Commonwealth v. Deloney’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] writ ... should be granted only upon a showing that: 1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or 2) the lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great justice and irreparable injury would result.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Peterson v. Shake · Arnold v. Commonwealth

2. “If the trial judge's findings of fact in the underlying action are not clearly erroneous, i.e. , are supported by substantial evidence, then the appellate court's role is confined to determining whether those facts support the trial judge's legal conclusion.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Scanlon v. Scanlon · Tavadia v. Mitchell

3. “As a general rule, a mistrial granted on the defendant's motion removes any double jeopardy bar to a retrial. Stamps v. Commonwealth, [ 648 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.1983)]; Silverburg v. Commonwealth, [ 587 S.W.2d 241 (Ky.1979)]. In United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), a narrow exception to this rule was recognized "where `bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor,' threatens the `[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict' the defendant." Id. at 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081 (citations omitted). In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), the Court clarified that "bad-faith conduct" means an "intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause," and "[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion." Id. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2089 . Our case law is of similar import. Tinsley v. Jackson, [ 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky.1989)] ("party seeking to prevent his retrial upon double jeopardy grounds must show that the conduct giving rise to the order of mistrial was precipitated by bad faith, overreaching or some other fundamentally unfair action of the prosecutor or the court”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terry v. Commonwealth