Volume 20 — District of Columbia Reports

<p>Scire Facias; Affidavit to Plea in; Judgment by Default; Practice.</p> <p>i. The affidavit required by Rule 121 of this court in cases of scire facias on judgment applies as well to a plea of nul tiel record as other pleas.</p> <p>.2. Where in an action against two or moré a judgment by default is taken, against one, and subsequently the declaration is amended and the case proceeded with against the remaining defendants, the amendment does not operate to set aside the judgment.</p> <p>.3. Where the defendant was personally served and filed a plea, notwithstanding which a judgment was taken against him as for want of a plea, upon which judgment, after the lapse of nine years, a scire facias to revive is.issued, judgment of revivor should follow unless the defendant files with his plea an affidavit under Rule 121 showing a defense to the action.</p> <p>4. Nor would error, however gross in the rendition of the original judgment, be a defense if it fall short of showing a want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action or of the person of the defendant; such a defense should have been made either by appeal from the original'judgment or in some direct proceeding to set it aside.</p>

<p>Orphans’ Court, Appeal from; How Taken.</p> <p>It is not necessary, in taking an appeal, that the fact of its having been taken shall be embodied in the order appealed "from and signed by the court; it is only necessary that it shall be taken in open court and spread upon the minutes, or entered in writing in the clerk’s office.</p>

<p>Nuncupative Wills; What are; How Proven.</p> <p>1. The law of nuncupative wills is regulated in this District by the 19th and 20th sections of the statute of 29th Chas. II., ch. 3.</p> <p>2. Consequently no testimony can be received six months after the nuncupation to establish the will unless such testimony have been reduced to writing within six days after the making of the will.</p> <p>3. In order to establish such a will it must appear by proof that at the time of pronouncing the alleged testamentary words the testator did bid the persons present, or some of them, to bear witness that such was his will, and it must also appear by proof that such nuncupative will was made in the time of the last sickness of the deceased.</p>

Motion by defendant for a new trial on a case and bill of exceptions in an action of ejectment. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion by plaintiff for a new trial in an action of assumpsit tried by stipulation of the parties without a jury. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Orphans’ Court; Appeal from; How Taken.</p> <p>1. An appeal from the attion of the justice holding a Special Term for Orphans’ Court business is to be taken in the same manner as an appeal from the action of a justice holding any other Special Term of the court.</p> <p>2. The 18th section of sub-chapter 15 of the Act of Maryland of 1798, chapter 101, so far as it prescribes a process of appeal is not applicable to this court.</p> <p>3. Keyser vs. Breitbarth, 2 Mackey, 332, affirmed.</p>

Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing an appeal from-the judgment of a justice of the peace in a landlord and tenant proceeding. .The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>'Washington Gas Light Co. ; Injuries to Persons ; Liability of Original Wrongdoer in an Action Over ; Defects in Footwalk.</p> <p>■l. The acts of Congress incorporating the Washington Gas Light Company gave it exclusive authority, subject to such conditions as should be imposed by the city authorities, to lay lateral pipes for the supply of gas to lot owners; the municipal ordinance of 1868, so far as it undertook to require this to be done by persons other than the gas company, was invalid and void.</p> <p>2. The gas boxes connected with service pipes are a part of the apparatus of the gas company, and it is liable for any damage to pedestrians caused by its failure to exercise a reasonable supervision of its boxes.</p> <p>3. Where one is liable in an action over and has received notice of the original action and had an opportunity to take part in that defense, evidence of what was testified to by a deceased witness in the original action is admissible in the action over.</p> <p>4. It is no defense to an action over by a municipality for the negligence of the defendant, whereby a recovery in damages was had against the municipality in the former action, that the injury for which the original recovery was had was caused by the neglect of the municipality to repair a defective sidewalk, unless proof is made that it had notice of such defect.</p> <p>5. Nor is the gas company relieved from liability to the municipality in the action over by the fact that the city authorities had so widened the footwalk that the box, from being originally near the curbstone, where it was less likely to cause injury to pedestrians, afterwards occupied a position in the center of the pavement, for the duty of the company is to keep its gas boxes in safe condition wherever they may be.</p>

<p>Administration ; Who Entitled to Letters of.</p> <p>The creditor of an alleged distributee has no right as such to apply for letters of administration upon the personal estate of the ancestor, or to intervene in such a proceeding.</p>

Hearing in the General Term in the first instance on a demurrer to a plea in an action of assumpsit. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion by defendant for a new trial on a bill of exceptions, in an action to recover damages on account of defendant’s negligence. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Motion in arrest of judgment on a verdict of guilty on the-trial of an indictment for murder. Heard in the General Term in the first instance.

