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← 20 U.S. 535 - Blight's v. Rochester

Blight's v. Rochester’s Empirical Analysis

20 U.S. 535 · 1822

Citation profile

75
cited by 75 later decisions
10
cited 10 times by the Supreme Court
18
states following
February 1963
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 34 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 75 later decisions (10 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 1963 · most notably Merrit Martin v. William C Waddell (1842), Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer (1892)

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 34 state decisions — followed in 18 states

140182218301840185018601870188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Columbian Insurance Company v. Wheelright · Harden v. Fisher

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““If lie Is bound in law to admit a title which has no existence in reality, It is not on the doctrine of estoppel that he is bound. It is because, by receiving a conveyance of a title which is deduced from Dunlap, the moral policy of the law will not permit Mm to contest that title. This principle originates in the relation between lessor and lessee, and so far as respects them, is well established, and ought to be maintained. The title of the lessee is in fact the title of the lessor. He comes in by virtue of it, he holds by virtue of it, and rests upon it to maintain and justify his- possession. He professes to have no independent right in himself, and it is part of the very essence of the contract under which he claims that the paramount ownership of the lessor shall be acknowledged during the continuance of the lease, and that possession shall be surrendered at its expiration. He cannot be allowed to controvert the title of the lessor, without disparaging his own, and he cannot set up the title of another without violating that contract by which hq obtains and holds possession, and breaking that faith.which he has pledged and the obligation of which is still continuing, and in full operation.””
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The plaintiffs show no lido in themselves, but allege and prove that the title under which the defendant claims is derived from their ancestor. They therefore insist that the defendant is bound in good faith to admit this title, and surrender the premises to them. But the sole principle on which this claim is founded is that the defendant must trace his title up to their ancestor, and Is bound, therefore, to admit it. But if the deed of the defendant does not refer to their ancestor, and the record does not convey this information, the defendant holds in opposition to the title of John Dunlap, or claims to have acquired that title. If he holds under an adversary title, his right to contest that of Dunlap is admitted. It he claims under a sale from Dunlap, and Dunlap himself is compelled to aver that he does, then the plaintiffs themselves assert a title against this contract. Unless they show that it was conditional, and that Ihe condition is broken, they cannot, in the very act of disregarding it themselves, insist that it binds the defendant in good faith to acknowledge a title which has no real existence.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““ The vendee acquires the property for himself, ¡and .his faith is not pledged to maintain the title- of the vendor. The rights of the -vendor are intended to bo extinguished by the sale, and he has no continuing interest in the maintenance of his title, unless he should be called upon in consequence of some covenant or warranty in his deed. The property having become by>the salé the property of the vendee, he has a right to fortify that 'title by1 the purchase of any other which may protect him in the quiet enjoyment of the premises. No principle of morality restrains -him from doing this, nor is either the letter or the spirit of the contract violated by it,” page 548.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.