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2000 Ohio 205

State ex rel. McDulin v. Indus. Comm.

Ohio Supreme Court

Decided August 9, 2000

Ohio Supreme Court · decided 2000-08-09

Workers' compensation—Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in failing to include claimant's form 1999 "miscellaneous income" in the computation of claimant's average weekly wage.

Relies on Carrel v. Allied Products Corp. · State ex rel. Clark v. Industrial Commission · 89 Ohio St. 3d 390 - State ex rel. McDulin v. Industrial Commission

Decided 2000-08-09

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 
89 Ohio St.3d 390
.]




  THE STATE EX REL. MCDULIN, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
                                    OHIO, APPELLEE.
        [Cite as State ex rel. McDulin v. Indus. Comm., 
2000-Ohio-205
.]
Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in
        failing to include claimant’s form 1999 “miscellaneous income” in the
        computation of claimant’s average weekly wage.
       (No. 98-1593—Submitted April 25, 2000—Decided August 9, 2000.)
   APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD06-763.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} In early 1995, appellant-claimant Stephen G. McDulin filed
applications for workers’ compensation benefits with the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation. He alleged wrist problems stemming from an October 20, 1994
fall, while employed at Contract Communications Company (“CCC”).                   His
employer certified the claim as valid but expressed concern over the extent of
claimant’s disability.
        {¶ 2} Based on the employer’s certification, the claim was apparently
allowed without hearing. CCC appealed the decision, seemingly contesting the
validity of the claim and/or the payment of further compensation. That appeal was
dismissed as untimely by the appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio.
        {¶ 3} At the same time, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation set
claimant’s average weekly wage (“AWW”) and full weekly wage at $782.69, based
on wages of $33,096.46 divided by 42 2/7 weeks. Twenty months later, CCC sent
a letter to the bureau, which alleged that claimant’s claim was fictitious and
fraudulent. For reasons that are not clear, the commission interpreted the letter as
a request to review claimant’s full weekly and average weekly wages. A district
hearing officer halved the amount of claimant’s AWW, writing:
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       “It is the order of the District Hearing Officer that the Average Weekly
Wage is set at $391.11.
       “Based upon the reported wages [for] the year prior to the injury[,] of
$20,337.67 divided by 52 weeks worked. The claimant appears to have received
other monies that were reimbursement for truck and tools, etc. These monies were
not shown to be wages for purposes of including the amount in the figuring of the
Average Weekly Wage. Per the claimant’s contract, he had to provide a list of tools
and safety equipment which he appears to have been reimbursed for per testimony
and pay records. Reimbursement for the use of claimant’s truck may have been
part of the reimbursement plan.
       “The wages of $20,337.67 is [sic] based upon the accountant’s 10-2-96
correspondence and employer documents reporting wages for the claimant.”
       {¶ 4} A staff hearing officer modified the calculation slightly:
       “The full weekly wage and average weekly wage are set at $400.00 based
on testimony and evidence that claimant was being paid $10.00 per hour and
normally worked a 40 hour week. The remainder of claimant’s remuneration
consisted of expense reimbursements (i.e., per diem of lodging and meal expenses,
and expenses for the use of claimant’s truck and tool[s]), which are not properly
includable in claimant’s wages for purposes of calculating the full weekly wage
and average weekly wage. Claimant has not submitted any evidence in the form of
tax records (e.g., 1040s) to rebut this.”
       {¶ 5} Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in lowering his
AWW. The court of appeals disagreed and denied the writ.
       {¶ 6} This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
                               __________________
       Phillip J. Fulton & Associates and William A. Thorman III, for appellant.




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                                January Term, 2000




        Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
                              __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 7} “The average weekly wage of an injured employee at the time of the
injury or at the time disability due to the occupational disease begins is the basis
upon which to compute benefits.” R.C. 4123.61.
        {¶ 8} The “standard formula for establishing [average weekly wage] is to
divide claimant’s earnings for the year preceding injury by fifty-two weeks.” State
ex rel. Clark v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 563, 565
, 
634 N.E.2d 1014, 1016
. Claimant asks us to substitute the term “income” for the terms “wage” and
“earnings.” In so doing, claimant seeks to include the amount of “miscellaneous
income”—which represents reimbursement for lodging, meals, and tool and
trucking expenses—that his employer reported on federal tax form 1099. We
decline this invitation.
        {¶ 9} “Income” is not synonymous with “earnings” or “wages.” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary (1986) 714, defines “earnings” as “wages …
* earned as compensation for labor.” Similarly, wages constitute “monetary
remuneration by an employer … for labor or services.” Id. at 2568. “Income,”
on the other hand, represents “a gain or recurrent benefit that is [usually] measured
in money and for a given period of time, derives from capital, labor, or a
combination of both.” Id. at 1143. Income is a much broader term than “earnings”
or “wages,” and cannot, therefore, be used interchangeably.
        {¶ 10} This is important, because the distinction in terms transforms
claimant’s proposal into a request that we read into a statute words that are not
contained therein. This we cannot do. See Carrel v. Allied Products Corp. (1997),
78 Ohio St.3d 284, 288
, 
677 N.E.2d 795, 799
. Claimant cites other Revised Code
and Administrative Code sections that he claims refer more broadly to the concept




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of income.     Those provisions—most of which apply to unemployment, not
workers’ compensation—are, upon review, all inapplicable to the present case.
       {¶ 11} Claimant also argues that nothing in R.C. 4123.61 directs the
commission to exclude form 1099 “miscellaneous income” from the AWW
calculation. That contention is, however, double-edged, since nothing in that
provision demands or authorizes its inclusion. Again, R.C. 4123.61 explicitly
refers to average weekly wage, not average weekly income.
       {¶ 12} To hold as claimant advocates is inappropriate from a legal
perspective, for to do so would permit the inclusion into the AWW calculation of
dividends, interest, and other forms of income unrelated to claimant’s job
performance. This is clearly not what the General Assembly had in mind.
       {¶ 13} We recognize that in some situations, lodging, meals, etc. can be part
of the wage package. The commission acknowledged this, but found, in its order,
that claimant did not present evidence that the disputed money was indeed gainful
remuneration rather than simple reimbursement for expenses incurred by claimant.
The commission was particularly interested in viewing claimant’s 1040 form and
its categorization of the disputed amount, but claimant did not submit that
information.
       {¶ 14} We find, therefore, that the commission did not abuse its discretion
in failing to include claimant’s form 1099 “miscellaneous income” in the
computation of his AWW.
       {¶ 15} Absent inclusion of “miscellaneous income” into his AWW,
claimant alternatively asserts that the commission abused its discretion in using the
revised calculation that it did. This is a difficult argument to analyze, for it is
unclear what the claimant seeks.
       {¶ 16} R.C. 4123.61 allows the commission to deviate from the standard
AWW formula where there are “special circumstances” that render the traditional
formula untenable. The commission, in this case, reset claimant’s AWW by




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                                January Term, 2000




multiplying claimant’s $10 hourly wage by forty hours. Claimant argues that this
calculation is unfair because during some weeks he worked less than forty hours.
In the same breath, however, claimant then states that there were some weeks that
he worked more than forty hours. Given these facts, the commission’s decision to
simply average these variations out to a forty-hour work week should not be
considered an abuse of discretion.
       {¶ 17} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
                                                              Judgment affirmed.
       MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.
       DOUGLAS, J., dissents.
                                __________________




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