¶1 The testimony for the state tends to prove that the defendant and two boys were seen by the sheriff and his deputy at or near a still; that the still was a can, and a crooked pipe connected, and had a fire under it; that the still was located about one and one-balf miles from defendant’s borne in a bollow and in tbe woods; that, when the sheriff bailed defendant, defendant ran and was shot at by both tbe sheriff and tbe deputy; that no arrest was made at tbe time, and none was made until after an indictment was returned. Tbe testimony as a whole makes tbe identity of defendant somewhat uncertain, but as to tbe question of alibi there, was sufficient evidence to submit to tbe jury.
¶2 As to refusal of the court to give at the request of defendant tbe general affirmative charge, tbe sufficiency of tbe state’s evidence to connect defendant with tbe possession is challenged. Possession as contemplated in the statute, making it a crime to possess a still, etc., contemplates ownership, interest in, and control over tbe apparatus. This, of course, need not be a sole interest, but may be joint or several. 6 Words and Phrases, 5464, subhead “Possession.” To prove this there must be some evidence tending to connect tbe defendant with tbe ownership, interest in, or control over tbe thing with which a defendant is charged with possessing. In this case there was no such evidence. Biddle v. State, 19 Ala. App. 563, 99 So. 59; Harbin v. State, 19 Ala. App. 623, 99 So. 740.
¶3 For tbe error in refusing the defendant tbe general affirmative charge, tbe judgment is' reversed and tbe cause is remanded.
¶4 Reversed and remanded.