Interim Decision #3127
MATTER OF IZATULA
In Exclusion Proceedings
A-29060863
Decided by Board February 6, 1990
(1)The general rule that prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a lawfully constituted
government does not constitute persecution is inapplicable in countries where a coup
is the only means of effectuating political change. Dwomoh v. Sam, 696 F. Supp. 970
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), followed.
(2)Alien who actively assisted the mujahedin in Afghanistan, and who was sought out by
the Afghan regime because of that activity, established a well-founded fear of
persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act since there
was no basis in the record to conclude that any punishment imposed on the alien
would be an example of prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a lawfully
constituted government.
EXCLUDABLE: Act of 1952—Sec. 212(a)(19) [
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19)]—Fraud or
willful misrepresentation of a material fact
Sec. 212(a)(20) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20)}—No valid
immigrant visa
ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
John A. Assadi, Esquire Peter Moran
Eleven Penn Plaza, Suite 2101 General Attorney
New York, New York 10001
BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne and Heilman, Board Members. Concurring Opinion:
Yacca and Mont, Board Members.
This is an appeal from the decision, dated April 3, 1989, in which
the immigration judge denied the applicant's requests for relief
pursuant to sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h) (1982), and ordered
that the applicant be excluded and deported from the United States.
The appeal will be sustained.
The applicant is a 23-year-old native and citizen of Afghanistan.
The applicant is married, but his wife and son are residing in
Afghanistan. The applicant arrived in the United States on January 14,
1989. He was subsequently placed in exclusion proceedings pursuant
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Interim Decision #3127
to sections 212(a)(19) and (20) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(0(19) and
(20) (1982). The applicant requested asylum and completed a written
application for that relief.I The applicant's asylum application was
referred to the Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs ("BHRHA.") for an advisory opinion. The
BHRHA advised that it "has no factual material about this specific
applicant." The BHRHA advised further that information regarding
human rights practices in Afghanistan can be found in "the State
Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices."
At the hearing on the merits of his asylum and withholding requests,
,
the applicant conceded that he was excludable under section
212(a)(20) of the Act. The applicant then presented testimony in
support of his applications for relief under sections 208(a) and 243(h).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge entered his
decision finding the applicant exccludable under section 212(a)(20) of
the Act and denying him asylum and withholding of deportation.
On appeal, the applicant contends that the immigration judge erred
In denying his asylum and withholding of deportation applications. An
applicant who seeks relief under section 208(a) may be granted asylum
in the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion if that applicant
qualifies as a "refugee" within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42XA) (1982). That section, in turn,
defines a "refugee" as follows:
Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of
a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The applicant bears the burden of proving that he is eligible for relief
under section 205(a). See
8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1989).
In order to qualify for withholding of deportation under section
243(h) of the Act, an applicant must show a "clear probability of
persecution" if he is returned to a designated country. That is, the
applicant must show that it is "more likely than not" that his life or
freedom would be threatened in Afghanistan owing to his "race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." See INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407 (1984). The
applicant also bears the burden of showing eligibility for relief under
section 243(h). See
8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1989). In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987), the Supreme Court held that there is a
1 Pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1989), a request for asylum is also regarded as a
request for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act.
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significant difference between the standards for relief under section
208(a) and section 243(h), and that a section 208(a) applicant need not
show a likelihood of persecution in order to be eligible for asylum. See
also Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986). We stated in
Matter of Mogharrabt, 19 UN Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), that an alien can
establish eligibility for asylum by showing that a reasonable person in
his circumstances would fear persecution in a given country.
The applicant here gave the following testimony in support of his
asylum request. He stated that he was raised in Kandahar in
Afghanistan, and that he attended school there until 1980, when he
was 14 years old. The applicant then began to manage a general store,
after his father, who had previously operated the store, retired.
The applicant testified that he avoided the representatives of the
Soviet-supported Afghan. Army and the KHAD secret police when he
was in Afghanistan, because he did not want to be conscripted and
forced to fight against his own countrymen. The applicant testified
further that between 1985 and 1988, he assisted the mujahedin by
providing them with clothes, groceries, and other supplies. He stated
that during this period he let his younger brother run the store. The
applicant would obtain a list from the mujahedin indicating the items
which they needed, and he would then obtain these supplies with the
assistance of his brother. The applicant stated that his brother was able
to travel freely around Kandahar because he was not old enough for
the Army to be interested in conscripting him. The applicant also
stated that he himself would deliver supplies to the mujahedin at night,
so that he could avoid being seen by members of the Army or other
security forces.
