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← 2000 SD 122 - State v. Moeller

State v. Moeller’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
2
states following
March 2026
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 29 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently March 2026 · most notably Christian v. Gray (2003), Hamilton v. Sommers (2014)

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 29 state decisions

130200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · Kumho Tire Company, Ltd., et al. v. Patrick Carmichael, Etc., et al. · Wainwright v. Witt · General Electric Co. v. Joiner · Oyler v. Boles

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a Class A or Class B felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a felony conviction for a crime of violence as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(9); (2) The defendant by the defendant’s act knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person; (3) The defendant committed the offense for the benefit of the defendant or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; (4) The defendant committed the offense on a judicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecutor, or former prosecutor while such prosecutor, former prosecutor, judicial officer, or former judicial officer was engaged in the performance of such person’s official duties or where a major part of the motivation for the offense came from the official actions of such judicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecutor, or former prosecutor; (5) The defendant caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person; (6) The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Any murder is wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman if the victim is less than thirteen years of age; (7) The offense was committed against”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A. Whether Moeller is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based on his trial counsel’s performance at the March 3, 1997, Daubert hearing and the ultimate admission of expert testimony regarding the AJPOB region of the DNA evidence; B. Whether Moeller is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based on his trial counsel’s failure to have tested the alleged gahnite which was the subject of the State’s soil expert’s testimony, and/or based on the trial court’s failure to conduct a Daubert hearing and the subsequent admission of expert testimony regarding the alleged gahnite; C. Whether Moeller is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based on the trial court’s response to the jury’s question regarding whether Petitioner would ever have a chance to appear before a parole board; D. Whether a pretrial screening requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the aggravating circumstance upon which Moeller’s death sentence was based be returned by a grand jury in an indictment or be set forth in an information under South Dakota law; and E. Whether Moeller is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based on the trial court having admitted evidence of Moses Schanfield’s DNA testing and Schanfield’s testimony at Moeller’s trial.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “(1) whether the delay resulting from the continuance will be prejudicial to the opposing party; (2) whether the continuance motion was motivated by procrastination, bad planning, dilatory tactics or bad faith on the part of the moving party or his counsel; (3) the prejudice caused to the moving party by the trial court’s refusal to grant the continuance; and (4) whether there have been any prior continuances or delays.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.