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2 Tyl. 64

Hall v. Brown

Supreme Court of Vermont

Decided February 15, 1802

Supreme Court of Vermont · decided 1802-02-15

The complaint was made to Samuel Safford Judge of the County Court, and Josiah Wright, Justice of the Peace, and charged Brown, that on the 10th day of April, 1801, vi et armis and with strong hand, he entered into possession of the complainant’s land in Pownal, (butted and bounded,) which land the complainant averred he had lawfully and peaceably possessed for more than three years before the forcible entry of the defendant, who with like force and strong hand continued to…

Decided 1802-02-15

¶1Opinion of the Court.

¶2The subject having been before the Court at the late term in Chittenden County, in the case of Ira Allen, administrator of Ethan Allen, v. Gideon and Jonathan Ormsby, it was at first concluded by the Court, and suggested to the parties, that the decision in that cause had settled the construction of the fifth section of the statute of limitations, as applicable to the act to prevent forcible entry and detainer; but as that decision, by recurrence to our minutes, is found *73to apply particularly to complaints brought upon the sixth section of this act, the Court were inclined to a further discussion.

Chauncey Langdon, for complainant,David Fay, for defendant.

¶3In the present case, the Court consider the fifth section of the statute of limitations, which renders a minute by the magistrate necessary on the exhibition of a complaint in certain cases, to apply to complaints exhibited to the Justices of a Freehold Court against those “ who make unlawful and forcible entry into lands, tenements, and other possessions, and with a strong hand detain the same,” and against those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into lands and tenements, unlawfully and by force hold the same.”

¶4That the magistrate’s power to impose a fine upon conviction, stamps the acts of forcible entry or forcible detainer as criminal; and therefore they are included in the purview of the preceding third section of this statute.

¶5And the only question in this case is, was the present complaint brought upon the second or the sixth section of the act to prevent forcible entry and detainer.

¶6The Court consider the complaint to have been brought upon the second section, and that the magistrate’s issuing process by summons cannot alter its inherent and essential qualities.

¶7Let judgment be therefore entered, that the complaint be quashed.

¶8Complaint quashed.

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