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← 20 NY2D 98 - People v. Marsh

People v. Marsh’s Empirical Analysis

1967

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
11
states following
April 2017
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 38 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2017 · most notably United States v. Robinson (1973), 7 Cal. 3d 186 - People v. Superior Court (1972)

4 federal appellate · 38 state decisions — followed in 11 states

270196719701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Preston v. United States · 19 Ill. 2d 11 - The People v. Watkins · 97 Okla. Crim. 299 - Brinegar v. State · People v. Zeigler · 19 Ill. 2d 136 - The People v. Mayo

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The search for weapons is a special exception to the proscription against warrantless searches, and it should not be extended beyond its purpose of securing the safety of the officer and preventing an escape. A motorist who exceeds the speed limit does not thereby indicate any propensity for violence or iniquity, and the officer who stops the speeder has not even the slightest cause for thinking that he is in danger of being assaulted. We can only conclude that, even though the `rules of criminal law are generally applicable' to traffic violations [citation], the Legislature never intended to authorize a search of a traffic offender unless, when the vehicle is stopped, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the officer is in danger or there is probable cause for believing that the offender is guilty of a crime rather than merely a simple traffic infraction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “the statutory scheme does not contemplate treating him as a common criminal to be booked, photographed, fingerprinted and jailed. It is equally degrading — and most assuredly not the Legislature's intention — to subject him to the affront of a search when one is not necessary for the proper execution of the warrant. In short, no search for a weapon is authorized as incident to an arrest for a traffic infraction, regardless of whether the arrest is made on the scene or pursuant to a warrant, unless the officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has committed a crime [other than a traffic offense].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “the Legislature never intended to authorize a search of a traffic offender unless, when the vehicle is stopped, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the officer is in danger or there is probable cause for believing that the offender is guilty of a crime rather than merely a simple traffic violation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.