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20 Ark. 542

Cofer v. Brooks

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided October 15, 1859

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1859-10-15

George.W, Beazley, Circuit Judge! The collector of taxes, in everything connected with his duties, as such, is considered as acting under a special authority; and all his acts, materially affecting the rights of parties, and in order to divest the title to real property, without the owner's consent, must be strictly conformable to law, and to the statute prescribing his duties, and the acts to be done. See 14 Pet.

Relies on Jerome Pillow v. Truman Roberts · Joshua Moore v. James Brown Alfred Brown Harmon Hogan and Joseph Froward

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1859-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently March 1954

8 state decisions

4018591860187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Chief Justice English

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶2On the 15th of December, 1855, Cofer brought an action of ejectment against Brooks, in the Phillips Circuit Court, for the possession of the North-east quarter of section 10, township 1 north, range 3 east.

¶3The plaintiff was defeated in the action, and appealed to this Court, upon exceptions taken at the trial.

¶4The defendant, among other pleas, which it is not necessary to notice, pleaded the statute of limitations of five years. (Eng. Dig., eh. 99, see. 6, p. 696.)

¶5On the trial the plaintiff proved that the land was patented to him 16th May, 1821, and closed.

¶6Against the objection of the plaintiff, the Court permitted the defendant to read in evidence two tax deeds executed to him by the sheriff of Phillips county, 25th November, 1850.

¶7The first deed shows, in substance, that the land in dispute was assessed by the sheriff, etc., of Phillips county, for the year 1844, in the name of Leland J. Bradley; that the taxes were not paid, and for want of personal property, etc., the land was regularly advertised, and on the 4th of November, 1844, offered for sale, at the court-house door, etc.; and that Brooks became the purchaser of thirty acres thereof for the taxes, etc., received the collector’s certificate therefor; and that after the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the deed was executed, etc.

¶8The second deed shows that the residue of the tract, 130 acres, was assessed to Bradley for the year 1845, and on default of payment of the taxes, and for want of personal property, etc., was advertised, etc., and sold on the 5th of November, 1845, at the court house,- etc., and purchased by Brooks, who obtained the collector’s certificate therefor, and after the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, the deed, etc.

¶9The defendant, Brooks, also proved that he was in the possession of the tract of land in controversy, about the 1st of April, 1846, with his family, residing on it, clearing the land, and preparing to raise a crop that year; and remained thereon, improving and cultivating the same continually, until about the time of the institution of this suit, when he sold the land and removed from it.

¶10The defendant also proved that he had paid the taxes on the land from the year 1845 to the time of the trial, etc.

¶11]. It is insisted for the appellant that the court below erred ill admitting the tax deeds offered in evidence by the appellee, because they failed to show regular and valid tax sales, and were void, etc.

¶12Without discussing the numerous objections made to the deeds, most of which are verbal criticisms, it may be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that their recitals fail to show •regular and valid tax sales, and that the deeds are void; yet it was competent for the appellee to introduce them, in connection with the evidence of his actual and continuous possession of the land for the full period of limitation, to defeat the action of the appellant, as held in Elliott et al. vs. Pearce, at the present term.

¶13It is true, as stated by the counsel for appellant, that in Moore vs. Brown, 14 McLean’s R. 211, Judge McLean held that a tax deed void upon its face could not avail a person who sets up a defence under the statute of limitations of Illinois.

¶14And this decision was sustained by a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, (S. C. 11 How. 414), Chief Justice Taney, Mr. Justice Catron, and Mr. Justice Grier, dissenting. But in Pillow vs. Roberts, 13 How. 472, it was held that the decision referred to was based upon a construction of the statute of Illinois, and that under our statute, tax deeds, even if irregular and worthless, are admissible in evidence, in connection with proof of possession, in order to establish a defence.

¶15We think, as was well said by Chief Justice Taney, in Moore vs. Brown et al., 11 How. 427, that a person having a good and valid tax title, needs not the protection of the statute of limitations; aAd that the object of the statute was to protect purchasers aS tax sales against errors and mistakes of officers, etc.

¶162. Nor did the court below err in refusing the instructions moved by the appellant, because they all, in one form or another, refer to supposed irregularities in the tax titles of the appellee., and assume the law to be, that if the irregularities existed, the titles were of no avail, etc.

¶17The possession of the appellee, under his purchases at the tax sales, for more than five years, was sufficient, under the act of limitation, to defeat the action of the appellant.

¶18Finding no error in the record, of which the appellant has the right to complain, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

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