[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
89 Ohio St.3d 421.]
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HOMAN, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State v. Homan, 2000-Ohio-212.]
Criminal procedure—Police must strictly comply with established, standardized
procedures in administering field sobriety tests—R.C. 2945.72(E) does
not extend the time within which a criminal defendant must be brought to
trial when the state files additional related charges after the defendant
files a pretrial motion.
1. In order for the results of a field sobriety test to serve as evidence of
probable cause to arrest, the police must have administered the test in strict
compliance with standardized testing procedures.
2. When a criminal defendant files a pretrial motion and the state later files
against the defendant additional, related criminal charges, R.C. 2945.72(E)
does not extend the time within which the defendant must be brought to trial
on those additional charges.
(No. 99-1107—Submitted April 26, 2000—Decided August 16, 2000.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, No. E-97-100.
__________________
{¶ 1} On October 25, 1996, Trooper Andrew R. Worcester of the Ohio State
Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle driven by appellee, Marie Homan, who was
traveling with her six-year-old daughter. As a result of this vehicle stop, appellee
was ultimately charged with driving under the influence (“DUI”) in violation of
R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), driving left of center in violation of R.C. 4511.25(C), and child
endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(C)(1).
{¶ 2} At appellee’s trial, Trooper Worcester testified that he stopped
appellee’s vehicle after twice witnessing appellee drive left of center. When
Trooper Worcester approached appellee’s vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
alcohol on appellee’s breath and observed appellee’s eyes to be red and glassy.
Trooper Worcester administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”),1 walk- and-turn,2 and one-leg-stand3 tests. Trooper Worcester testified that, based upon the
results of these field sobriety tests, appellee’s demeanor, and appellee’s own
admission that she had consumed three beers, he placed appellee under arrest.
{¶ 3} During cross-examination, Trooper Worcester testified that, in
administering to appellee the HGN and walk-and-turn tests, he at times deviated
from established testing procedures. With respect to the HGN test, for example,
Trooper Worcester testified that, in observing appellee’s eyes for nystagmus at
maximum deviation, he did not hold appellee’s eyes at maximum deviation for a
full four seconds as standardized procedures require. In addition, in determining at
what angle appellee’s eyes began to exhibit nystagmus, Trooper Worcester did not,
as recommended, move the stimulus at a pace that would take a full four seconds
1. The HGN test is one of several field sobriety tests used by police officers in detecting whether a
driver is intoxicated. “Nystagmus” is an involuntary jerking of the eyeball. “Horizontal gaze
nystagmus” refers to a jerking of the eyes as they gaze to one side. The position of the eye as it gazes
to one side is called “maximum deviation.” In administering the test, an officer takes some object,
a pen for example, and places it approximately twelve to fifteen inches in front of the suspect’s nose.
The officer then observes the suspect’s eyes as they follow the object to determine at what angle
nystagmus occurs. The more intoxicated a person becomes, the less the eyes have to move toward
to the side before nystagmus begins. Cohen & Green, Apprehending and Prosecuting the Drunk
Driver: A Manual for Police and Prosecution (1997), Section 4.04[2][a]. Other signs of intoxication
include distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation and the inability of the suspect’s eyes to smoothly
follow the object. See 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases (3 Ed.1997), Sections 10.04[5] and
10.06[1].
2. The walk-and-turn test requires the suspect to walk a given number of steps, heel-to-toe, in a
straight line. The suspect is then told to turn around and walk back in the same manner. During the
test, the suspect is told to keep his or her hands at his or her sides. The officer assesses a suspect’s
performance according to the degree to which the suspect exhibits a lack of balance or coordination.
Erwin, at Section 10.03[2].
3. The one-leg-stand test requires the suspect to stand with his or her feet together and his or her
arms at his or her sides. The suspect is then told to hold one leg straight and forward about eight to
twelve inches off the ground for approximately thirty seconds. While in this position, the suspect
counts off the number of seconds. At all times, the suspect is to keep his or her arms at his or her
sides and to watch his or her raised foot. The officer demonstrates the test before administering it.
