dissent">CAYTON, Judge

(dissenting).

In the first place defendant was entitled to judgment on the ground that there was no consideration for the note. The uncon-tradicted evidence was that neither she nor her brother owed anything to plaintiff. The statement in a deposition, that the note was for “a debt” has no probative value and indeed no actual meaning.

More important, the trial court should have found that the note was given under duress. Defendant was confronted by two armed men, one a Chicago detective (Cham-berlin) and the other dressed as a D. C. Metropolitan policeman, both of their guns being visible. Chamberlin said he had papers for the arrest of her brother (present at the time) and both men told her they would take her brother back to Chicago to answer criminal charges (actually there were no such charges) unless she signed a note. In fear of the threat by the armed men, she signed. This was a holdup, not a commercial transaction. And defendant’s testimony was uncontradicted, for it was not touched by the conclusionary and hearsay statements in plaintiff’s deposition.

This type of situation is one of the ugliest arising in the law of contracts or negotiable instruments. It involves robbing a human being of his volition and forcing him to sign a paper acknowledging a debt, whether a debt existed or not. In this case there was the awesome might of two armed men, obviously able to immediately carry out their threat to arrest defendant’s brother and haul him off to face prosecution in another state. Pitting that might and that threat against defendant’s natural affection for her brother and her urge to protect him, it is *86small wonder that she capitulated. The law does not say that she is liable on the note because she should have been more stalwart or courageous. In situations like this the law in modern times has consistently protected the weak and the timid, and many courts, including this one, have sternly said that recovery may not be had on a note or other contract obtained under such circumstances. See e. g., O’Toole v. Lamson, 41 App.D.C. 276 (1914); Meisel v. Alexander, D.C.Mun.App., 111 A.2d 873 (1955); Rizzi v. Fanelli, D.C.Mun.App., 63 A.2d 872 (1949). See also Restatement, Contracts, Sections 492-495 (1932).

The trial court gave no reasons for its decision and made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. If the decision was made on factual grounds it was manifestly wrong in rejecting defendant’s uncontradict-ed evidence. If it was based on legal grounds it is completely unsupportable. By any standard it is a wholly unjust and erroneous decision.

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