CORREA-GARCES

                                                               Interim Decision #3169




                    MATTER OF CORREA-GARCES
                           In Deportation Proceedings
                                      A 29111329
                                        -




                      Decided by Board March 27, 1992

(1)The immigration judge has no authority to extend the appeal period provided for by
   federal regulations at 

(a) (1991).
(2)The authority to grant a stay of deportation once an order of deportation is entered
   against an alien is generally vested in the district director under federal regulations at
   

 (1991), and the immigration judge's authority is limited to granting a
   stay in connection with a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, or in connection
   with an appeal from a decision on such a motion.
(3) A conviction which forms the basis of a finding that an alien lacks good moral
   character under section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(f) (1988), need not be the basis upon which the alien is found deportable.
(4) A conviction for making false statements on an application for a United States
   passport in another person's name, and for willfully, knowingly, and with intent to
   deceive, falsely representing a social security account number as one's own, for the
   purpose of fraudulently obtaining a passport in another person's name, is for a crime
   involving moral turpitude.
CHARGE:
Order. Act of 1952—Sec. 241(a)(2) [

(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant—remained
                      longer than permitted
ON BEHALF OF RFSPONDENT:                                ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
 James J. Orlow, Esquire                                 Richard J. Sharkey
 Orlow and Orlow, P.C.                                     District Counsel
  1154 Public Ledger Building
 Sixth and Chestnut Streets
  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
BY: Milhoilan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members


   In an oral decision dated May 21, 1990, an immigration judge
found the respondent deportable as charged under section 241(a)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(aX2) (1988),
denied his application for voluntary departure under section 244(c)(1)
of the Act, 

(e)(1) (1988), and ordered him deported to
Colombia, with the deportation order stayed until June 23, 1990. The
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respondent filed an untimely appeal and requested oral argument
before the Board. We will take the case on certification as provided by

(c) (1991) to avoid any question of untimeliness. The
immigration judge's decision will be affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The request for oral argument is denied.
   We initially point out that the immigration judge in this case
granted the respondent 33 days, until June 23, 1990, within which to
file an appeal of his decision. However, federal regulations provide:
   An appeal shall be taken within 10 days after the mailing of a written decision, or the
   stating of an oral decision, or the service of a summary decision.... When service of
   the decision is made by mail, as authorized by this section, 3 days shall be added to
   the period prescribed for the taking of an appeal.

(a) (1991) (emphasis added). The immigration judge
has no authority to extend this appeal period. Therefore, the respondent's appeal, which was filed on June 22, 1990, over 10 days after the
oral decision was rendered, is untimely.
   The respondent is a native and citizen of Colombia. On December
 15, 1989, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an Order
to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien
(Form 1-221S), alleging that the respondent entered the United States
on June 20, 1988, as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure, authorized
to remain until December 19, 1988, and that he remained beyond that
date without authorization from the Service. At his deportation
hearing on March 8, 1990, the respondent, through counsel, admitted
the factual allegations and conceded deportability. We are satisfied
that the respondent's deportability has been established by evidence
that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. See Woodby v. INS, 

 (1966); 

(a) (1991).
   The respondent subsequently applied for the discretionary relief of
voluntary departure under section 244(e)(1) of the Act, and a hearing
was held on May 21, 1990. The immigration judge denied voluntary
departure without articulating the basis for his determination, either in
his oral decision or in the memorandum of decision dated May 21,
1990. He ordered the respondent deported, but further provided that
the deportation order be stayed until Tune 23, 1990.
   On appeal, the respondent contends that the immigration judge's
deportation order was unlawful because it was "conditional." While
the respondent correctly points out that conditional orders are
improper, we disagree with his characterization of the immigration
judge's order in the instant case as a conditional order. Rather, the
immigration judge has merely granted a stay of deportation in addition
to ordering the respondent deported and denying his application for
voluntary departure. We do, however, fmd that the immigration judge
exceeded his authority in granting a stay of deportation to the
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respondent. The authority to grant a stay of deportation once an alien
is ordered deported is generally vested in the district director. Federal
regulations provide, in relevant part, as follows:
  Any request of an alien under a final administrative order of deportation for a stay of
  deportation, except a request for withholding of deportation pursuant to section
   243(h) of the Act, shall be filed on Form 1-246 with the district director .... The
   district director, in his discretion, may grant a stay of deportation for such time and
   under such conditions as he may deem appropriate.... Denial by the district
   director of a request for a stay is not appealable but such denial shall not preclude the
   Board from granting a stay in connection with a motion to reopen or a motion to
   reconsider as provided in part 3 of this chapter, nor such denial preclude the
   [immigration budge], in his discretion, from granting a stay in connection with, and
  pending his determination of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider a case
  falling within his jurisdiction pursuant to § 242.22 of this chapter, and also pending
   an appeal from such determination.