Erwin, at Section 10.04[1].
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January Term, 2000
to move appellee’s eyes from a forward gaze to the right. It took Trooper Worcester
only one to two seconds to make the pass.
{¶ 4} Trooper Worcester also admitted to deviating from established police
practice by conducting the walk-and-turn test between his patrol car and appellee’s
car. In addition, Trooper Worcester gave appellee the option of turning either to the
right or the left after completing the required number of steps. Police procedure
requires that the suspect turn to the left. Trooper Worcester also erred in the manner
in which he instructed appellee on how to perform this test. Trooper Worcester
testified that he did not, as required by police training manuals, instruct appellee on
how to conduct the test while the appellee stood, on the testing line, with her right
foot placed in front of her left. The record also indicates that the walk-and-turn test
was conducted on a gravel-covered, uneven surface of road when a flat surface is
required to perform the test.
{¶ 5} On November 4, 1996, appellee filed a speedy trial waiver. At this
point, appellee faced charges of DUI and driving left of center. On November 21,
appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered by the state as a result of
the vehicle stop, arrest, and subsequent detention. In this motion, appellee argued,
inter alia, that, because Trooper Worcester did not administer the field sobriety
tests in strict compliance with standardized methods and procedures, the results of
these tests were unreliable and could not serve as the basis for probable cause to
arrest. In an order dated May 2, 1997, the Erie County Court held that, taken as a
whole, the field sobriety tests indicated sufficient impairment to support a finding
of probable cause, notwithstanding Trooper Worcester’s failure to strictly comply
with established police procedures. In the intervening months between appellee’s
filing of the motion to suppress and the trial court’s order, appellee was charged
with child endangering. Appellee’s trial commenced on July 17, 1997.
{¶ 6} On the morning of trial, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the child
endangering charge on speedy trial grounds. The trial court denied the motion; it
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
concluded that, under R.C. 2945.72, appellee’s filing of the motion to suppress
tolled the time in which she had to be brought to trial on the child endangering
charge even though her motion preceded the filing of this charge. Thereafter,
appellee entered a plea of no contest to child endangering. Appellee proceeded to
trial on the charges of DUI and driving left of center. At the conclusion of this trial,
a jury returned a verdict of guilty on the DUI charge. The trial court found appellee
guilty of driving left of center.
{¶ 7} Appellee appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, arguing that
the trial court improperly admitted the results of the field sobriety tests and erred in
concluding that the filing of the motion to suppress tolled the time in which she had
to be brought to trial on the charge of child endangering. The court of appeals
agreed that the trial court improperly admitted the results of the field sobriety tests
as evidence of probable cause. The court of appeals held that because Trooper
Worcester did not strictly comply with standardized testing procedures in
administering the HGN and walk-and-turn tests, these tests could not form the basis
for probable cause to arrest. However, the court of appeals concluded that, even
with the suppression of the HGN and walk-and-turn tests, there remained sufficient
evidence upon which Trooper Worcester could have relied in arresting appellee.
The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court should have dismissed the
child endangering charge. Construing R.C. 2945.72, the court of appeals held that,
because the child endangering charge was filed after the motion to suppress, the
motion to suppress did not toll the time in which appellee had to be brought to trial
on this charge.
{¶ 8} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
__________________
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Ann Barylski,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
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January Term, 2000
Gardner & Kucharski, Mark Gardner and Timothy J. Kucharski, for
appellee.
Donald W. White, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and David H.
Hoffmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio
Prosecuting Attorneys Association.
__________________
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶ 9} This case presents two issues for our consideration. First, we are asked
to consider whether, in administering field sobriety tests, the police must strictly
comply with established, standardized procedures. The second issue concerns R.C.
2945.72(E), which provides that pretrial motions instituted by criminal defendants
extend the time within which they must be brought to trial. Appellant contends that
this extension can apply to additional, related charges brought against the defendant
after the motion is filed.
