[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
93 Ohio St.3d 614.]
JOHNSON, APPELLANT, v. TIMMERMAN-COOPER, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Cite as Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 2001-Ohio-1803.]
Juvenile court—Transfer of case for criminal prosecution—Habeas corpus
sought to compel relator’s release from prison due to void conviction and
sentence on authority of State v. Hanning—Court of appeals’ denial of
writ reversed and writ granted, when.
(No. 01-736—Submitted October 2, 2001—Decided November 28, 2001.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Union County, No. 14-2001-01.
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Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} On the evening of February 20, 1997, Quantez Wright, Steven
Wright, Teia Smith-Armstrong, and appellant, Faith Hope Johnson, robbed Don’s
No. 1 Quick Stop, a convenience store in Columbus, Ohio. Quantez Wright was
armed with a semiautomatic nine-millimeter rifle, and Steven Wright was armed
with a twelve-gauge shotgun. Johnson was not armed.
{¶ 2} During the robbery, Quantez Wright shot and killed one employee and
wounded another employee. Johnson and Smith-Armstrong stole merchandise,
cigarettes, and money before fleeing the store. The robbery was planned by a gang
known as the Linden Avenue Crips and occurred on Johnson’s sixteenth birthday.
{¶ 3} In March 1997, a complaint was filed in the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch. In the
complaint, Johnson was charged with delinquency counts of involuntary
manslaughter and aggravated robbery in connection with the February 20, 1997
robbery. Johnson was further charged with having a firearm on or about her person
or under her control while committing the charged offenses and displaying,
brandishing, indicating possession of, and/or using a firearm to facilitate the
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
commission of the charged offenses. The state filed a motion to relinquish
jurisdiction under the mandatory bindover provisions of R.C. 2151.26(B),
requesting that the case be transferred to the general division of the common pleas
court for Johnson’s trial as an adult.
{¶ 4} Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the state’s motion and
transferred the cause to the general division of the common pleas court for the
prosecution of Johnson as an adult. The juvenile court found that Johnson was
sixteen years old at the time of the charged conduct and that there was probable
cause to believe that Johnson had committed the acts charged.
{¶ 5} In May 1997, the Franklin County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Johnson with involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and
felonious assault. The indictment included an accompanying firearm specification
for each of the three counts. In August 1997, the common pleas court accepted
Johnson’s guilty plea to the charges of involuntary manslaughter, aggravated
robbery, and the accompanying firearm specifications. The court accepted the
state’s request that a nolle prosequi be entered for the felonious assault charge. In
February 1998, the court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate prison term of ten
years.
{¶ 6} In June 2000, we decided State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86,
728 N.E.2d 1059. In that case, we held at paragraph one of the syllabus that “[t]he
mandatory bindover provision of R.C. 2151.26(B)(4)(b) does not apply unless the
child, himself or herself, had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the
child’s control while committing the act charged and the child displayed the
firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the firearm, or used the
firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged.” In so holding, we
emphasized that “the plain language of the bindover statute” dictated this result.
Id.
at 92,
728 N.E.2d at 1064.
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January Term, 2001
{¶ 7} In January 2001, Johnson filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals
for Union County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel appellee, Warden Deborah
Timmerman-Cooper of the Ohio Reformatory for Women, to release her from
prison. Johnson claimed that, based on Hanning, her conviction and sentence were
void. Warden Timmerman-Cooper moved for summary judgment. In March 2001,
the court of appeals granted the warden’s motion and denied the writ. The court of
appeals ruled that our holding in Hanning could not be retrospectively applied to
Johnson.
{¶ 8} The cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits
and Johnson’s motion for oral argument.
Oral Argument
{¶ 9} Johnson moves for oral argument in this appeal. We deny the motion.
S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2) does not require oral argument in this appeal, and Johnson does
not specify why oral argument would be beneficial in this case. State ex rel. Toma
v. Corrigan (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 591,
752 N.E.2d 281, 284. Furthermore,
we have decided comparable issues without the benefit of oral argument. Agee v.
Russell (2001),
92 Ohio St.3d 540,
751 N.E.2d 1043.
Retroactive Application of Decisional Law to Collateral Proceeding
{¶ 10} Johnson asserts that the court of appeals erred in refusing to
retroactively apply the court’s decision in Hanning to her habeas corpus action. In
so holding, the court of appeals relied on the appellate court’s decision in Agee v.
Russell (Oct. 27, 2000), Warren App. No. CA2000-07-062, unreported.