The applicant testified further that his brother was arrested by
KHAD secret police in October 1988. He stated that someone
informed the KHAD police that he and his brother were assisting the
mujahedin. According to the applicant, the KHAD agents then came
to the store and arrested his brother. The applicant learned from Ijim
Mohammad, a man who lived next to the store, that the KHAD agents
had asked for the applicant too when they arrested his brother. The
applicant stated that he never saw or heard from his brother after the
arrest, but he believed that his brother had been imprisoned.
The applicant stated that he hid at home for the 2 days following his
brother's arrest. According to the applicant, on the second day that he
was in hiding, a KHAD agent came to the house looking for him. The
applicant's father told the KHAD agent that he did not know where
the applicant was, and the agent "beat ... up" the applicant's father.
The applicant stated that after the KHAD agent had left his home, he
went to a village named Arghandab which is approximately 2
kilometers from Kandahar. The applicant's father moved with him to
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Arghandab, which was an area under mujahedin control. The applicant also stated that his uncle informed him that KHAD agents
continued to look for him at his house in Kandahar after he had fled to
Arghandab.
The applicant remained in Arghandab for 1 1/2 months. He fled
Arghandab because of the "constant bombardment" there, and
because his father was injured during an air raid near the house where
the applicant and his father were living. The applicant travelled to
Pakistan along with 9 or 10 members of the mujahedin. After he had
arrived in Pakistan, the applicant stayed in Chaman for 3 days. He
subsequently travelled to Karachi, where he remained for 20 days. In
Karachi, the applicant paid a fee to an agent who provided him with a
passport and a boarding pass. The applicant testified that he made
arrangements to leave Pakistan because he had no family ties there,
and because he could not afford to continue to pay for the hotel where
he was staying in. Karachi.
Finally, the applicant denied that he had displayed a fraudulent
passport to examining immigration officers in this country. The
applicant stated that he showed only his boarding pass to these
officers, and that he immediately requested asylum. The applicant also
stated that his father-in-law is in a lawful immigration status in this
country.
The immigration judge based his denial of the applicant's asylum
request on two separate grounds.2 He found first that the applicant's
fear of being conscripted by the pro-Soviet Afghan Army was no longer
a valid basis for a persecution claim, due to the Soviet forces having
withdrawn from Afghanistan in February 1989. Concerning the
applicant's active support of the mujahedin, the immigration judge
found that the applicant's fear of harm from the Afghan Government
relates to "an act of prosecution rather than act of persecution for
aiding groups in opposition in an attempt to overthrow the defacto
[sic] government of Afghanistan."
We concur with the immigration judge's reasoning that the applicant is not eligible for asylum based on an unwillingness to perform
military service in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan, an asylum claim based on a refusal to serve
in the Afghan military is no different than any other alien's claim that
he will be punished because he did not serve in his country's armed
2 The immigration judge did not comment on the issue of the applicant's credibility
but appears to have accepted the applicant's testimony as credible. Furthermore,
because he concluded that the applicant had not met his burden of demonstrating
statutory eligibility for asylum, the immigration judge did not address the issue of
whether the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion.
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forces. See Matter of Vigil, 19 I&N Dec. 572 (BIA 1988); see also
Matter of Salim,
18 I&N Dec. 311 (BIA 1982), modified by Matter of
Canas, 19 1&N Dec. 697, at 709 n.11 (BIA 1988), and Matter of A - G-,
19 I8th Dec. 502, at 506 (BIA 1987), affd sub nom, M.A. v. INS, 899
f.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990).
We do not agree, however, with the immigration judge's rationale
that the applicant would be subject to prosecution in Afghanistan due
to the assistance which he rendered on behalf of the mujahedin. The
applicant established through his testimony that his brother was
arrested, and not heard from again, because of his support for the
mujahedin. He further established that the authorities sought him out
too because he had assisted the mujahedin.
The BHRHA advisory opinion in the record makes reference to the
Department of State's 1988 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 1st Session (1989) [hereinafter "Country
Reports"]. The Country Reports provide the following concerning the
Afghan Government's treatment of suspected political opponents:
Regime authorities frequently employ torture to punish or to extract information or
confessions. The policy is widespread, indicating that it has official sanction. Victims
often claim that Soviet officials monitor and indirectly control the torture sessions.