{¶ 10} For the reasons that follow, we conclude that in order for the results
of a field sobriety test to serve as evidence of probable cause to arrest, the police
must have administered the test in strict compliance with standardized testing
procedures. We also determine that when a criminal defendant files a pretrial
motion and the state later files against the defendant additional, related criminal
charges, R.C. 2945.72(E) does not extend the time within which the defendant must
be brought to trial on those additional charges.
I
{¶ 11} When field sobriety testing is conducted in a manner that departs
from established methods and procedures, the results are inherently unreliable. In
an extensive study, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration4
4. The NHTSA has been a leader in the study and development of field sobriety testing policy and
procedure. The NHTSA’s standardized test manuals form the basis for manuals used by state law
enforcement agencies across the country. Taylor, Drunk Driving Defense (5 Ed.2000), Section 4.3.2.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
(“NHTSA”) evaluated field sobriety tests in terms of their utility in determining
whether a subject’s blood-alcohol concentration is below or above the legal limit.
The NHTSA concluded that field sobriety tests are an effective means of detecting
legal intoxication “only when: the tests are administered in the prescribed,
standardized manner[,] … the standardized clues are used to assess the suspect’s
performance[, and] … the standardized criteria are employed to interpret that
performance.” National Highway Traffic Safety Adm., U.S. Dept. of Transp., HS
178 R2/00, DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing, Student
Manual (2000), at VIII-3. According to the NHTSA, “[i]f any one of the
standardized field sobriety test elements is changed, the validity is compromised.”
Id. Experts in the areas of drunk driving apprehension, prosecution, and defense all
appear to agree that the reliability of field sobriety test results does indeed turn upon
the degree to which police comply with standardized testing procedures. See, e.g.,
1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases (3 Ed.1997), Section 10.06[4]; Cohen &
Green, Apprehending and Prosecuting the Drunk Driver: A Manual for Police and
Prosecution (1997), Section 4.01.
{¶ 12} We too have recognized that while field sobriety tests are a
potentially effective means of identifying intoxicated drivers, these tests’ reliability
depends largely upon the care with which they are administered. In State v. Bresson
(1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 123,
554 N.E.2d 1330, we considered whether a police
officer may testify at trial regarding a driver’s performance on the HGN test as it
pertains to the issue of probable cause. In holding that such testimony is admissible,
we stressed the importance of the testing process. We noted that the arresting
officer’s knowledge of the test, his training, and his ability to interpret his
observations are key considerations in determining admissibility.
Id.,51 Ohio St.3d
at 129,
554 N.E.2d at 1336. Although the only test at issue in Bresson was the HGN,
we suggested that these strict prerequisites to admissibility would also apply to the
other field sobriety tests, including the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand tests.
Id.
6
January Term, 2000
{¶ 13} The small margins of error that characterize field sobriety tests make
strict compliance critical. Here, for example, Trooper Worcester’s failure to use the
full four seconds when checking for the onset of nystagmus, while seemingly
trivial, rendered the results of this test unreliable. When a police officer moves the
stimulus too quickly, he or she runs the risk of going past the point of onset or
missing it altogether. NHTSA Student Manual, at VIII-8.
{¶ 14} The HGN test is not the only field sobriety test that requires special
care in its administration. With respect to the walk-and-turn test, for example, it is
important that the investigating officer have the suspect balance heel-to-toe while
listening to his or her instructions on how to perform the test, a step that was omitted
by Trooper Worcester. The ability or inability of the suspect to keep his or her
balance while simultaneously listening to instructions is an important test clue.
NHTSA Student Manual, at VIII-11. Even the seemingly straightforward one-legstand test requires precise administration. For instance, a police officer must make
sure that the suspect keeps his or her foot elevated for the full thirty-second
duration. Some intoxicated persons can competently perform the test for up to
twenty or twenty-five seconds. Erwin, at Section 10.04[1].
