20 Md. App. 254 - Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ . . . Your Honor, the defense would proffer that if James Watkins of the Public Defender’s staff was allowed to testify he would state that on the date of January 26, 1973 he had a telephone conversation with Officer Edward Brown of the Baltimore City Police Department. In the course of that conversation Mr. Watkins was informed that the deceased Johnnie Smith, on visiting the hospital [sic], being confronted by Officer Brown, was told [sic] that this incident was an accident. “THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection. Do you object to the proffer? “MR. WASE [State’s Attorney]: Yes, Your Honor. I do. “THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection to the proffer. “THE COURT: I haven’t made my ruling yet. For the following reasons the testimony would be double hearsay and would be admissible only if it was shown that a statement made by the deceased, alleged statement made by the deceased was a dying declaration. There’s no evidence whatever to show that it was such. . . . For that reason the Court will not allow the witness to testify to the hearsay statements or to any statements, such statements made by the decedent on the grounds that they were a dying declaration. You now have an exception.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Smith v. State

2. ““In the case at bar, the critical ‘fact, as to which the prior self-contradiction is predicated’ is an ostensible statement from the ultimate murder victim, from his hospital bed, to Officer Brown, in which he stated that the gun had gone off by accident. That statement was neither shown nor alleged to have been ‘a dying declaration.’ It did not, therefore, qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule, and was inadmissible as direct evidence. Since the appellant could not have offered evidence of such a statement ‘for any purpose independently of the self-contradiction [of Officer Brown],’ the fact of the statement was ‘collateral’ and not ‘material.’ Under the circumstances, Judge Harris ruled properly in refusing to permit extrinsic evidence for the purpose of contradicting the trial testimony of Officer Brown that he had never heard such a statement. . . ’ 20 Md. App. at 260 (emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Smith v. State

3. ““The cross-examination of Officer Brown in the first instance was undoubtedly proper, even if the ostensible statement made by him to James Watkins was as to a ‘collateral’ fact rather than a ‘material’ fact. With respect to merely ‘collateral’ matters, however, the cross-examiner must ‘take the answer.’ He may only introduce extrinsic evidence of contradiction where the statement in issue was as to a ‘material’ fact . ...” 20 Md. App. at 257 (emphasis added).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Smith v. State