<p>Motion by defendant to dismiss an appeal.</p> <p>The Facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appear from a decree on a bill filed to enforce mechanics’ liens.</p> <p>The pacts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing in General Term in the first instance of a motion to dismiss a petition for an asssessment of values of land under the Act of Congress, September 27, 1890, entitled, “An act authorizing the establishing of a public park in the District of Columbia.” Statement oe the Case. This was a proceeding instituted under the Act of Congress entitled “An act authorizing the establishment of a public park in the District of Columbia,” approved September 27, 1890.

<p>Appeal from a decree upon a bill filed to enforce a trust. Certified to be beard in General Term in tbe first instance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The Chief Justice and Justices Cox and Jambs sitting. Appeal from an order striking out a demurrer as frivolous and rendering judgment for plaintiff for the amount claimed, and an appeal from an order denying defendant’s motion to set aside said judgment. The Facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Statute op Eimitations; “Beyond Seas;” Statutory Construction.</p> <p>1. Section 466, R. S. D. C., abrogating the right to reply “beyond seas ” to a plea of the Statute of Limitations applies to all forms of actions.</p> <p>2. The title of a statute is no part of the statute itself and furnishes no authoritative guide to its meaning.</p> <p>3. Nor, by Sec. 5600, R. S. U. S., is any inference or presumption of a legislative construction to be drawn by reason of the title under which any particular section of the Revised Statutes of the District is placed.</p>

<p>Assignments; Fraud; Practice.</p> <p>1. Where ,a preference in a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors is made under a mistake as to the legal right of the party preferred to claim as a creditor, the assignment, if not otherwise fraudulent, is not thereby rendered void, but the mistake must be corrected.</p> <p>2. Where, in the judgment of the court, a verdict, if found for the plaintiff, should be set aside, the court is justified in withdrawing the case from the jury.</p> <p>8. Where the financial condition of a firm is such that an assignment for the benefit of creditors should be made, and is accordingly made, the fact that immediately before the assignment, the members of the firm drew out a large amount of cash which they appropriated to their individual uses, does not render the assignment void, if it be in all other respects honestly made.</p>

<p>Actions; Tost Note; Practice.</p> <p>1. An action at law cannot be maintained upon a lost negotiable instrument which at the time of its loss was capable of transfer. -</p> <p>2. Boteler vs. Dexter, ante, p. 26, explained and distinguished from the present case.</p>

<p>Equity Pleading; Statute of. Frauds;. Part Performance; Fraud.</p> <p>T. The 'averments of a bill in equity, when they are ambiguous, are to be taken most strongly against the complainant.</p> <p>' 2. A bill in equity cannot be sustained upon a mere claim for damages for the failure to specifically perform an alleged contract; the remedy is at law in such a case.</p> <p>. 3. Payment of a consideration is not such a part performance of a parol contract to convey lands as will take the case out of the Statute of Frauds; and whether the consideration consists of money or personal services the rule seems to be the same.</p> <p>4. The part performance must be that sort of a partial execution of the contract which results from entering into possession, making outlays on the property, etc., so that a party cannot be completely restored to his former position.</p> <p>5. Breach of a promise to do something in the future is not such a fraud as would be an answer to the defense of limitations; the fraud must be some concealment or misrepresentation as to existing facts which prevented the plaintiff from sooner instituting his suit.</p>

<p>Motion for judgment under Rule 73.</p> <p>The pacts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment rendered in a trial by the court without a jury, the latter being waived by the parties.</p> <p>Thb pacts are stated in the opinion'.</p>

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Circuit Court on an agreed statement of facts in an action of replevin. The pacts are stated in tbe opinion.

