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20 Vt. 9

State v. Carpenter

Supreme Court of Vermont

Decided October 15, 1847

Supreme Court of Vermont · decided 1847-10-15

<p>In an indictment against one for endeavoring to prevent a witness, recognized to appear and testify before the grand jury, from appearing and testifying, the indictment in the original case, in which the witness was recognized to appear, need not he recited; nor does the gnilt or innocence of the respondent depend upon the sufficiency of that indictment, or upon the guilt, or innocence, of the respondent in that case.</p> <p>The attempt, whether successful, or not, to obstruct the due administration of justice, by preventing the attendance of witnesses upon the trial of a case, is a substantive offence, punishable by the common law.</p> <p>An allegation, in an indictment for such offence, that the respondent, “ being an evil disposed person, and contriving and intending to obstruct and impede the due course of justice,” “ unlawfully and unjustly did endeavor to dissuade, hinder and prevent” the witness from appearing and testifying in a certain criminal prosecution named, sufficiently shows, that the respondent knew of the existence of that prosecution and of the obligation of the witness to attend.</p>

Relies on State v. Keyes

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1847-10-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently October 1984

1 federal appellate · 9 state decisions

30184718501860187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Davis, J.

¶2A verdict of guilty having been rendered in the county court, a motion in arrest of judgment was filed by the respondent, founded wholly upon supposed defects in the indictment. The motion was overruled in that court, and exceptions were taken and allowed ; which brings the same questions regularly before us.

¶3*12Much of the argument at the bar has been expended upon supposed irregularities in the original proceedings against Goodale and Poor, and insufficiencies in the indictment against them prepared and laid before the grand jury. That indictment is not recited, and need not be, in the present; it is no , consequently, before us. In offences of this kind guilt or innocer, le does not depend upon the guilt or innocence of the original j. arty, against whom the witness may be subpoenaed, or recognized, i appear ; nor upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the original 'ndictment. To thwart or obstruct the due administration of justice by violence, bribery, threats, or other unlawful means, whether in preventing the attendance of witnesses, jurymen, or other officers of court, is a high handed offence, which strikes at the vitals of judicial proceedings, and subjects to severe animadversion in every well ordered community. The attempt to commit such an act, it is well settled, is itself a substantive offence, punishable by the common law.

¶4In this instance, the attempt was unsuccessful; the witness, Warren, attended court and testified before the grand jury, as he had bound himself by recognizance to do. Moreover, the parties, against whom he appeared, must be taken to have been innocent of the crime imputed to them; and, in addition to this, the indictment against them, if in the description of the offence it followed the complaint preferred before the magistrate, I am inclined to think was fatally defective. Still, all these circumstances are entirely consistent with the respondent’s guilt. Since the case of State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, it is quite unnecessary to pursue this subject at any length. That case, in fact, is a decisive authority against the respondent here on nearly every point raised, except one; and that is the objection, that the indictment does not allege, that the respondent knew of the existence of the proceedings against Poor and Goodale, or of the obligation of Warren to attend as a witness.

¶5It is true, that the information there filed distinctly stated these particulars. The objection now chiefly relied upon was of course not made there; and the case is no farther an authority, than that one attorney supposed the allegation to be material. Some members of the court at first entertained doubts on this point alone; but ■full consideration has removed those doubts.

¶6The indictment has followed very exactly the form given in Chit*13ty, and other books published in this country. Knowledge to a certain extent is undoubtedly implied in the very description of the offence; and to that extent, at least, this indictment is not subject to just exception. Its language is, “ being an evil disposed person and contriving and intending to obstruct and impede the due course of justice,” “ unlawfully and unjustly did endeavor to dissuade, hinder and prevent the said William Warren” &c.

¶7This is sufficiently distinct and definite in that respect; and the bill of exceptions shows, that the evidence adduced fully satisfied every reasonable requirement of the law.

¶8The result is, that the respondent take nothing by his motion.

¶9The respondent not being present in court, no sentence was passed, but his bonds were estreated.

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