Camann v . Camann CV-00-431-JD 05/21/01
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
In r e : Stephen Camann
Joan Camann and Gregory Camann
Civil N o . 00-431-JD
v. Opinion No. 2001 DNH 093
Stephen Camann
O R D E R
The present bankruptcy appeal involves a family dispute over
the disposition of a family business. Joan Camann and Stephen
Camann, who were divorced in 1995, considered a plan to convey
the family business, Camco Inc., to their son, Gregory Camann.
When progress toward implementing the plan slowed, Joan and
Gregory filed a petition in state court to enforce the plan as
part of the divorce decree. Stephen then filed a petition in
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court determined that no enforceable
agreement existed to convey Camco to Gregory. Joan and Gregory
Camann, as creditors of Stephen, appeal the decision of the
bankruptcy court.
On appeal, this court reviews the bankruptcy court’s legal
conclusions under a de novo standard. See In re I Don’t Trust,
143 F.3d 1 , 3 (1st Cir. 1998). In contrast, the bankruptcy
court’s factual findings and applications of properly construed
law to fact are entitled to deference and will not be set aside
unless they are proven to be clearly erroneous. See Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 8013; In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries,
50 F.3d 7 2 , 73
(1st Cir. 1995). Under the clearly erroneous standard, the
bankruptcy court’s factual findings must be accepted unless the
reviewing court is “‘left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’” Anderson v . City of
Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v .
United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Deferential
review of the bankruptcy court’s factual findings recognizes the
bankruptcy judge’s superior position to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses and to make difficult judgment calls. See In re I
Don’t Trust,
143 F.3d at 4 ; Palmacci v . Umpierrez,
121 F.3d 781,
785 (1st Cir. 1997).
By way of background, the bankruptcy court concluded that in
1998 Stephen and Joan agreed in concept to a plan, which was
proposed by Theodore Medrek, an accountant for Stephen and the
family businesses, to divide their marital property. They began
to negotiate the terms of the plan through their respective
counsel. Medrek’s plan included a provision that Stephen would
give fifty percent of his stock in Camco to Joan, and then
Stephen and Joan would sell all of the Camco stock to Gregory.
Because the Medrek plan to divide their marital property had not
been fully implemented by the summer of 1999, Joan filed a
petition in state court to enforce their divorce decree
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agreements. Before trial on Joan’s petition, Stephen filed for
bankruptcy, and litigation of the disputed matters continued in
the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court divided its consideration of Stephen’s
motion to reject the alleged agreement with Gregory (later
expanded to include any alleged agreement with Joan) into two
phases. In the first phase, the court would decide whether any
enforceable contract existed. If s o , in the second phase, the
court would decide whether the contract was executory, and could
therefore be assumed or rejected, and other related issues.
A hearing was held over four days on the first phase of the
motion. The bankruptcy court heard testimony from five
witnesses. Gregory, Medrek, and lawyers who represented Stephen
and Joan in the course of the negotiations over Medrek’s plan
testified. A sixth witness, another lawyer involved in the
negotiations, submitted testimony by deposition. The parties
also submitted extensive evidentiary exhibits, which were
considered by the court, together with the parties’ pretrial
statements and arguments of counsel.
The bankruptcy court found that the plan to sell Camco to
Gregory was a part of the attempted overall settlement agreement
between Stephen and Joan for the distribution of their property.
Therefore, the existence of an enforceable agreement, which was a
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key issue in this case, turned on whether or not Stephen and Joan
had a meeting of the minds concerning the division of all of
their assets. The bankruptcy court found that the disposition of
Stephen’s life insurance was a material term of their agreement
that was never resolved between them. The court further found
that because there was no meeting of the minds as to the
disposition of the life insurance policy, along with other
marital property, a valid and enforceable agreement did not exist
between Stephen and Joan. Therefore, absent an agreement between
his parents, the part of the agreement to sell Camco to Gregory
was also not enforceable.
Under New Hampshire law, a dispute as to the existence of a
contract presents a factual issue. See Trachy v . Laframboise,
2001 WL 286086, at *4 (N.H. Mar. 2 6 , 2001) (quoting Harrison v .
Watson,
116 N.H. 510, 511 ((1976)). “Offer, acceptance, and
consideration are essential to contract formation.” Tsiatsios v .
Tsiatsios,
140 N.H. 173, 177 (1995). “‘Among the requirements
for contract formation is a meeting of the minds about
terms--each party must have the same understanding as to the
terms of the agreement.’” Simonds v . Manchester,
141 N.H. 742,
744 (1997) (quoting Appeal of Sanborn Reg’l Sch. Bd.,
133 N.H.
513, 518 (1990)).
On appeal, Joan and Gregory do not contest the bankruptcy
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court’s application of the legal standards. They contend that
the bankruptcy court’s findings were clearly erroneous.
Specifically, they argue that the court’s findings, that any
agreement to convey Camco to Gregory was part of his parents’
agreement to distribute their marital property and was not a
separately enforceable agreement, were clearly erroneous because
Stephen did not testify to contradict Gregory’s testimony about
their agreement and because substantial evidence was presented to
show that an independent agreement existed between Stephen and
Gregory. The court has carefully reviewed the bankruptcy court’s
decision and the parties’ submissions. The bankruptcy court
considered evidence in support of both parties’ positions. Based
on the record presented, the court is not convinced that the
bankruptcy court’s findings were clearly erroneous.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the bankruptcy
court is affirmed. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr.
District Judge
May 2 1 , 2001
c c : Richard B . Couser, Esquire
George J. Marcus, Esquire
Andru H . Volinsky, Esquire
John M . Sullivan, Esquire
George Vannah, Clerk, USBC
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