¶1dissenting.
¶2[¶ 22] If I believed N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15, could be constitutionally applied to Ru-bey, I would join in the majority’s analysis and interpretation of the statutory reference to “address” set forth in Part B of the majority opinion. However, Rubey committed the felony offenses of gross sexual imposition in 1985 and 1986. Those offenses are the basis for the obligation to register as a sex offender under a statute which did not exist at the time of his offenses. For the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, 598 N.W.2d 147,1 would hold the application of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15 to Rubey is a violation of the ex post facto provisions of the federal and state constitutions. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.