Torture techniques include both physical and psychological abuse. Use of electric
shock to sensitive parts of the body, immersion in water, and beatings are common
forms of physical abuse reported by victims and witnesses. Threats of abuse against
family members and prolonged sleep deprivation are typical forms of psychological
abuse. Persistent reports describe cases of mental disturbances induced by torture in
regime prisons. Political prisoners are usually not segregated from criminal or
mentally ill prisoners. Medical care is commonly described as minimal at Pol-e-
Charkhi, where prisoners are generally required to wait at least a month before being
allowed access to medical personnel. According to reliable reports, many prisoners
died in 1988 as a result of inadequate diet, corporal punishment, and torture.
Id. at 1269. Furthermore, the Country Reports estimate that there are
"at least several thousand" political prisoners being held in Afghanistan. Id. at 1271. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has
submitted no evidence to rebut the information in the Country
Reports concerning human rights conditions in Afghanistan. Thus, we
find that the applicant has demonstrated that he is at risk of
imprisonment, at a minimum, in Afghanistan because of his political
activity there.
Moreover, we find no basis in the record to conclude, as the
immigration judge did, that any punishment which the Afghan
Government might impose on the applicant on account of his support
for the mujahedin would be an example of a legitimate and internationally recognized government taking action to defend itself from an
armed rebellion. The Country Reports explain that in Afghanistan,
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"[cjitizens have neither the right nor the ability peacefully to change
their government. Afghanistan is a totalitarian state under the control
of the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan], which is kept in
power by the Soviet Union." Country Reports, supra, at 1273. We
accordingly find the existing political situation in Afghanistan to be
different from that of countries where citizens have an opportunity to
seek change in the political structure of the government via peaceful
processes. See Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 979 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("general rule [that] prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a
lawfully constituted government does not constitute persecution ...
[is not] applicable in countries where a coup is the only means through
which a change in the political regime can be effected"). Therefore,
because we find that the applicant has established that he is at risk of
being punished for his political activities in Afghanistan, and because
there is no basis in the record to conclude that any punishment
imposed by the Afghan Government would be a legitimate exercise of
sovereign authority, we conclude that the applicant has established a
well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan. A reasonable person
in the applicant's position would fear persecution in Afghanistan
within the meaning of the Act. Matter of Mogharrabi, supra.
The remaining issue in this case is whether the applicant warrants a
favorable exercise of discretion. We note that the applicant denied that
he sought to enter the United States by fraud, and the Service did not
submit any evidence regarding this issue. 3 There is also no indication
in the record that the applicant had permission to work or to remain in
Pakistan. The applicant established that he has at least one relative in
a lawful immigration status here. As there are no adverse factors in his
record, we find, considering the totality of the circumstances, that the
applicant's asylum application should be approved as a matter of
discretion. See Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987).
Because the applicant will be granted asylum, we need not address
the issue of the applicant's eligibility for withholding of deportation.
See Matter of Mogharrabi, supra, at 449. Accordingly, the following
orders will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the decision of the
immigration judge denying the applicant's request for asylum is
reversed.
FURTHER ORDER: The applicant is granted asylum pursuant to section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended, and the proceedings are terminated.
3 As stated above, the immigration judge found the applicant to be excludable only
under section 212(a)(20) of the Act.
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CONCURRING OPINION: Fred W. Vacca, Board Member
I respectfully concur.
The applicant in these exclusion proceedings contends on appeal
that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan for
essentially two reasons. The first being that he would be persecuted by
the Afghan Government because of his unwillingness to serve in the
army. The second reason is that he would be persecuted by the Afghan
Government because of his assistance in furnishing supplies to the
mujahedin rebels in that country.
As to the first contention, I take administrative notice of the
withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces from Afghanistan. The
conflict that now exists in Afghanistan is in the nature of a civil war in
which the Government established during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan is in armed conflict with various rebellious factions
seeking to overthrow that government. Therefore, the conclusion
reached by a majority of the members in Matter of alim, 18 I&N Dec.
311 (BIA 1982), is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the
absence of a Soviet-dominated Afghan army, the applicant's refusal to
perform military service in Afghanistan is indistinguishable from the
refusal of a citizen of any sovereign nation to serve in its armed forces.
Thus, the applicant's expressed unwillingness to serve in the Afghan
Army may not be a predicate for a well-founded fear of persecution. In
Matter of A-G-,
19 I&N Dec. 502 (BIA 1987), the Board affirmed the
long-accepted position that it is not persecution for a country to
require military service of its citizens. Accordingly, I concur in the
finding of the majority as to this point.
