LI

 Interim Decision #3207




                                  MATTER OF LI

                  In Visa Petition Revocation Proceedings
                                      A-71867441
                    Decided by Board September 29, 1993

(1) An adopted child, as defined by section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and
  Nationality Act, 

(b)(1)(E) (1988), may not confer immigration
  benefits upon a natural parent without regard to whether the adopted child has been
  accorded or could be accorded immigration benefits by virtue of his or her adoptive
  status. Matter of Valsamakis, 

 (BIA 1967); and Matter of Lum, 

 (BIA 1964), overruled. Matter of Kirby, 13 l&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969),
  modified.
(2) The petitioner, who was an adopted child under the immigration laws, may not
  confer immigration benefits upon the beneficiary, his natural sibling, because their
  common natural parent no longer has the status of parent of the adopted child for
  immigration purposes.
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:                            ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
   Stephen P. Gleit, Esquire                          Thomas K. Ware
   Gleit & Fair                                       Service Center
   401 Broadway, Suite 601                            Counsel
   New York, New York 10013
BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members



   The petitioner applied for preference classification for the beneficiary as his sibling pursuant to section 203(a)(5) of the immigration
and Nationality Act, 

(a)(5) (1988).' The petition was
approved on May 26, 1990. In a decision dated August 3, 1991, the
district director revoked approval of the petition. The petitioner has
appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. The request for oral argument
is denied. See 

(e) (1993).
 'At the time the petitioner filed his application for preference classification, it was
made pursuant to section 203(a)(5) of the Act. However, section 203(a) was amended in
its entirety by section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990, 

Stat. 4973, 4986 (effective Oct. 1, 1991), and the provisions for preference classification
of siblings of United States citizens now appear in section 203(a)(4) of the Act, 

(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1992). As it relates to this case, there is no substantive difference
in the section as amended.

                                            700
                                                              Interim Decision #3207

   Under section 205 of the Act, 

 (1988), the Attorney
General may revoke the approval of any visa petition approved by her
for what she deems to be "good and sufficient cause." A notice of
intention to revoke a visa petition is properly issued for "good and
sufficient cause" when the evidence of record at the time of issuance, if
unexplained and unrebutted, would warrant a denial of the visa
petition based upon the petitioner's failure to meet the requisite
burden of proof. Matter of Arias, 

 (BIA 1988); Matter
of Estime, 

 (BIA 1987). The basis for issuance of the
notice of intention to revoke in these proceedings was the Immigration
and Naturalization Service's position that, as a matter of law, the
beneficiary was ineligible for classification as the sibling of the
petitioner. For the reasons we discuss below, we find the notice of
intention to revoke to have been properly issued for good and
sufficient cause.
   The petitioner, a naturalized citizen of the United States, was
adopted as a child. He did not gain.an immigration benefit by virtue of
his adoption. However, after gaining lawful status in the United States,
he filed a petition to have immediate relative status conferred upon his
adoptive mother. That petition was granted upon the petitioner
establishing that his adoption satisfied the requirements of section
101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, 

(b)(1)(E) (1988). He then
sought to have a petition for preference classification approved on
behalf of his natural sibling. That petition was approved, but the
approval was subsequently revoked by the Service.
   The question before us is whether a petitioner, who qualifies as an
adopted child within the provisions of section 101(bX1)(E) of the Act,
can successfully petition for a natural sibling on the basis of their
relationship to a common natural parent? Does the natural sibling
relationship survive for immigration purposes when a child has been
adopted and that adoption satisfies the requirements of section
101(b)(1)(E)?
   The petitioner finds support for his position that his natural sibling
is eligible for immigration benefits by virtue of their relationship to a
common natural parent in Matter of Fujii, 

 (D.D.
1967).2 In that case, a district director held that the relationship of
brother and sister created by the legitimate birth of siblings to the same
parents is not destroyed by the subsequent adoption of a sibling, and,
therefore, the natural siblings of the adopted child are entitled to any
immigration benefit generally available to siblings.

  2 We note that Matter of Fujii, supra, was a decision of a district director and does not
constitute a precedent for this Board. See 

(g), 103.3(c) (1993); Matter of
Bennett,   19 1&N Dec. 21, 23 n.2 (BIA 1984).
Interim Decision #3207

   On the other hand, the Service submits that a parent/child
relationship ceased to exist between the petitioner and his natural
parents subsequent to his adoption and that thereafter his natural
parents' other children, including the beneficiary, could no longer
qualify as his siblings within the scope of the Act. The Service cites
Matter of Kong, 

 (BIA 1979), in support for this
position.
   As a starting point, we note that the Act does not define "brother"
or "sister," but does define the terms "child," "parent," "father," and
"mother." The relevant portions of section 101(b)(1) provide:
   The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who
   is—
      (A) a legitimate child;