Hearing in the General Term in the first instance of a demurrer to an indictment charging á violation of the 12th section of the act of Congress approved January 16, 1883, entitled “An act to regulate and improve the civil service.” The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>Appeal from a judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense under the seventy-third rule in an action of assumpsit.</p>

<p>Patents : Anticipation of Inventions ; Scope 'of Application for Patent.</p> <p>3. An invention is not tobe regarded as anticipated because it combines distinct elements existing in different combinations in former patents in order to make a combination that never before existed.</p> <p>a. Where the application for an electric invention claims as a source of electric supply “any known means of supply, ” the applicant is no.t to be limited to any one of such means of supply because in illustrating his invention he used that particular means.</p>

<p>Malicious Prosecution; Evidence; Measure oe Damages; Pleading; Instruction to Jury.</p> <p>1. In an action for malicious prosecution for causing the arrest of the plaintiff on a charge of perjury, alleged to have been committed in Virginia, it is not competent for the purpose of showing malice to admit testimony showing that plaintiff had been arrested at the instance of the defendants, in Washington, D. C., one year before the pending trial, and four years after the suit was brought. Acts done so long after the original cause of action are not to be supposed in any sense a part of the original matter.</p> <p>2. An action on the case to recover damages for malicious prosecution before a court having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, will lie; but the recovery will be confined to damages caused by the mere prosecution, such as the expense of defending, and the annoyance and discredit caused thereby, but not for the arrest.</p> <p>3. Proof that an arrest was made at the instance of the prosecutor is inadmissible in an action for merely prosecuting, since such proof can only be relevant when the arrest is the substantive matter of action. To admit such evidence would be to assume that the action was not brought for merely prosecuting falsely and maliciously, but for causing an arrest by the malicious prosecution.</p> <p>4. Where the declaration discloses the want of jurisdiction in the justice ordering the arrest, and alleges that it was in fact caused by the defendants, trespass and not case is the proper remedy.</p> <p>5. This instruction, “now gentlemen of the jury, it is for you to pass on the question of probable cause. Of course, I hardly need say to you that if you are satisfied from the imperfect explanation of the court as to what is necessary from the evidence in this case, that these defendants did have probable cause, reasonable cause, to do what they 'did, that would end the case and your verdict would be for the defendants,” is not erroneous.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Special Term.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Bill IN Equity brought by an administrator to obtain the direction of the court to enable him to distribute in the Orphans’ Court certain money in his hands collected on a French Spoiliation award; certified to be heard in General Term in first instance. Statement op Facts. Plaintiff was appointed December 1, 1885, by the Orphans’ Court of the District of Columbia administrator with the will annexed of Caleb Gardner, late of Newport, Rhode Island.

<p>Jurors, excuse of ; Dying Declarations ; Evidence ; Prayers ; Argument of Council to Jury ; Criminal Daw ; Murder ; Manslaughter ; Reasonable doubt.</p> <p>1. Under Section, 874, R. S. D. D. C., a juror may be excused by the Court from serving for reasons given in the Statute at any time before the jury is impanelled and sworn.</p> <p>2. While a dying declaration is competent evidence only as to the circumstances of the death and, therefore, whatever cannot be regarded as part of those circumstances should be excluded, yet a mere interruption of a few moments in the conflict between the deceased and the accused will not be sufficient to exclude the deceased’s dying declarations as to the occasions antecedent to the interruption, when it is apparent that the entire .occurrence was one conflict, notwithstanding the disconnection of a few moments.</p> <p>3. Evidence which is not relevant except upon the assumption of the existence of another unproved fact, is not admissible until the other fact is first established.</p> <p>4. Where two prayers for the instruction of the jury are materially the same, it is not error to refuse one if the other be granted. Moreover, it is obviously mischievous to grant two instructions involving a repetition of the same matter, because it may cause the instruction to play the part of evidence by impressing its hypothesis on the jury as a fact.</p> <p>5. A prayer for an instruction which is misleading and objectionable by reason of the ambiguity of its language should be refused, especially when the court deals sufficiently and correctly in its charge with the subject of the prayer.</p> <p>6. It is not error for the court to stop counsel for the defense and point out to him and the jury that he is making an argument based upon an improper assumption of facts having no existence in the case.</p> <p>7. Homicide can be reduced to manslaughter either when the blow is struck in the heat of passion when the deceased had been the aggressor, and the passion had not cooled or had time to cool, or where the accused struck the blow under a bona fide but negligent and careless apprehension of danger.</p> <p>8. It is not error to instruct the jury in defining the term reasonable doubt that “if the evidence in any case is sufficient to satisfy a jury to an extent which would justify them in acting upon the more important affairs of life, then the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.”</p>

