2 So. 3d 445 - State v. Davenport’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

91 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 91 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In the past, this Court has ordered the trial court to properly advise defendant of the prescriptive period under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 by written notice within ten days of the rendition of this Court’s opinion and then to file written proof in the record that defendant received the notice. However, in State v. Morris, 40,322 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So.2d 359, 363 , the Second Circuit corrected this error patent by way of its opinion rather than a remand. State v. Davenport, 08-463, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 445, 457 .”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 90 So. 3d 1 - State v. Escobar-Rivera · 77 So. 3d 378 - State v. Keller

2. “Voluntary intoxication is a defense to a prosecution for simple burglary only if the circumstances indicate that it has precluded the presence of specific criminal intent. La. R.S. 14:15(2). The de fendant has the burden of proving the existence of that condition at the time of the offense. The specific legal question is not when the requisite specific intent was formed, but rather whether, at the time the unauthorized entry occurred, the defendant was so intoxicated as to preclude the existence of any specific intent on his part to commit a theft or felony therein. State v. Davenport, 08-468 (La.App. 5th Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 445 ; State v. Godbolt, 2006-0609 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So.2d 727 . When circumstances exist that intoxication could have precluded specific intent, the burden shifts to the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that specific intent was present. Whether intoxication is sufficient to negate specific intent is a question for the trier of fact. State v. Davenport, supra.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 105 So. 3d 246 - State v. Jones · 63 So. 3d 399 - State v. Bias

3. “On the afternoon of November 29, 2007, Nicole Frickey returned to her home in Marrero and found defendant asleep on her sofa. She immediately left and went to her neighbor’s house to call the police to report that a man she did not know was in her house. Deputy Wade Hotard of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office responded to the call. Upon entering Ms. Frickey’s house, Officer Hotard found defendant still sleeping on the sofa with a bottle of the victim’s vodka next to him. For safety reasons, Deputy Hotard handcuffed defendant and then yelled at him to try to wake him up. After a minute or two, defendant woke up and mumbled something. Officer Hotard accompanied defendant out of the house and brought him to the rear of his patrol unit. The deputy advised defendant that he was under arrest and read defendant his Miranda rights. Thereafter, Officer Hotard searched defendant and found several items of jewelry and coins belonging to Ms. Frickey in his pockets. Ms. Frickey testified that she did not know defendant prior to the date of the incident and had not given him permission to be in her house. Defendant testified that he had been drinking for two days prior to the incident and did not remember going into the house or anything about the incident.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 28 So. 3d 430 - State v. Davenport