hilliard on Mortgages, vol. 1, p. 32, sec. 2.

II. The subsequent agreement set up in the answer is not sustained by the proof, but even if it were, it would be invalid and could not cancel the complainant’s right to redeem. A mortgage being intended simply for security, and the nature of the transaction affording opportunity and temptation to the lender to take advantage of the necessities of the borrower, courts of equity have strenuously resisted all attempts to abridge the right of redemption, and held express agreement for that purpose to be wholly void. The maxim upon which they proceed is: “ Once a mortgage, always a mortgageHilliard on Mortgages, vol. 1, p. 69, et seg.\ Kent’s Commentaries, vol. 4 (11th ed.), pp. 173-4, see. 159, foot note C.

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