Motion • for .a new trial upon a bill of exceptions in an action upon a judgment of a court of another State, The case is stated in the opinion.

These two cases were considered together. The first was a hearing in General Term in the first instance of a return to a writ of certiorari to review a land condemnation proceeding by the authorities of the District. The second was an appeal from a decree enjoining the .District from laying out upon complainant’s land a proposed highway for public use. The facts in each case are stated in the opinion.

<p>Trust Companies; Purview oe Act op 1890.</p> <p>The Act of -Congress of October i, 1890, providing for the incorporation in this District of trust and loan corporations, applies to the trust companies which were in existence at the time of the passage of the act and which have since complied with its provisions, as well as to those which were originally organized under that act.</p>

Motion by plaintiff in a landlord and tenant proceeding for a new trial on exceptions, The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>Demurrer to a bill in equity filed to enforce certain judgments.</p> <p>The CASE is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Husband and Wipe; Trusts; Sale op Infants’ Real Estate.</p> <p>1. Where a husband purchases real estate with his own means but places the title in his wife’s name, she agreeing to make a will devising the property to him, such agreement will be enforced in equity by holding the heirs of the wife as trustees for the husband, even where the heirs are infants.</p> <p>2. A proceeding in equity to enforce such an agreement against infant heirs, does not come within the provisions of the statute providing for the sale of infant’s real estate, for the reason that real estate in such a case is not the property of the infants, but of the father.</p>

<p>Accommodation Note; Judgment, Assignment and Satisfaction of.</p> <p>Where A makes an accommodation note to B, to enable B to raise money upon it, which he does by disposing of it to C, a judgment recovered against A upon the note is satisfied by an assignment of the judgment to B, the principal debtor.</p>

Motion by defendant for a new trial on bill of exceptions in an action of trespass q. c.f. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>Courts of the United States; Poor Convicts’ Act; R. S. D. C. 1042.</p> <p>1. Although the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is a court of the United States, the question whether an act of Congress using those words applies to this court as well as the circuit courts, is one of intention.</p> <p>2. Section 1042 R. S. U. S. providing for the release of poor convicts who are imprisoned for non-payment of fines, &c., is in force in the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Equity; Trusts; Promissory Notes.</p> <p>1. If after part of the purchase money under a contract for the sale of land has been paid, the vendee dies, his equitable title descends to and vests in his heirs at-law.</p> <p>2. If a conveyance of the land be made by the vendor by a deed reciting that it is made in pursuance of such contract, the grantee takes the property as trustee for the heirs.</p> <p>3. A purchaser of a promissory note, with notice of equities, from an innocent holder, is protected to the same extent as his vendor would have been ; and if the note is secured by a deed of trust, the lien or security created thereby, follows the assignment of the note.</p>

Motion by defendant for a new trial on a case stated and bill of exceptions combined, on indictment for murder. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Deeds; Competency oe Parties; Insanity.</p> <p>1. The fact that the grantee in a deed of a person of unsound mind did not know the grantor to be non compos at the time of the execution of the deed, gives it no validity.</p> <p>2. The de.ed of an insane person is void and therefore cannot be ratified by acts in pais.</p> <p>3. As to what is'the effect upon a deed of a finding by a jury de lunático that the grantor was insane at a day prior to the date of the deed, quczre.</p>

<p>Expert Testimony; Criminal Raw; Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>1. A police officer whose experience has familiarized him with the methods of committing a certain crime, is qualified to testify as an expert upon the subject. ,</p> <p>2. A non-resident' who from without the District has procured the commission of a crime in the District by a guilty or innocent agent, can be punished whenever found within the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>' 3. The defendant in a criminal case is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence, but.not to the benefit of a doubt raised by ingenuity of counsel.</p>

<p>Practice; Rule 128.</p> <p>That portion of Rule 128, of this court, providing that if an appellant from the Police Court to the Criminal Court shall fail to pay a docket fee, his case shall be dismissed and remanded to the Police Court, conflicts with R. S. D. C., sections 1073 to 1077, both inclusive, and is therefore void.</p>

Hearing on motion by defendant in arrest of judgment; certified by Criminal Court to be heard in General Term in first instance. Ti-ie case is stated in the opinion.

