Heno v. Federal Deposit Insurance’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 federal appellate · 13 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “FDIC construes the pivotal statutory bar-date exception in subsection 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii) — “the claimant did not receive notice of the appointment of the receiver in time to file such claim before [the bar] date” — as permitting late filing even by claimants who were on notice of FDIC’s appointment [as receiver] but could not file their claim because it did not come into existence until after the bar date prescribed in subsections 1821(d)(3)(B)(i) and 1821(d)(6)(C)(i).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. LNV Corp. v. Outsource Services Management, LLC · Miguelachuli v. Federal Deposit Insurance

2. ““First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, howev er, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore, Inc. v. Bullen · 51 soc.sec.rep.ser. 522, Medicare & Medicaid Guide P 44,573 Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore, Inc. v. Bruce M. Bullen, Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore, Inc. v. Bruce M. Bullen

3. “proposed interpretation is far from the most natural reading of subsection 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii) itself, we cannot say that it [fails to] represent a 'permissible' reading of an ambiguous provision viewed in the broader context of the statute as a whole under the deferential standard required by [Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 , 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Carlyle Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Federal Deposit Insurance · Stamm v. Paul