{¶ 15} Although in a number of our DUI cases we adopt a rule of substantial
compliance, we find these cases to be inapposite. Two representative cases, State
v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292, 22 OBR 461,
490 N.E.2d 902, and State v.
Steele (1977),
52 Ohio St.2d 187,
6 O.O.3d 418,
370 N.E.2d 740, illustrate the
important differences between our substantial-compliance cases and the case now
before us.
{¶ 16} In Plummer, we held that the police need only substantially comply
with an administrative regulation that required urine specimens to be refrigerated
when not in transit or under examination. Accordingly, a three- to four-hour interval
of non-refrigeration did not render the results of a subsequent urinalysis test
inadmissible at a DUI trial. In reaching our holding, we noted that the refrigeration
7
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
requirement contemplated situations involving longer periods of non-refrigeration
than that at issue in Plummer. Plummer, 22 Ohio St.3d at 295, 22 OBR at 464,
490
N.E.2d at 905. We further noted that strict compliance with this regulation would
not always be realistic or humanly possible.
Id.,22 Ohio St.3d at 294, 22 OBR at
463,
490 N.E.2d at 905.
{¶ 17} Similarly, in Steele, we held that strict compliance with Department
of Health regulations in regard to breathalyzer testing was not necessary in order
for the test results to be admissible at trial. At issue in Steele was a Department of
Health regulation that required arresting officers to visually observe the suspect for
twenty-minutes prior to testing so as to prevent the suspect from orally ingesting
any substance. We found that this requirement had been fulfilled even though the
arresting officer had averted his gaze from the suspect for a few seconds while he
exited and walked around his patrol car. We noted that because there was no
evidence to suggest that the suspect had in any way corrupted the test results during
the few seconds that the officer had departed, the purpose of the rule had not been
undermined. Steele, 52 Ohio St.2d at 190,
6 O.O.3d at 419-420,
370 N.E.2d at 742.
{¶ 18} Cases such as Plummer and Steele are distinguishable from the case
at bar. In the substantial-compliance cases, the minor procedural deviations that
were at issue in no way affected the ultimate results. In contrast, it is well
established that in field sobriety testing even minor deviations from the
standardized procedures can severely bias the results. Moreover, our holdings in
the substantial-compliance cases were grounded, at least in part, on the practical
impossibility of strictly complying with the applicable administrative regulations.
In contrast, we find that strict compliance with standardized field sobriety testing
procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly impossible in the great majority of
vehicle stops in which the police choose to administer the tests.
{¶ 19} In determining whether the police had probable cause to arrest an
individual for DUI, we consider whether, at the moment of arrest, the police had
8
January Term, 2000
sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and
circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was
driving under the influence. Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91,
85 S.Ct. 223,
225,
13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145; State v. Timson (1974),
38 Ohio St.2d 122, 127,
67
O.O.2d 140, 143,
311 N.E.2d 16, 20. In making this determination, we will examine
the “totality” of facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest. See State v. Miller
(1997),
117 Ohio App.3d 750, 761,
691 N.E.2d 703, 710; State v. Brandenburg
(1987),
41 Ohio App.3d 109, 111,
534 N.E.2d 906, 908.
{¶ 20} In the case sub judice, Trooper Worcester, the arresting officer,
admitted to having not strictly complied with established police procedure when
administering to appellee the HGN and walk-and-turn tests. We nevertheless agree
with the court of appeals that the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding
appellee’s arrest supports a finding of probable cause.
{¶ 21} While field sobriety tests must be administered in strict compliance
with standardized procedures, probable cause to arrest does not necessarily have to
be based, in whole or in part, upon a suspect’s poor performance on one or more of
these tests. The totality of the facts and circumstances can support a finding of
probable cause to arrest even where no field sobriety tests were administered or
where, as here, the test results must be excluded for lack of strict compliance.
