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20 N.C. 150

Hooper v. Hooper

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided December 15, 1838

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1838-12-15

<p>Where a deed of gift conveys the immediate, absolute and entire interest in a slave, an endoisement made thereon by the donee at the same time when the deed was executed, stipulating that the slave “may be at the disposal of the ' donor during his life,” will not operate as a reservation of a life estate by the donor, but will be regarded at law, only as an executory covenant on the part of the donee that the donor during his life shall have the enjoyment of the slave, for the breach of which covenant the donee will be answerable in damages ; though in equity, the donor would probably be regarded as taking an interest for life.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently December 1838

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1838-12-15

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Gaston, Judge.

¶1We entirely approve of the opinion given by his Honor upon the legal construction of the deed from Susanna, to Henry Hooper. Admit, as the plaintiff’s counsel insists, that the endorsement, being cotempbraneoús with the deed, should be regarded as a part thereof, it by no , means follows that the meaning of what is declared by the endorsement, would be thereby changed. This endorsement speaks the language of the donee, and is a declaration or stipulation on his part in relation to the precedent subject matter. The legal limitation of the gift is the language of the donor, who had the sole right to prescribe the extent and modifications of her donation. This limitation is immediate and absolute — and therefore passes directly the entire property from the donor to the donee. The subsequent declaration or stipulation on the part of the donee is an engagement *152that during the life of the donor she shall have the disposal— that is, the enjoyment of the thing which has been transferred to him. At law, it can be regarded but as an executory covenant, for the breach whereof he would be answerable in damages. In equity, the donor would probably be regarded as taking an interest for life — but however this might be it could not affect the legal operation of the instrument. The judgment below is affirmed.

¶2Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.

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