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← 200 MO 456 - Hockaday v. Lynn

Hockaday v. Lynn’s Empirical Analysis

1906

Citation profile

120
cited by 120 later decisions
28
states following
November 1994
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 111 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 120 later decisions — most recently November 1994 · most notably Darling v. Darling (1916), Collins Estate (1958)

5 federal appellate · 111 state decisions — followed in 28 states

2301906191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Sharkey v. McDermott · Van Matre v. Sankey · Humphries v. Davis · Keegan v. Geraghty · Lynn v. Hookaday

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 120 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““In fact, it may be laid down as a general conclusion that while the statute of adoption must be read into the statute of dower and that of descent and distribution, it is with this singularity, always to be observed, viz_, that the adopted child is so let in only for the purpose of preserving-in full its right of inheritance from its adoptive parent; and the door to inheritance is shut and its bolt shot at that precise point. If we look to our statute on adoption it will be found to be writ - large there that an adopted child bears only the badg-e and relation of child to the adopting- parent. In Revised Statute 1899, § 5246, it is provided that ‘if any person in this state shall desire to adopt any child * * * as his or her heir or devisee, it shall be lawful for such person to do the same deed,’ etc. The very next section (5247) provides that: ‘A married woman, by joining in the deed of adoption with her husband, shall, with her husband, be capable of adopting any child or children.’ It will thus be seen that, in the legislative mind, the effect of the adoption of a child is restricted to the adopting parent, and, hence, the adopted child does not become the child of a married woman by the adoption of her husband, but to become such child the adoption must be joined in by the wife.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““Consanguinity is so fundamental in statutes of descent and distribution that it may only be ignored by construction when courts are forced so to do either by the terms of express statute or by inexorable implication.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.