{¶ 22} Prior to stopping appellee’s vehicle, Trooper Worcester observed
erratic driving on the part of appellee. Upon stopping appellee’s vehicle, he
observed that appellee’s eyes were “red and glassy” and that her breath smelled of
alcohol. Appellee admitted to the arresting officer that she had been consuming
alcoholic beverages. The totality of these facts and circumstances amply supports
Trooper Worcester’s decision to place appellee under arrest. See Mason v. Murphy
(1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 592, 598,
704 N.E.2d 1260, 1263; State v. Beall (Mar. 8,
1999), Belmont App. No. 94-B-43, unreported,
1999 WL 148371.
II
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 23} Appellant contends that appellee’s motion to suppress tolled the time
in which appellee had to be brought to trial on the child endangering charge, which
was filed subsequent to the filing of the motion to suppress. We disagree.
{¶ 24} Under R.C. 2919.22, driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated with
one or more children in the car constitutes child endangering. A violation of this
law is a first-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 2919.22(E)(5)(a). A defendant charged
with a misdemeanor of the first degree must be brought to trial within ninety days
after arrest. R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). This period of time may be extended by “[a]ny
period of delay necessitated by reason of … motion … instituted by the
accused.” R.C. 2945.72(E). This extension is strictly construed in favor of the
defendant. State v. Singer (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 109,
4 O.O.3d 237, 240,
362
N.E.2d 1216, 1220.
{¶ 25} The question presented is whether R.C. 2945.72(E) applies where
the filing of the motion precedes the filing of the criminal charge. Because an
answer to this question does not appear on the face of the statute, we invoke rules
of statutory construction in order to arrive at the legislature’s intent. Symmes Twp.
Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553,
721 N.E.2d 1057, 1061.
R.C. 1.49 sets forth specific rules of statutory construction, which serve as
guideposts for courts to follow in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Included among
them are the object sought to be attained by the legislature and the consequences of
a particular construction. Applying these guideposts, we conclude that tolling was
not intended to occur for charges filed subsequent to the defendant’s motion filing.
{¶ 26} The facts of the instant case are analogous to those in State v. Adams
(1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67,
538 N.E.2d 1025. In Adams, we held that when a
defendant waives his right to a speedy trial as to an initial charge, this waiver is not
applicable to additional charges arising from the same set of facts that are brought
subsequent to the waiver. We attributed our holding in Adams to the objective
underlying Ohio’s speedy trial statutes—that the ability of a defendant to maintain
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January Term, 2000
his or her defense not be impaired. Id.,43 Ohio St.3d at 70,
538 N.E.2d at 1028.
We noted in Adams that knowing and intelligent tactical decisions cannot be made
until all of the facts are known by the accused, and this, of course, includes knowing
the exact nature of the crimes charged.
Id.
{¶ 27} Here, as in Adams, the state’s interpretation of Ohio’s speedy trial
law conflicts with the objective sought to be achieved by the General Assembly.
Appellant’s proposed construction of R.C. 2945.72(E) provides the state with an
incentive to file charges piecemeal, as opposed to bringing all related charges at the
same time. The potential prejudice to defendants is manifest. When a defendant is
unaware of the precise nature of the crimes charged, he or she cannot make
informed and intelligent tactical decisions about motion filings and other matters.
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that R.C. 2945.72(E) does
not apply to charges filed by the state after the defendant’s motion is filed.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., ROCCO and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
ROCCO, J., concurs separately.
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in judgment and dissent in
part.
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for
RESNICK, J.
__________________
ROCCO, J., concurring.
{¶ 29} I agree with the majority that field sobriety test results can provide
probable cause to arrest only if the administering officer strictly complies with the
standardized testing procedures. I write separately to emphasize an additional
point.
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 30} I would extend the court’s holding here to explicitly state that field
sobriety test results are admissible at trial only if the officer strictly complied with
standardized testing procedures. The majority has demonstrated that the care with
which a field sobriety test is administered has a decisive effect on the test’s
reliability, and hence its evidentiary value. It seems self-evident to me that if strict
compliance with testing procedures is necessary to demonstrate probable cause to
arrest, it becomes even more necessary if the tests are to be used to prove guilt.