Hearing on demurrer to a plea to the jurisdiction of the Police Court, filed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the District; heard in the General Term in the first instance.

<p>Petty Earceny ; Jury Triar Waiver-oe.</p> <p>i. Petty larceny is a felony at common law and is triable by jury; the Police Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to try such an offense having no power to impannel a jury; following U. S. vs. Day, and U. S. vs. Herzog, ante. p. 430.</p>

Hearing on appeal by defendants from judgment of special term sustaining demurrer to pleas to writ of scire facias. The CASE is stated in the opinion.

Hearing upon report of auditor upon reference made by General Term after appeal from decree of Special Term had been argued. The Facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Corporations, Incorporation and Dissolution of; Equity Pleading.</p> <p>1. A court of equity has no power to dissolve a corporation.</p> <p>2. Under the laws of this District, the Recorder of Deeds is forbidden to record a certificate of incorporation which adopts the same name as that belonging to a corporation previously incorporated, and the filing of such a certificate is a void act.</p> <p>3. Where by a bill in equity it is sought to have property in the possession of a corporation placed in the hands of a receiver, the corporation should be made a party defendant; and the bill should contain a prayer for the adjudication of the title of the property.</p> <p>4. A court of equity has no power to grant a prayer in a bill which prays that complainants be decreed members of a corporation, organized by the respondents, in good standing with equal rights with the respondents.</p>

<p>Deeds; Consideration; Trusts; Equity; Fraud.</p> <p>1. When one person conveys to another his property in consideration of a promise of support the duty of rendering the consideration for which the donee holds the property does not cease until the donor refuses to receive it; such support must be offered and not left to be asked.</p> <p>2. One of the necessarily implied obligations of an engagement to furnish support during the lifetime of a grantor, is the duty of decent burial.</p> <p>3. Conveyances of this kind are substantially trusts, and the failure of the donee to meet his obligation renders his continued possession of the property a violation of the trust.</p>

<p>Special Improvement Taxes; Collector of Taxes; Agency.</p> <p>1. Under certain ordinances of the corporation of Washington, and certain provisions of the Act of Congress of February 21, 1871, commonly known as the Organic Act (Secs. 91, 94 and 96, R. S. D. C.), it was the duty of the District of Columbia to enforce atid collect from lot owners certain special improvement taxes, and to pay over to the contractor such taxes for the work done by him, under contract with the District, in making the special improvement; and where the District failed to perform its duty to so collect the tax which had been provided as the means of paying for the work done at its request, it became chargeable with the indebtedness due the contractor.</p> <p>2. In collecting taxes — although it be done for the purpose of providing means to pay a particular person — the authorities exercise their own public functions and cannot be regarded as private agents.</p>

Hearing in General Term in the first instance on a certificate from the justice' holding the Orphans’ Court, as to the sufficiency of a codicil. The FACTS are stated in the opinion.

<p>Equity Pleading and Practice; Plea supported by Answer; Appealable Orders.</p> <p>1. As a general rule interlocutory orders are not appealable, but when such an order deprives the party of a substantial defense or remedy and thus involves the merits of the action it becomes appealable.</p> <p>2. Where leave is given upon conditions, to file an amended plea, and on complainant’s motion the amended plea is 'stricken out for noncompliance with such conditions, an appeal will not lie.</p> <p>3. It is within the discretion of the trial court to prescribe conditions in an order granting leave to plead.</p> <p>4. Where a bill in Equity charges fraud or errors in an account, and the defendant files a plea of an account stated, it is sufficient if the plea traverse in general terms the averments of the bill, but the plea must be supported by a full answer and discovery.</p>