      (E) a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the child has been in the
   legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two
   years: Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by
   virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this
   Act.... 3
   Section 101(b)(2) of the Act provides that the term "parent,"
"father," or "mother" means a parent, father, or mother only where
the relationship "exists" by reason of any of the circumstances set
forth in section 101(bX1).
   The Board has long held that in order to qualify as siblings under
section 203(a)(5) of the Act, a petitioner must establish that he and the
beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent within the
meaning of sections 101(b)(1) and (2) of the Act. See Matter of
Mourillorz, 

 (BIA 1981); Matter of Kong, supra; Matter
of Ferreira, 

 (BIA 1978); Matter of Clahar, 

 (BIA 1978); Matter of Bourne, 

 (BIA 1977);
Matter of Gur, 16 I&N Dec- 123 (BIA 1977); Matter of Behman, 

 (BIA 1975); Matter of Garner, 

, 216 n.2
(BIA 1975), and cases cited therein; Matter ofHeung, 

(BIA 1974).
  This "once qualified" rule has been applied to "give effect to the
time limitations set out in the Act's definition of 'child', while
recognizing that the circumstances creating the relationship are
unaffected by the passage of time, marriage of the child, or even
death." Matter of Kong, supra, at 153. As we explained in Kong,

   3 That the adoptive relationship could be used as a means to circumvent the
immigration laws has been a concern of long standing. See Matter of Fakalata, 

, 218 n.2 (BIA 1982); Matter of B-, 

 (BIA 1960); Act of Sept. 11,
 1957. 

§ 2, 

.
                                                   Interim Decision #3207

however, this language was not intended to suggest that the status of
"parent," once established, could not be terminated. In Kong, we
clarified that to qualify as siblings under section 203(a)(5) of the Act, a
petitioner must establish both that he and the beneficiary once
qualified as children of a common parent and that the parental
relationship has not been severed. In that case, we found that a sibling
relationship created by an adoption did not survive for immigration
purposes the termination of the adoption. Although the petitioner and
beneficiary "once qualified" as sister and brother, they no longer
qualified as siblings under the Act because they no longer had a
common parent. The petitioner's adoptive parents were not her
"parents" at the time the visa petition was filed because the
relationship between them and her had been severed.
   Does the parent/child relationship between natural parents and
child survive for immigration purposes when a child has been
adopted? Section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act defines the adoptive child
relationships that will be recognized under the Act. Under that section,
there must be a legal adoption while the child is under 16 years of age
and the child must have been in the legal custody of, and have resided
with, the adopting parent or parents for at least 2 years. If "such" an
adoption occurs, the child is recognized as the child of the adoptive
parent or parents, and no natural parent can thereafter by virtue of
such parentage be accorded any "right, privilege, or status" under the
Act. See section 101(b)(1XE) of the Act; Matter of 5-, 

(BIA 1962); Matter of K-, 

 (BIA 1960). If an adoption
occurs, but it does not satisfy the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E),
the relationship between the natural parent and the child continues to
be recognized under the Act. See Matter of B , supra. Thus, for
                                                     -


purposes of any "right, privilege, or status" under the Act, a child may
be recognized as the child of his or her natural parents or of his or her
adoptive parent or parents, but not of both. The determinative test is
whether an. adoption occurred that satisfied the requirements of
section 101(b)(1XE). If "such" an adoption has occurred, any right,
privilege, or status of the natural parents under the Act is thereafter
terminated. Thus, natural parents no longer have the "status" of
parents under the Act once "such" an adoption has occurred.
Accordingly, where there is "such" an adoption, a sibling relationship
will not be recognized for immigration purposes based simply on the
fact that the petitioner and beneficiary "once qualified" as children of
a common natural parent because it can no longer be shown that the
natural parent has the "status" under the At of "parent" of the
adopted child.
   We note that in Matter of Lum, 

 (BIA 1964), we
added a gloss to the language of section 101(b)(I)(E) of the Act that we
Interim Decision #3207

now fmd cannot be supported by the words of the statute. In Matter of
Lum, we held that the term "such adopted child" contained in the
proviso to section 101(b)(1)(E)—that no natural parent of any such
adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded
any right, privilege, or status under this Act—"obviously means an
adopted child who under the terms of the section is eligible for—or has
obtained—an immigration benefit." 

.4 As such, we considered
the proviso barring a natural parent from receiving an immigration
benefit to be inapplicable where an adopted child had received no
immigration benefit from his or her adoptive status and as a matter of
either law or fact was in no position to claim such benefit. Consequently, in the factual context of Lum, where an adopted child had not
received an immigration benefit by virtue of her adoption and where
her adoptive parents were dead or presumed dead, we held that the
fact of her adoption was immaterial to the eligibility of her natural
mother for immediate relative status based upon their natural
relationship.
   However, contrary to our holding in Matter of Lum, we do not find
it "obvious" from a plain reading of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act
that the proscription on its application was only intended to be
applicable where an adopted child had received, or could receive or
confer, an immigration benefit by virtue of his or her adoption. There
is no support for this finding in the language of section 101(b)(1)(E),
and simply terming it "obviously" correct does not make it so. That
section, by its express terms, makes no distinction between adopted
children on the basis of whether they have received or conferred, or
whether they remain eligible to receive or confer, an immigration
benefit by virtue of their adoptive status. Congress could have written
the proviso in the manner enunciated in Lum, but it did not do so.
Rather, the restrictive language of that section, defining an adopted
child by virtue of the child's having met age, custody, and residence
requirements, proscribes, without qualification, any right, privilege, or
status to the natural parent of "any such child." Where an adoption
has occurred which meets the definitional requirements of section
101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, there simply is no statutory basis by which the
phrase "any such child" can be qualified to allow "any right, privilege,
or status" thereafter to be accorded to a natural parent of an adopted
  4 Compare Matter of Greenwood, 