Where I disagree pertains to the applicant's contention that he
would be persecuted because of his assistance to mujahedin rebels
when he resided in Afghanistan. Specifically, the majority takes issue
with the immigration judge's finding that the applicant's assistance to
the mujahedin may result in his prosecution for criminal violations if
he were to be returned to Afghanistan. The majority reasons that the
assistance in furnishing supplies to the mujahedin was a political
activity, that the applicant's brother was imprisoned by the Government for the same activity, and that in view of the thousands of
Afghans who are imprisoned for political activity, the applicant "is at
risk of imprisonment at a minimum." The majority rationalizes that
"there is no basis in the record to conclude that any punishment
imposed by the Afghan Government would be a legitimate exercise of
sovereign authority.... " In effect, the majority finds that the Afghan
Government is illegitimate and therefore incapable of imposing a
lawful punishment. This finding is based upon the notion that any
government that does not provide for political change through
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democratic and peaceful processes cannot defend itself against armed
rebellion, insurrection, and coup d'etat without engaging in persecution.
In its broadest ramifications, the majority wades in dangerous
waters when it presumes to make judgments as to the legitimacy of
sovereign nations by scrutinizing their political systems. Clearly, the
President of the United States has constitutional authority to formulate and conduct foreign policy and does so through the Secretary of
State and the Department of State. The Board, however, as a delegate
of the Attorney General, has no authority to make pronouncements
concerning the legitimacy of sovereign nations. Just as treason,
insurrection, and providing aid and comfort to the enemy are
punishable crimes under the political system of the United States,
these acts are most probably punishable crimes in Ghana, El Salvador,
Afghanistan, and almost all countries of the world. To hold that some
governments may create laws affecting crimes, adjudicate criminal
cases, and impose punishments upon offending citizens and other
governments may not depending upon the nature of -their political
systems is patently absurd. The right of all nations to recruit soldiers
and maintain armies to protect themselves from enemies within or
without their borders is recognized as fundamental in international
law. This sovereign right is not limited to countries whose internal
political structures are democratic. If a totalitarian government
prevents violent overthrow of its government, then the perpetrators of
the failed coup are subject to the criminal laws of that government
notwithstanding the fact that due process as we know it may not exist
in that country.
To the extent that the majority espouses the view of the district
court in Dwamoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), to
the effect that the issue of prosecution versus persecution is determined by whether a sovereign nation conducts free national elections
and accords its defendants in criminal proceedings due process rights,
I disagree.
To focus, as the majority does, on the political system of a country
in order to determine whether it engages in persecution or prosecution
is erroneous and serves no useful purpose. In my view, the issue is
whether the punishment the applicant faces for assisting the mujahedin is, in fact, persecution on account of political opinion. As pointed
out in the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1988), persons fleeing from prosecution are not normally refugees. Id. at 15. However, prosecution for an
offense may be a pretext for punishing an individual for his political
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opinion. Therefore such factors as the nature of the crime and the
severity of the punishment vis-a-vis the crime committed should be
considered. Id. at 15-16. Moreover, in order to determine if the
offender can be considered a refugee, the Board should also consider
his political opinion, the motive behind his actions, the nature of the
act committed, the nature of the prosecution and its motives, and the
nature of the law on which the prosecution is based. See id. at 20-21.
Under the facts of this case, it is apparent from the applicant's
uncontroverted testimony that he supplied various goods to the rebels
in Afghanistan. The mujahedin initially fought to repel the invading
Soviet Army and its Afghan Army surrogates. After the Soviet Army's
withdrawal, the rebel factions sought to overthrow the Afghan
Government and overcome the Afghan Army. The rebels' objectives
were and still are military and political. The applicant assisted the
rebels' cause by furnishing tangible support for their fighting force.
The nature of his "crime" is obviously political and his motivation
was clearly political. His crime was that of aiding the Government's
enemy and the prosecution while criminal in nature is entwined with
the political objectives of the Government. In Afghanistan prisons and
detention camps, political prisoners are routinely tortured, deprived of
adequate food and medical care, and suffer corporal punishment.' I
find it reasonable to conclude that if the applicant were convicted for
his crime and incarcerated he would suffer punishment disproportionate to his crime. Under these circumstances, his punishment would be
in the nature of persecution. Therefore, I conclude that the applicant
has a well-founded fear of persecution and is statutorily eligible for the
relief of asylum. I also would grant him this relief in the exercise of
administrative discretion for the reasons stated in the majority's
decision. Accordingly, I would sustain the applicant's appeal and
reverse the decision of the immigration judge as to his asylum claim
for the foregoing reasons. For the reason stated by the majority in its
decision, I do not address the issue of the applicant's eligibility for
withholding of deportation.
CONCURRING OPINION: James P. Morris, Board Member
I concur in the foregoing opinion.
1 1988 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, joint Committee of the Senate
and House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 1st Session (1989).
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