Seale v . Riordan CV-98-481-JD 03/01/00
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Michael A.R. Seale
v. Civil N o . 98-481-JD
Opinion N o . 2000 DNH 051
Denis Riordan, et a l .
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Michael Seale, brought claims against the
defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v . Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971),
alleging that he received inadequate medical care while in
detention at the Hillsborough County House of Corrections. The
court granted summary judgment for the defendant James O’Mara,
Superintendent of the Hillsborough County Department of
Corrections, in its order dated January 19, 2000. Now the
federal defendants Denis Riordan, Deputy District Director of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), and
Allan Greenbaum, Supervisor/Detention Enforcement Officer with
the INS, move for summary judgment (document n o . 7 9 ) , and Seale
objects.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record.
See Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). An issue
is only genuine if there is sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party, while a fact is
only material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of
the suit under the applicable law. See Bourque v . FDIC,
42 F.3d
704, 708 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing NASCO, Inc. v . Public Storage,
Inc.,
29 F.3d 2 8 , 32 (1st Cir. 1994)).
In response to a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party bears the burden to show a genuine
issue for trial by presenting significant material evidence in
support of the claim. See Tardie v . Rehabilitation Hosp., 168
F.3d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1999). The record evidence is taken in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Zambrana-Marrero v . Suarez-Cruz,
172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.
1999). Summary judgment will not be granted as long as a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving
party. Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
2
Background
I. Facts Relating to Seale’s Medical Care
On or about January 7 , 1998, Seale, who was in the custody
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), was sent
to be detained at the Hillsborough County Department of
Corrections (“HCDOC”), where he remained until August of 1998.
On January 8 , 1998, Seale completed an intake form concerning his
medical history. He reported that he took the drug coumadin, an
anticoagulant, on a daily basis since September of 1997 to treat
deep vein thrombosis. He also reported a history of “h/A” that
becomes worse if he misses a dose of coumadin. It is unclear
from the record what “h/A” means.
Seale claims that the first instance of inadequate medical
care occurred when he missed his daily dose of coumadin on
January 7 , the date of his transfer to HCDOC, allegedly because
he was not given the intake form until January 8 . The medical
notes from Seale’s file indicate that on January 7 , HCDOC
officials were aware of Seale’s coumadin prescription, although
the notes do not indicate whether Seale received his daily dose
on January 7 . Seale does not say whether he verbally requested a
dose of coumadin on January 7 , nor does he specifically allege
that anyone refused to give him his medication.
Seale alleges that on a number of other occasions during his
3
stay at HCDOC he was denied his daily dose of coumadin. Seale
identified two nurses, “Nurse Roy” and “Nurse Trish,” whom he
alleges offered him coumadin that was crushed and contaminated by
residue that he did not recognize but believed to be from a
previous patient’s medication. Consequently, he refused on these
occasions to take the medicine, and he claims that they refused
to replace i t . In addition, Seale claims that “Nurse Trish”
sometimes forgot to bring Seale his coumadin.
The medical notes indicate that roughly once a month,
Seale’s blood was drawn and tested, after which a physician, D r .
Stein, reviewed the lab results and indicated that Seale’s
coumadin prescription should continue. The notes do not
specifically reveal whether Seale was given coumadin on a daily
basis. On March 1 0 , 1998, the notes say that Seale refused to
take his medications, including coumadin, stating “he doesn’t
want these anymore.” The notes also say that Seale was “aware of
possible complication” resulting from his refusal to take the
drugs. On April 2 4 , 1998, the medical notes say that Seale was
to stop receiving coumadin a few days before he was scheduled to
have surgery, and was to resume after his surgery.
In addition to the alleged refusals to provide medication,
Seale claims that his requests to see a physician for rectal pain
and bleeding were ignored for approximately two months beginning
4
in late January of 1998. The medical notes and affidavits
indicate that the first time Seale met with a physician was
January 2 7 , 1998, for a physical. The notes make no mention of a
complaint or diagnosis of rectal pain or bleeding. The notes
reflect that on February 1 4 , 1998, a “sick slip” was recorded
that reported Seale’s rectal bleeding. Seale claims that this
was not the first time he had complained of pain and bleeding.
