2000 Pa. Super. 91 - Commonwealth v. McClease’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In determining whether [an interaction should be considered a mere encounter or an investigative detention], the focus of our inquiry is on whether a “seizure” of the person has occurred. Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, ... 552 Pa.484, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998). Within this context, our courts employ the following objective standard to discern whether a person has been seized: “[W]hether, under all the circumstances surrounding the incident at issue, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 732 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Pa.Super.1999)... Thus, “a seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.” United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 950 (3d Cir.1994).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2000 Pa. Super. 181 - Commonwealth v. Hayward · 2010 Pa. Super. 60 - Commonwealth v. Cooper

2. “The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2003 Pa. Super. 358 - Commonwealth v. Wood · 2000 Pa. Super. 305 - Commonwealth v. Phinn

3. “As the defendant in DeWitt , McClease was stopped late at night in an area that had previous reports of criminal activity. Prior to the stop, [police] noticed McClease sitting in his car with his head down as if he were looking at his hands. Similar to the defendant in DeWitt , McClease was observed making furtive movements. In DeWitt , our Supreme Court held that these factors are not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in DeWitt , in addition to the foregoing factors, the defendant attempted to flee. Notwithstanding the presence of this additional bolstering factor for reasonable suspicion, the Court still found the evidence insufficient. .. Therefore, applying our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to the facts of the instant case, we are compelled to conclude that the specific and articulable facts... are insufficient... the stop of McClease was illegal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2002 Pa. Super. 59 - Commonwealth v. Mulholland