<p>Equity; Sale of Land; Defective Title; Recission; Specific Performance.</p> <p>1. In an ordinary sale of land there is an implied condition that if the title be defective, the vendee may decline to take it and may recover the deposit money if he has paid any; but there is no such legal obligation on the part of the vendor to perfect the title as will give the vendee the right to recover damages for the failure to do so.</p> <p>2. The rule that one party to a contract cannot rescind it without the consent of the other, was made for the benefit of the injured party only.</p> <p>3. A vendee having once repudiated his contract for the purchase of land, cannot afterwards (especially -when the land has greatly-enhanced in value), demand of the vendor that he specifically perform his contract to convey.</p>

<p>Scire Facias; Practice; Limitations.</p> <p>1. A sci. fa. on a judgment issued against one only of two joint debtors is a nullity.</p> <p>2. If a sci. fa. issued on a joint judgment be served on one onty of two joint debtors it cannot afterwards be amended to include both, so as to save tbe bar of tbe statute of limitations.</p>

<p>Wires; Eegacies; Testamentary Intention.</p> <p>A bequest having been made of a sum of money in bank to be equally divided between A., B. and C. and the children of D., deceased; held, considering the circumstances of the case, that the children of D. took one-fourth per stirpes.</p>

<p>Fícense Tax; Police Court</p> <p>1. The only condition upon which a prosecution under the act of the Legislative Assembly, imposing a license tax upon trades, etc., can be based, is a failure to pay such tax when due, or before engaging in the trade or businéss taxed. «■</p> <p>2. An information which charges a person with carrying on his business without having obtained a license, but which omits to . charge him with a failure to pay the tax prescribed, is defective.</p> <p>3. The proper method of securing the review by this court of • proceedings in the Police Court, is by writ of error under 26 Stats., 849; and every other method of review is by that act excluded.</p>

<p>Alimony; Equity.</p> <p>I. Where a decree for alimony had been suspended upon a showing by defendant that he was unable to pay alimony, and subsequently it was asserted that he was in prosperous circumstances and the decree was sought to be enforced; held, that the alleged fact of petitioners having led an immoral life since the passage of the decree, was no defense in a proceeding to enforce it. The right to alimony having been once adjudicated, the only inquiry left was as to the ability of defendant to pay it.</p>

<p>Public Rand; Right of Way; Equity; Injunction.</p> <p>1. The Act of Congress of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 482) granting rights of way through public lands to certain railroads, applies only to railroads which are common carriers; and whenever application is made to the Secretary of the Interior by a railroad company for his approval of its map locating the proposed line of road, it is the duty of the Secretary to ascertain and determine whether or not the railroad is for public or private use.</p> <p>2. When the Secretary has approved the location of the route, and the company, acting upon that authority, has expended money in the construction of its road, the legal title to the right of way becomes vested in the company, and the title so vested in the company, even if improperly acquired, cannot be divested by any action on the part of the Secretary, or his successors, but only by due process of law.</p> <p>3. When a public officer unlawfully assumes powers over property, and by so doing infringes upon or violates the rights of a citizen, equit}' has power to interfere by injunction.</p>

Hearing on appeal by plaintiffs from an order of the Special Term quashing writs of attachment. The cases are stated in the opinion.

Hearing in General Perm in the first instance on petitions for writs of habeas corptis, each petitioner alleging an unlawful conviction in the Police Court. Phe pacts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Capital Sentence, Execution of.</p> <p>The time and place of execution of a sentence of death are not parts of the judgment or sentence, and this rule of common law is not changed by R. S. D. C. Sec. 845.</p>

<p>Deeds of Trust; Husband and Wife; Gift.</p> <p>In the absence of evidence of intent to defraud creditors, a gift of stocks and bonds by a then solvent husband, is valid and neither these nor their proceeds can be subjected to the payment of the subsequently incurred debts of the husband.</p>

Hearing on appeal by complainants from a decree of the Special Term settling the rights of parties in a suit to enforce mechanics’ liens. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hearing on appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Circuit Court quashing a writ of attachment and garnishment. The facts are stated in the opinion.