Martin v . Corrections CV-00-226-JD 03/21/01
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Ronald Martin
v.
Opinion N o . 2001 DNH 053
Commissioner, New Hampshire
Department of Corrections, et a l .
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Ronald Martin, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brings a civil rights action challenging the medical
care that he has received at the New Hampshire State Prison and
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The
defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
claims are barred by claim and issue preclusion, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and the plaintiff’s failure to plead a
factual basis for supervisory liability. The plaintiff agrees
that his claims against the Commissioner of the Department of
Corrections and the Warden are to be construed as official
capacity claims against the Department of Corrections. Martin
also agrees to dismiss his claims against Dr. Stefan Eltgroth,
and D r . Mark Johnson. The plaintiff otherwise objects to the
defendants’ motion.
Background
The plaintiff filed his complaint on May 8, 2000, alleging
that he had not been properly treated for his heart condition and
naming the commissioner, the warden, several doctors, a nurse,
and the prison dietician as defendants. He alleges that he had a
heart condition that was treated with medication when he entered
the prison in 1993. In 1998, he alleges that his heart condition
worsened and that after he suffered a heart attack, he underwent
cardiac bypass surgery at Catholic Medical Center in April of
1998.1 He contends that he was not properly treated before and
after surgery by the prison officers and medical staff.
He also contends that in 1999, after he underwent a stress
test with an abnormal result, the attending surgeon recommended
that he have surgery as soon as possible, and that the defendants
ignored that recommendation. He further alleges that his
condition continues to worsen, causing him to pass out and to
have pain. He claims that the defendants’ conduct was negligent
and demonstrated deliberate indifference to his serious medical
need in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims in
1
In his objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff indicates that his surgery was in June of 1997, rather
than 1998, and that the stress test was done in October of 1998.
2
part based on the preclusive effect of the plaintiff’s state
court proceeding, Martin v . Warden Cunningham, Docket N o . 00-E-
156. The defendants submit copies of the plaintiff’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and motion for injunctive relief
filed in state court and dated May 1 6 , 2000; the defendant’s
motion to dismiss and objection to injunctive relief and
memorandum, and the court’s decision in that proceeding. The
plaintiff also submits copies of the pertinent documents from the
state court proceeding attached to his objection to the
defendants’ present motion to dismiss.
In his petition and motion in the state court proceeding,
the plaintiff stated that he was attacking the conditions of his
confinement based on the prison’s failure to treat his coronary
condition when he entered prison and their continuing failure to
adequately respond to his known medical needs. He stated that
his condition was worsening and that it was a life threatening
situation. He claimed Eighth Amendment violations, among other
things, and sought immediate treatment based upon the alleged
recommendation that he receive immediate surgery.
On June 2 8 , 2000, Judge Robert E . K. Morrill, Merrimack
County Superior Court, issued the following order:
An inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison,
petitioner, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and for injunctive relief. He complains about
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his medical treatment. He suffers from coronary artery
disease and, in June of 1997, underwent coronary bypass
surgery. As a follow-up, in October of 1998, the
Prison scheduled a treadmill stress test at the Lahey
Hitchcock Clinic. The results were abnormal, and the
defendant claims that the doctor conducting the test
warned him that he required another bypass operation
immediately. Based on the petitioner’s medical
records, his claim is false. The physician who
conducted the stress test merely recommended that the
Prison medical staff “to follow” [sic] the petitioner.
The Prison has adequately dealt with the petitioner’s
coronary artery disease by prescribing medication, a
special diet, placing him on light duty, and examining
him four times a year at the Cardiac Care Unit.
Both petitions are dismissed.
P l . Ex. F (Martin, N o . 00-E-156 (June 2 8 , 2000)). The plaintiff
does not indicate whether he filed an appeal of the court’s
decision.
In his objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss in
this case, the plaintiff challenges the affidavit submitted by
the chief of the medical department in the state proceeding and
alleges new facts and incidents in support of his claims. He
states that Judge Morrill was not aware of the new facts and
argues that Judge Morrill’s decision was erroneous. The
plaintiff also states that he was scheduled for further cardiac
surgery in February of 2001.
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Discussion
The state court proceeding raises a question of subject
matter jurisdiction that the court is obligated to raise and
resolve sua sponte because the defendants have failed to raise
the issue. See In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 4 5 , 50 n.4
(1st Cir. 1998). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider
claims that are inextricably intertwined with a state court
ruling.2 See Sheehan v . Marr,
207 F.3d 3 5 , 439-40 & n.4 (1st
Cir. 2000). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state-court claims ‘if the federal claim succeeds only to the
extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before
it.’”
Id. at 440 (quoting Hill v . Town of Conway,
193 F.3d 3 3 ,
39 (1st Cir. 1999)). The proper recourse for a litigant in state
court is through the state appellate process and then to the
Supreme Court, if necessary, because the lower federal courts
lack jurisdiction to consider whether a state court decided a
matter fairly or correctly. See, e.g., Young v . Murphy,
90 F.3d
1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1996); Phinizy v . Alabama,
847 F.2d 282, 284
(5th Cir. 1988). In other words, a party is barred from seeking
2
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v . Feldman, 460
U.S. 4 6 2 , 486 (1983); Rooker v . Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413
(1923).
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appellate review of a state court decision in this court. See
Johnson v . DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).
Since the same issues pertaining to the plaintiff’s medical
treatment in prison were raised and decided in the state court
proceeding, the plaintiff’s claims in this case are inextricably
intertwined with the state court ruling. The plaintiff could
succeed in his civil rights claims here only to the extent that
this court would find that Judge Morrill’s ruling was erroneous.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars such review. As a result, this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
plaintiff’s claims.
Conclusion
The court dismisses the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The defendants’ motion to dismiss (document n o . 7 )
is denied as moot. The clerk of court shall enter judgment
accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, J r .
District Judge
March 2 1 , 2001
cc: Ronald Martin, pro se
N.H. Attorney General
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