State v. Hancich’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
73 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 73 later decisions — most recently October 2019 · most notably State v. Pollitt (1987), State v. Day (1995)
73 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Morrissey v. Brewer · Gagnon v. Scarpelli · Zant v. Stephens · Local 408, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Board · State v. Evans
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“While 'legal' impairment is conclusively established where a person's blood alcohol percentage falls between .07 and .1 percent, the version of General Statutes § 14-227a(d)(4) in effect when this offense was committed did not create a similar presumption of guilt, based on blood alcohol percentage, with respect to the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor as defined in General Statutes § 14-227a(a). The former § 14-227a(d)(4) provided that a blood alcohol level of 'ten-hundredths of one per cent or more ... shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of this section.' That section thus created only a rebuttable presumption that a person was 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor' where his or her blood alcohol level was found to equal or exceed .1 percent. While evidence of such an alcohol level was sufficient to establish the state's prima facie case, the defendant was formerly allowed to introduce evidence to show that, despite a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than .1 percent, he or she had not been under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of arrest. Thus, although in the present case the defendant's blood alcohol level was measured at .165 percent, the possibility that she was merely impaired, and not under the influence, cannot be excluded as a matter of law under the former General Statutes § 14-227a(d)(4).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Despite being conceptually distinct parts of the Whistnant formulation, the third and fourth prongs are subject to the same evidentiary analysis.... [A reviewing court] will, therefore, analyze them simultaneously. The third prong of Whistnant requires that there [be] some evidence, introduced by either the state or the defendant, or by a combination of their proofs, which justifies conviction of the lesser offense.... The fourth prong requires that the proof on the element or elements which differentiate the lesser offense from the offense charged is sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“offered to allow [defense counsel] to retract [the] last peremptory challenge, and therefore, to accept as a member of the jury the recently excused [venireperson]. The trial court also offered to allow [defense counsel] an additional peremptory challenge. [Defense counsel] refused the offer[s]....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.