 (BIA 1983), where we held that a
similar proviso in section 101(b)(1)(F) of the Act operates to forever bar an eligible
orphan from conferring immigration benefits upon his or her natural parents. The
proviso relating to the natural parents of orphans in section 101(b)(1)(F) is identical to
the proviso in section 101(b)(1)(E), except for the fact that it also addresses any prior
adoptive parent that the orphan may have had.
                                           end
                                                             Interim Decision #3207

child simply because no immigration benefit had been or could be
accorded by virtue of the adoption.
   Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous it must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive since there is a strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 

, 432 n.12 (1987); North Dakota
v. United States, 

 (1983). Words are to be interpreted
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. See Perrin
v. United States, 

 (1979). We look to the legislative
history to determine only whether there is "'clearly expressed legislative intention— contrary to statutory language, which would require us
to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent
through the language it chooses. United States v. Tames, 

 (1986) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 

 (1980)). In this case, there is no
legislative history for section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act which indicates a
congressional intent contrary to our interpretation of the plain
meaning of the statutory language. See H.R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016.
   In accordance with the plain meaning of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the
Act, we hold that an adoption that meets the requirements of that
section in all instances, whether or not an immigration benefit has
been or could be obtained by virtue thereof, precludes a natural parent
of any such adopted child from being thereafter accorded any right,
privilege, or status under the Act. In so holding, we overrule Matter of
Lum, supra, and its progeny, Matter of Valsamakis, 

(BIA 1967), to the extent the holdings in those cases are inconsistent
with our holding today. We also withdraw from the language in Matter
of Kirby, 

 (BIA 1969), which references Matter of
Lum.
   We finally note that we are not persuaded by the district director's
analysis in Matter of ujii, supra, that a sibling relationship created by
the legitimate birth of a petitioner and beneficiary to the same parent
is not terminated by the subsequent adoption of the petitioner in
compliance with the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E). The district
director found the following determinative:
  Section 101(b)(1)(E) ... contains the proscription that no natural parent of an
  adopted child described in that section "shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage
  be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act." However, neither that
  section nor any other provision of the immigration laws, contains a similar
  proscription with regard to brothers, sisters or other natural relatives of the adopted
  child.
Id. at 497. However, the familial definitions in section 101(b) of the
Act exclusively relate to parent/child relationships and only those

                                         Inc
Interim Decision #3207


relationships are defined. All other familial relationships are dependent on these definitions. That is, to determine whether a sibling
relationship will be recognized, one must look to the parent/child
definitions as a starting point. It would neither be expected that there
would be a reference to siblings or other relatives in the section
 101(b)(1)(E) proviso nor necessary that there should be. A sibling
relationship can only be recognized through the fact of having a
common parent within the definition of the Act. If a natural parent
loses his or her "status" as a "parent" under the Act as a result of the
proviso to section 101(b)(1)(E), then no sibling relationships can be
recognized through that parent as there is no longer a parental
relationship that is recognized under the Act.
   We note that if one were to accept the analysis of the district
director in Matter of Fujii, .supra, the restrictive proviso of section
101(b)(1)(E) could be rendered meaningless over time. For example,
under the district director's interpretation of the law, a child adopted
in accordance with the terms of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act could,
subsequent to his or her naturalization, petition for immigrant benefits
on behalf of a natural sibling, who could then, in turn, petition for the
natural parent that he or she shares with the adopted child. Over time,
this would allow for the use of adoption as a means for an adopted
child's natural parents to immigrate as a direct result of the adoption.
Accordingly, we disapprove of the reasoning and holding in Matter of
Fujii, supra.
   The basis for revocation of the previously approved visa petition in
this case was the Service's determination that, as a matter of law, the
beneficiary was ineligible for classification as the sibling of the
petitioner. We uphold that determination. Since the petitioner qualified as an adopted child within the definition of section 101(b)(1)(E) of
the Act, he is precluded from successfully petitioning for visa
preference classification on behalf of his natural sibling. To the extent
that a relationship between the petitioner and his natural parents was
terminated by virtue of his adoption, he cannot now establish that he
and the beneficiary are children of a common parent as is required by
the Act for the purpose of establishing a sibling relationship. Section
203(a)(5) of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner's appeal of the
revocation of the previously approved visa petition will be dismissed.
  ORDER:          The appeal is dismissed.




                                  706