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2 R.I. 112

Gardiner v. Chace

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Decided March 6, 1852

Supreme Court of Rhode Island · decided 1852-03-06

Action for freight upon lumber transported for the defendant in the plaintiff’s ship, the Virginia, from Providence to San Francisco, as by the following bill of lading : Shipped in good order and well conditioned, by Caleb Chace, in and upon the brig called the Virginia, whereof is master, Bennet, now in the harbor of Providence and bound for San Francisco, U. G., to say five thousand clapboards and two thousand feet of joist, these goods to be received from the vessel…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1852-03-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently July 1954

4 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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By the Court.

¶1 We do not think this testimony is competent. The paper, which is produced, is an agreement between the parties to carry certain lumber from Providence to California, at the rate of $48 per thousand, for clapboards and $70 per thousand feet for joist. This is the written contract. The evidence proposes to set up a verbal contract, according to which the plaintiff was to have these rates of freight if the proceeds of the sale should amount to so much, but if not, the amount produced by the sale. The bill of lading is absolute in its terms, the verbal contract is conditional. Undoubtedly a bill of lading may be contradicted in certain particulars. It is a contract of a complex character. It is partly a receipt acknowledging the shipment of the articles, and as such, open to the rule of law applicable to receipts. It is partly a contract specifying the terms upon which the articles are to be carried, and as such cannot be contradicted by parol evidence. There is, also, a large class of cases, in which it has been held that where there is a written contract to do a certain thing, parol evidence may be admitted to show that a different time or place of performance was agreed upon. But here it is not proposed to change the time or place, but to change the obligation itself, making a contract, which is absolute in its terms, conditional, and if the evidence does not contradict the contract, it at least varies it, which is equally fatal.

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