 (1991) (emphasis added); see also Bueno v. INS, 578
F. Stipp. 22 (N.D. III. 1983). Thus, it is clear from the language of the
regulation that the immigration judge has limited authority to grant a
stay of deportation once he has entered an order of deportation. The
judge's authority is limited to granting a stay in connection with a
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, or in connection with an
appeal from a decision on such a motion. The immigration judge in
the instant case therefore exceeded his authority when he entered a
stay of deportation at the same time his deportation order was entered.
Nevertheless, the erroneous grant of a stay of deportation does not, as
the respondent argues, invalidate the immigration judge's deportability determination. We will, however, vacate the judge's temporary stay
of deportation.
   The only remaining issue on. appeal is the respondent's eligibility for
voluntary departure under section 244(e)(1) of the Act. Because of the
immigration judge's failure to articulate the basis of his decision to
deny the requested relief, we review the record and make a de novo
determination .
   In order to be statutorily eligible for voluntary departure, an alien
must establish that he is, and has been, a person of good moral
character for at least 5 years preceding his application for such relief.
See section 244(e)(1) of the Act. The alien has the burden of
establishing that he is statutorily eligible for voluntary departure and
that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. Matter of Pritchard,

 (BIA 1977); Matter of Tsang, 

 (BIA
1973). Under section 101(0(3) of the Act, 

(3)
(1988), a person is precluded from establishing good moral character if
he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The
conclusion that the person has not established good moral character
may be based on that person's admissions at the deportation hearing

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that he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of the crime in question.
See Matter of Pritchard, supra. Contrary to the respondent's assertion
on appeal, it is not necessary that the conviction used to determine
whether the alien is a person of good moral character be the basis upon
which the alien is found deportable. See, e.g., id. (alien deportable for
entry without inspection, but precluded from establishing good moral
character for purposes of voluntary departure based on a foreign
conviction for possession of marihuana). Section 101(f)(3) of the Act
relates to any crime of which the evidence, including the alien's
admissions, establishes that the respondent was convicted.
   The record reflects that the respondent was convicted on March 20,
1990, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, for making false statements on an application for a
United States passport under another name; and for willfully, knowingly, and with intent to deceive, falsely representing a social security
account number as having been issued to him, for purposes of
obtaining a passport in that other name. Crimes involving fraud are
considered to be crimes involving moral turpitude. See Jordan v.
DeGeorge, 

 (1951); Matter of Flores, 

 (BIA 1980). Convictions for making false statements have been
found to involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Kabongo v. INS, 

 (6th Cir. 1988) (convictions for making false statements in order
to obtain student financial aid involve moral turpitude). We therefore
fmd that the respondent's conviction for making false statements, in
order to fraudulently obtain a passport in another person's name, is for
a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the crime for which the
respondent was convicted in March 1990 is a crime involving moral
turpitude, we find that the respondent cannot establish that he has
been a person of good moral character for the last 5 years, and that he
is statutorily ineligible for the relief of voluntary departure.
   Having found the respondent statutorily ineligible for voluntary
departure, we find it unnecessary to address the issue of whether he
demonstrated that he merits voluntary departure as a discretionary
matter. Accordingly, the immigration judge's decision to deny the
respondent voluntary departure will be affirmed, but his grant of a stay
of deportation will be reversed.
   ORDER:       The immigration judge's decision with respect to
deportability and voluntary departure is affirmed.
   FURTHER ORDER:             The immigration judge's grant of a stay
of deportation until June 23, 1990, is reversed.




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