¶1(dissenting).— I am unable to agree with the conclusions of the majority of the court as to the effect of the act of March 3, 1877, upon Minnick’s entry. I think that it appears from the complaint that the secretary of the interior found as a fact that Minnick had actual knowledge that the land in question was within the corporate limits of Seattle at the time he made his entry thereof. And this finding of fact, under the circumstances set up in the complaint, is conclusive upon all parties, and cannot be questioned in the courts. Upon finding this fact of actual knowledge by Minnick that the land was not subject to *352entry, the secretary of the interior found as a question of law, that his entry was not aided by the said act of 1877. I think that this finding of law was correct. It is not reasonable to suppose that congress by said act intended to aid one who willfully and with full knowledge attempted to acquire title to the land that the law had declared he should not obtain. The statute as construed by the secretary of the interior is a reasonable one, and as thus construed protects every one who had in actual good faith entered land within the limits of any incorporated town. Those who entered in bad faith ought not to be protected. Besides, there is some doubt as to whether or not said curative act applied at all to this entry, for the reason that before it was passed such entry-had been ordered canceled by the commissioner of the general land office. In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed.
2 Wash. 344
Alger v. Hill
Decided April 7, 1891
Washington Supreme Court · decided 1891-04-07
<p>PUBLIC LANDS —TOWN SITES — MUNICIPAL INCORPORATIONS — KNOWLEDGE OP ENTRYMAN.</p> <p>The special act of the territorial legislature oí Washington (Laws 1869, p. 437), incorporating the city of Seattle, does not come within the prohibition of the organic act (Rev. St. U. S., § 1889) against granting private charters or special privileges, as such act of incorporation is the grant of a public charter.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s grantor in 1874 pre-empted vacant, unoccupied public lands which had been included in the coi’porate limits of the city of Seattle in the year 1869 by the act of the territorial legislature incorporating said city, and did not ascertain until after entry that the land was within said corporate limits. The secretary of the interior, in 1879, canceled the entry, on the ground that, as plaintiff’s grantor was at the time marshal of the city of Seattle, he must, by virtue of his office, have known that the land pre-empted was within the corporate limits. Held, That the secretary’s decision was erroneous, as, under § 2 of the act of congress of March 3, 1877 (19 U. 8. St. at Large, 392), confirming entries which, though regular in other l-espects, had theretofore been allowed upon lands afterward ascertained to have been embraced in the corporate limits of any town, no knowledge of the law or the fact of incorporation can be imputed to the entryman. (Hoyt, J., dissents.)</p>
Decided 1891-04-07