However, Seale does not indicate to whom he complained earlier or
who denied his earlier requests to see a physician.
Seale saw D r . Stein on February 1 7 , 1998, and was examined
and treated for his rectal distress. He had follow-up
appointments with Dr. Stein on March 6 and March 2 0 , 1998. On
April 1 3 , 1998, Seale visited a surgeon, after which he was
scheduled for rectal surgery on May 1 , 1998. Seale saw Dr. Stein
again on April 2 4 , 1998, and underwent surgery on May 1 , 1998.
Seale claims that between May 1 and June 4, 1998, and
between June 9 and July 7 , 1998, he never saw Dr. Stein. Seale
does not indicate that he requested to see a doctor during these
periods, or that anyone denied such a request. The medical
records indicate that Dr. Stein saw him on May 5 , 8 , and 2 6 .
Seale saw the surgeon on May 14 and again on June 4 , 1998, at
which time Seale says the surgeon advised that he might need a
second surgery but that other treatments would probably obviate
5
the need for further surgery. On July 2 4 , 1998, Dr. Stein
examined Seale, who was still complaining of rectal pain. On
August 1 8 , 1998, Seale was discharged from HCDOC.
II. Facts Relating to Federal Defendants’ Knowledge and Actions
On January 3 0 , 1998, Seale wrote a letter to the “Supervisor
in Charge” at the INS office in Boston. In the letter, he
complained that he had missed three consecutive daily doses of
coumadin and that his blood had not been drawn since arriving at
HCDOC. He also requested a transfer to another facility.
Riordan did not become aware of this letter until Seale filed
this lawsuit.
In June of 1998, Riordan received a letter from Rebecca
Feldman of the Boston College Immigration & Asylum Project.
Feldman wrote that Seale had complained to her of contracting an
infection at HCDOC from soiled underwear. He reported receiving
inadequate care for his infection, missing doses of coumadin, and
missing necessary blood monitoring. Riordan directed Greenbaum
to investigate Seale’s allegations.
Greenbaum went to HCDOC to investigate, and on June 1 2 ,
1998, he sent Riordan a memorandum summarizing his findings.
Greenbaum reported that he toured the property room and laundry
facilities at HCDOC and interviewed the housekeeping supervisor
6
at the jail. Apparently satisfied by the routine procedures in
place at HCDOC, Greenbaum believed that Seale had not been issued
soiled underwear upon arrival at the jail, as Seale claimed.
Greenbaum also reviewed Seale’s medical records and reported that
Seale was seen by a physician three days after the “sick slip”
mentioning rectal bleeding was submitted, received follow-up
care, was operated on and received post-operative care. Finally,
Greenbaum noted the dates on which Seale’s blood had been drawn
to monitor his coumadin dosage. Riordan read Greenbaum’s
memorandum and concluded that HCDOC’s laundry procedures posed no
risk of harm to inmates and that Seale was receiving appropriate
medical care.
Feldman wrote Riordan a second letter in July of 1998. She
wrote that Seale had complained that he was denied access to a
doctor, his blood monitoring had been delayed in June, he was
taken off coumadin when he had surgery, and his coumadin dosage
level was changed. Feldman also wrote that Seale complained of
being kept in the general population and his requests to return
to the medical unit were refused. If kept in the general
population, he required privacy to properly treat his rectal
condition, and this was not being arranged.
In response to this letter, Riordan contacted O’Mara and
arranged to meet with him and other HCDOC and INS officials to
7
discuss Seale’s situation. After this meeting, which occurred on
July 2 2 , 1998, Riordan was satisfied that Seale was receiving
adequate care at HCDOC. Riordan felt it unnecessary to transfer
Seale to another facility, though he could have done s o . Riordan
referred Seale’s matter to the INS Office of Internal Audit for
an independent investigation, but that office determined it did
not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
Discussion
As a pretrial detainee, Seale’s claims of inadequate medical
care arise from his constitutional due process right to be free
of punishment. See Bell v . Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979).
