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← 2000 OK CR 9 - Selsor v. State

2000 OK CR 9 - Selsor v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
2
states following
May 2011
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 10 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Dobbert v. Florida · Collins v. Youngblood · Trident Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. · Jusino v. Brown · Spring Meadows Apartment Complex Ltd. Partnership v. Stallings

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In Proposition I, Selsor argues that the ex post facto provisions of the federal and state constitutions were violated because he was tried in 1998 pursuant to the First Degree Murder statute (21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(A)) in effect then rather than the statute in effect when he allegedly committed the crime (21 O.S. Supp.1973, § 701). In Proposition V, he asserts that his jury was mis-instructed on the applicable elements of First Degree Murder and that the Information did not adequately notify him of the charges against which he had to defend. We address these propositions together and conclude that they both lack merit. This Court focuses on the following factors when determining whether there has been an ex post facto violation: i, the elements of the offense; ii, the conditions and quantum of punishment; and iii, the quantity and degree of proof necessary to establish guilt. Although the elements of First Degree Murder and the burden of proof contained in the 1973 statute (under which Selsor was charged) differ from those contained in the current statute, Selsor’s jury was instructed on all the elements of First Degree Murder under the 1973 statute. While all elements of First Degree Murder under the 1973 statute were not contained within Instruction 9, they were included within the instructions as a whole. Instruction 18 correctly informs the jury on the elements of Robbery with Firearms. The essential elements of that offense are the same under the statute applicable at the”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “At approximately 11:00 p.m. on September 15,1975, Selsor and Richard Eugene Dodson robbed the U-TOTE-M convenience store at 5950 33rd West Avenue in Tulsa. Selsor and Dodson entered the store, each armed with a .22 caliber handgun. Employee Clayton Chandler was working at the cash register. Selsor approached Chandler, pulled his gun, and demanded the contents of the register. Dodson located employee Ina Morris, who was restocking the walk-in cooler. Dodson pointed his gun at her and ordered her to get down. Morris replied, “You’ve got to be kidding me.” Dodson then fired a shot striking Morris in the shoulder. Chandler loaded a sack with money and handed it to Selsor, who then shot Chandler several times in the chest killing him. Upon hearing the shots, Dodson emptied his weapon through the cooler door at Morris. Morris was shot in the head, neck and shoulder, but survived. Selsor and Dodson then fled. On September 22, 1975, Selsor and Dodson were arrested in Santa Barbara, California. Selsor confessed this and other crimes to Detective John Evans of the Santa Barbara Police Department. In his confession, Selsor admitted that before entering the store, he and Dodson had agreed to leave no witnesses.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “In Selsor v. Turnbull, this Court ... anticipated and resolved [an] issue[ ] Selsor failed specifically to raise then but which he raises now in Proposition! ] ... Ill ...: whether the retroactive application of this Court’s decision overruling Riggs v. Branch violated due process. * * * This Court ... found that the retroactive application of this Court’s decision overruling Riggs v. Branch to this case did not violate due process. We specifically stated: “the change in law by judicial decision that Riggs should be overturned does not violate due process ... because it does not change the crime for which [Selsor] is charged, increase the punishment prescribed therefore, or increase the quantity, or degree of proof necessary to establish . his guilt.” In sum, Selsor’s argument! ] in Proposition ] ... Ill w[as] adequately resolved in Selsor v. Turnbull; nothing in his brief is convincing or persuasive enough to change those results.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.