__________________
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 31} I concur with the majority in that the filing of a motion before an
additional charge is brought does not toll the speedy-trial provisions for that charge
under R.C. 2945.72(E). Prosecutors should refile applicable motions or require
defendant’s counsel to refile their motions if the motions also apply to the new
charge in order to extend speedy-trial provisions to those later charges.
{¶ 32} However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that field
sobriety tests require strict compliance. Field sobriety tests are used by arresting
officers to assist in determining whether probable cause exists to arrest the driver
for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Field sobriety tests are not
constitutionally required, nor are they mandated by statute. They are not even
required by the Department of Health or any traffic regulation. They are merely
procedures established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(“NHTSA”). As such, they are only evidentiary tools.
{¶ 33} In 1986, this court examined the level of compliance required in
administering regulations concerning storage temperature of urine samples taken
from suspected impaired drivers. This court held that “absent a showing of
prejudice to a defendant, the results of a urine-alcohol test administered in
substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a
prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.” State v. Plummer (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292, 22
12
January Term, 2000
OBR 461, 490 N.E.2d 902, syllabus. Because the court required only substantial
compliance, rather than strict compliance, for those regulations, the evidentiary
value of the item decreased as substantial compliance decreased. But even at a
substantial-compliance level, rather than a strict-compliance level, the test retained
strong evidentiary value.
{¶ 34} Similarly here, substantial compliance affects the evidentiary value
of the field sobriety tests. But substantial compliance should not result in the tests’
exclusion. If Plummer only requires substantial compliance with the Ohio
Administrative Code for the admissibility of chemical test readings for a strictliability statute, I would find that only substantial compliance should be required
for administering the field sobriety tests in question.
{¶ 35} The majority notes that according to the NHTSA, “[i]f any one of
the standardized field sobriety test elements is changed, the validity is
compromised.” National Highway Traffic Safety Adm., U.S. Dept. of Transp., HS
178 R2/00, DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing, Student
Manual (2000), at VIII-3. Again, this potential compromise in validity can be
challenged by the defense on the basis of reliability. A trial court can conduct a
pretrial hearing on whether the tests are sufficiently reliable to be admissible, just
as a trial judge conducts similar hearings on other evidentiary issues. Even if the
trial judge finds that there was substantial compliance with the field sobriety tests
so as to make these tests admissible, defense counsel can still attack the tests’
reliability as evidence at trial, depending on the degree of compliance. The NHTSA
testing only confirms that the better the compliance, the better the reliability.
{¶ 36} The majority highlights Plummer’s observation that strict
compliance is “not always realistically or humanly possible” regarding urine test
regulations. Id.,22 Ohio St.3d at 294, 22 OBR at 463,
490 N.E.2d at 905.
However, field sobriety tests are often administered in the dark, on icy roads, on
gravel, during wind and rain. Law enforcement officers do not have the ability to
13
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
select the ideal environment. Thus, so too with field sobriety tests, I believe that
strict compliance is not always realistically or humanly possible.
{¶ 37} I fear that this ruling will substantially hamper the effectiveness of
law enforcement officers in their ability to ascertain probable cause for OMVI
arrests. Defense counsel can now attack any minor deviation from the field sobriety
tests and seek exclusion of the tests. At a time when more tools are needed in the
effort to combat drunk driving, we have greatly reduced the effectiveness of one of
those tools, field sobriety tests.
{¶ 38} I believe that strict compliance is neither constitutionally nor
statutorily mandated, and certainly not mandated by any evidentiary rules.
Therefore, I respectfully concur in the judgment, but dissent in part and would find
that substantial compliance, not strict compliance, is the appropriate standard for
the admissibility of field sobriety tests.
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
__________________
14
