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20 Va. 692

May v. Joynes

Supreme Court of Virginia

Decided February 15, 1871

Supreme Court of Virginia · decided 1871-02-15

<p>Jolm 3?. May, of Petersburg, died in July, 1856,, leaving, surviving him, his wife, Margaret B. May, and two daughters. One of the daughters, Mrs. Bayly,. was a widow, whose husband died shortly before the testator, and had two daughters; both under age. The other daughter of the testator was the wife of William T. Joynes, and had a daughter and two sons; all under age. These grandchildren were all living at the date of the testator’s will, and were the only grandchildren then living; and they and their mothers were the only descendants of the testator.</p> <p>The testator left a will dated May 21, 1853, and several codicils. A question «arose whether, upon the true construction of the will, the widow took a fee simple in the real estate, except that embraced by the second codicil, and an absolute title to the personal property, or only a life estate in both. This question depended on the second clause of the will, which is as follows:</p> <p>“ 2. I give to my beloved and excellent wife, subject to the provisions hereafter declared, my whole estate^ real and personal, and especially all real estate which I may hereafter acquire, to her during her life, but with full power to make sale of any part of the said estate, and to convey absolute titles to the purchasers; and use the purchase money for investment or any purpose that she pleases; with only this restriction, that whatever remains at her death, shall, after paying any debts she may owe, or any legacies that she may leave, be divided as follows.” He then gave one moiety to three trustees in trust for the use of his daughter Evelyn and her children, during her life, paying to her five hundred dollars per annum, semi-annually; and at her death to be equally divided between them. And he gave the other moiety to trustees for the use of his daughter Margaret and her children, during her life, with the same annuity; and at her death to be equally divided between them, and the survivors of them. Out of the profits of this moiety, he wishes §500 to be paid to each of his grandsons for five years after they respectively come of age, unless their mother should deem it right to withhold it in whole or in part. And there were farther limitations over upon the death of any of the grandchildren. He appoints his wife executrix, with power to appoint executors of his will to succeed her.</p> <p>In the first codicil he provides that, in case of the marriage of his granddaughter Anna Joynes, he wishes an annnity of $500 for five years, out of her mother’s share of his estate, hut with her consent only, to he paid to Anna. And he makes the like provision in favor of Anna and Evelyn Baily.</p> <p>By the second codicil he refers to a sum of nearly $5,000 which his wife will derive from the United States, for the naval services of her father; and that he had directed an investment of $6,000, which he considers' wholly hers.If she dies without disposing of it, he wishes each of their five grandchildren, then living, to-have one thousand dollars of the principal, and the other thousand dollars of the principal and all the interest to be divided between his two daughters, for-their sole and separate use respectively. And he appoints his sons-in-law executors after the death of his wife. There was a devise in this codicil of a tract' of ‘ land to the wife of "William B. Green, about which-there was no dispute.</p> <p>To settle the construction of this second clause off the will, a friendly suit in chancery was instituted im the Circuit court of Petersburg, at Uovember term,., 1856. The bill was filed by the children of Mrs.. Joynes. Mrs. May, in her own right and as executrix of her husband, Mrs. Bayly and her children, and Mrs. Joynes and her husband, were made defendants.</p> <p>The bill insisted that Mrs. May was entitled to the real and personal property for her life only; and that the plaintiffs, who claimed to be interested in remainder, were entitled to demand from her an inventory of all such money and personal property in her hands, as she elected to hold as legatee; and like inventories, from time to time, as other money or personal property should come into her hands as legatee; and as she should, under the power given her by the will, convert one sort of property into another; and that they were also entitled to require that she should register the slaves that had come, or might-come, to her hands as legatee, as provided by the statute. Code of 1849, ch. 103, sec. 8. The prayer of the bill was, that the court would construe the will and settle the rights of the parties, and order Mrs. May, as tenant for life, to file the inventories and to make the registry of slaves, as the plaintiffs claimed they had a right to demand.</p> <p>The answer of Mrs. May claimed that she was entitled absolutely to the whole estate, real and personal, except that embraced in the second codicil; and denies the right of the plaintiffs to demand of her an inventory or a registry of the slaves. Answers were filed by the other defendants, all of which, so far as they related to the rights claimed by Mrs. May, were merely formal, and submitted the question to the decision of the court. The following facts were argued in the pleadings; that the testator, at the date of the will, was about seventy years of age, and his wife nearly as old; that the testator’s estate consisted of land, slaves, money and other personalty, worth not less than $200,000, and yielding an income of about $12,000 per annum; that the debts were of inconsiderable amount; that the husbands of the testator’s daughters were men in easy circumstances; that the testator was a man of ability and sound judgment, a lawyer of distinction ■ and great experience, and was for several years a judge of the General court.</p> <p>The case was heard, by consent, on the bill and answers, and the Circuit court being of opinion that Mrs. May was not entitled to a fee simple in the real estate and an absolute title to the personal property, as claimed by her, but was entitled only to a life estate in both classes of property: decreed that she should file the inventories, and make the registry of slaves, prayed for by the bill.</p> <p>Mrs. May, in her own right and as executrix of John E. May, dec’d, applied for an appeal from this decree, which was allowed.</p>

Decided 1871-02-15

Allen, P.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2This day came the parties, by their counsel, and the-court having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the decree aforesaid, and the arguments of' counsel, is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that the Circuit court erred in holding that Margaret B. May is not entitled to a fee simple in the real estate, and an absolute property in the personal estate, of her late husband, John F. May, deceased, under his last will and testament, as-claimed by her in her answer; but that she is entitled . to the same, except the part embraced by the second codicil, for life only, with remainder to the children' and grand-children of the testator. The court then reversed the decree of the Circuit court, with costs, and proceeded: “And this court, proceeding to pronounce; *715such decree as the said Circuit court ought to have pronounced, doth declare that, by the last will and testament of John F. May, the said Margaret B. May is entitled to a fee simple in the real estate, and an absolute property in the personal estate, of her late husband, the said John F. May, deceased, under his last will and testament, as claimed by her in her answer; and that the limitation over of whatever remains at her death is inconsistent with, and repugnant to, such fee simple and absolute property in said real and personal estate, and fails for uncertainty; and doth adjudge and decree that such are the rights of said Margaret B. May under said will; and that no interest vested in the other parties by the limitation over in said will.” The court proceeded, therefore, to dismiss the bill with costs.

¶3Samuels, J., dissented.

¶4Decree reversed.

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