¶1¶ 79. (concurring). I agree with the standard of review set forth in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Abrahamson. I write separately, however, to express my concern with that *242part of the majority opinion addressing parole eligibility information as a direct consequence of a plea.
¶2¶ 80. The majority attempts to rein in the reach of its holding and asserts that parole eligibility information is a direct consequence only in the "limited circumstance" in which the circuit court has the statutory authority to fix the parole eligibility date under Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2). Majority op. at ¶ 67. Despite the majority's effort to narrow the reach, it nevertheless fails to address the broad implications of its holding.
¶3¶ 81. I understand why the majority does not address the issue of retroactivity. It was neither briefed nor argued by the parties. Nevertheless, retroactive application is a critical concern because circuit courts now may face a number of collateral challenges asserting the failure to inform defendants of their parole eligibility. Implications for Truth in Sentencing purposes also may arise. The majority establishes a new legal principle yet provides little guidance to courts in addressing the ramifications of this newly articulated mandate. Accordingly, I concur.