To establish that this right was violated, Seale must show that
he had a serious medical need, and that this need was treated
with deliberate indifference “tantamount to an intent to punish.”
Elliott v . Cheshire County,
940 F.2d 7 , 10 (1st Cir. 1991)
(applying standard to detainee claiming due process violation);
see also DesRosiers v . Moran,
949 F.2d 1 5 , 19 (1st Cir. 1991)
(applying standard in Eighth Amendment context).1
1
The standard for deliberate indifference to medical need is
essentially the same in the due process and Eighth Amendment
contexts. See City of Revere v . Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463
U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Mahan v . Plymouth County House of
Corrections,
64 F.3d 1 4 , 17-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (analyzing
8
Under a theory of supervisory liability, a supervisor may be
held liable only if a subordinate violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. See Aponte Matos v . Toledo Davila, 135
F.3d 182, 192 (1st Cir. 1998). In its order dated January 1 9 ,
2000, the court held that on the facts before it on summary
judgment pertaining to Seale’s medical care, there was no triable
issue that anyone acted with deliberate indifference to Seale’s
medical needs. The court is presented with the same facts on
this motion for summary judgment. Therefore, under a theory of
supervisory liability, Riordan and Greenbaum are entitled to
summary judgment.
As the defendants themselves point out, it is unclear from
the record whether Riordan and Greenbaum had supervisory
authority over the medical personnel who cared for Seale at
HCDOC. A more appropriate analysis might be whether Riordan and
Greenbaum themselves acted with deliberate indifference to
Seale’s medical needs -- Riordan by failing to transfer Seale to
another facility, and Greenbaum by failing to thoroughly
investigate Seale’s allegations. “To demonstrate deliberate
indifference a plaintiff must show (1) a grave risk of harm, (2)
the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of that risk,
pretrial detainee’s claim using Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference standard).
9
and (3) his failure to take easily available measures to address
the risk.” Camilo-Robles v . Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1 , 7 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citing Manarite v . City of Springfield,
957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st
Cir.1992)); see also Farmer v . Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837, 844
(1994) (discussing standard for deliberate indifference in Eighth
Amendment context).
There is insufficient evidence to show that Seale was at a
grave risk of harm during his confinement at HCDOC. The medical
records and affidavits indicate that doctors and nurses regularly
and promptly saw him in response to his complaints. They ordered
and carried out a course of treatment and provided follow-up
care. The records show that nursing staff monitored Seale’s
blood on roughly a monthly basis and that his coumadin
prescription was maintained. There is no evidence that Seale
ever suffered adverse effects from an improper dosage or failure
to provide coumadin. Even if Seale did miss occasional doses of
his medication, the record fails to show that such negligence
would have put Seale in grave danger, or that the defendants had
any reason to know he would be in danger.
Furthermore, Riordan and Greenbaum took significant measures
to address Seale’s allegations as soon as they became aware of
them. Riordan never received Seale’s letter sent in January of
1998, and so was not aware at that time of Seale’s complaints.
10
Riordan requested Greenbaum to investigate within days of
receiving Feldman’s first letter in June of 1998. Greenbaum went
to HCDOC, explored the merits of Seale’s claims, and reported
back to Riordan promptly with his findings. Riordan acted
quickly again when he received Feldman’s second letter,
addressing the allegations personally with HCDOC officials and
staff. For these reasons, the court finds that there is no
triable issue of whether Riordan or Greenbaum acted with
deliberate indifference to Seale’s medical needs.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted (document n o . 7 9 ) . The clerk shall
enter judgment and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr.
District Judge
March 1 , 2000
cc: Michael Adrian Ricardo Seale, pro se
T . David Plourde, Esquire
11