{¶ 11} The court of appeals erred in so holding. The rationale it found
persuasive was deemed erroneous by this court in Agee, 92 Ohio St.3d 540,
751
N.E.2d 1043. In Agee, we held that Hanning could be applied retrospectively in
habeas corpus proceedings:
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“In fact, there is no retroactivity issue here because we did not announce a
new rule of law in Hanning. Instead, we merely determined what R.C. 2151.26 has
meant since its enactment. …
“Therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that under Teague [v. Lane
(1989), 489 U.S. 288,
109 S.Ct. 1060,
103 L.Ed.2d 334], and Pinch [v. Maxwell
(1965),
3 Ohio St.2d 212,
32 O.O.2d 504,
210 N.E.2d 883], our decision in Hanning
could not be applied to Agee’s collateral challenge of his conviction and sentence
in habeas corpus. This conclusion is consistent with our holding that ‘ “[i]n the
absence of a specific provision in a decision denying its application to be
prospective only, … the decision shall be applied retrospectively as well.” ’
Lakeside Ave. Ltd. Partnership v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999),
85 Ohio
St.3d 125, 127,
707 N.E.2d 472, 475, quoting State ex rel. Bosch v. Indus. Comm.
(1982),
1 Ohio St.3d 94, 98, 1 OBR 130, 133,
438 N.E.2d 415, 418; State v. Bolin
(1998),
128 Ohio App.3d 58, 62-63,
713 N.E.2d 1092, 1095. We did not
specifically provide in Hanning that its application would be prospective only, so
it may be applied retrospectively.” Agee,
92 Ohio St.3d at 543-544,
751 N.E.2d at
1047.
{¶ 12} Therefore, the court of appeals committed error by denying the writ
of habeas corpus on this basis.
{¶ 13} Nevertheless, we will not reverse a correct judgment based on an
appellate court’s erroneous rationale. Id. at 544,
751 N.E.2d at 1047. Therefore,
we must examine the warden’s alternate contention that Johnson is not entitled to
the requested writ of habeas corpus because she has or had adequate alternate legal
remedies by way of appeal or petition for postconviction relief.
Habeas Corpus
{¶ 14} A writ of habeas corpus is warranted in certain extraordinary
circumstances “where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there
is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Pegan v. Crawmer (1996),
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January Term, 2001
76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99,
666 N.E.2d 1091, 1094. The most common of these
extraordinary circumstances in which the writ of habeas corpus will issue is when
the petitioner successfully attacks the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. State ex
rel. Jackson v. McFaul (1995),
73 Ohio St.3d 185, 187,
652 N.E.2d 746, 748.
{¶ 15} Johnson challenges the jurisdiction of her sentencing court here.
Like the convicted juvenile in Hanning, Johnson was erroneously bound over for
trial as an adult under the mandatory bindover provision in R.C. 2151.26(B)(4)(b),
although the evidence was uncontroverted that she did not herself have a firearm
on or about her person or under her control while committing the acts charged and
that she did not display a firearm, brandish a firearm, indicate possession of a
firearm, or use a firearm to facilitate commission of the acts charged.
{¶ 16} Johnson’s allegation of improper bindover raises a viable habeas
corpus claim. Absent a proper bindover procedure under R.C. 2151.26, the
jurisdiction of a juvenile court is exclusive and cannot be waived. State v. Wilson
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40,
652 N.E.2d 196, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus;
Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995),
74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151,
656 N.E.2d 1282, 1284
(allegation of improper bindover raised potentially good cause of action in habeas
corpus).
{¶ 17} Moreover, despite the warden’s arguments to the contrary, the writ
of habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy. As we recently reaffirmed, “ ‘[w]hen a
court’s judgment is void because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction,
habeas corpus is generally an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.’
” Davis v. Wolfe (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 549, 552,
751 N.E.2d 1051, 1055, quoting
Rash v. Anderson (1997),
80 Ohio St.3d 349, 350,
686 N.E.2d 505, 506; see, also,
In re Lockhart (1952),
157 Ohio St. 192, 195,
47 O.O. 129, 131,
105 N.E.2d 35,
37, and paragraph three of the syllabus.
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{¶ 18} Based on Hanning and the plain language of R.C. 2151.26(B)(4)(b),1
Johnson’s sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to
convict and sentence her on the charged offenses when she had not been lawfully
transferred to that court. The resulting conviction and sentence are void, and the
availability of alternate remedies does not prevent issuance of the writ.
{¶ 19} The cases cited by the warden do not require a contrary conclusion.
See Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 380,
667 N.E.2d 1194 (“Gaskins
II”); State ex rel. Fryerson v. Tate (1999),
84 Ohio St.3d 481,
705 N.E.2d 353. In
Gaskins II, the bindover entry filed following the allowance of the writ and ordering
of a return established full compliance with the bindover requirements, and the
petitioner merely challenged the accuracy of the entry. And in Fryerson,
84 Ohio
St.3d at 485,
705 N.E.2d at 356, we concluded that the petitioner was not actually
challenging the bindover. Johnson is not merely challenging the accuracy of the
bindover entry, and she is challenging the propriety of her bindover.
{¶ 20} Finally, the warden suggests that habeas corpus is inappropriate
because Johnson may still be subject to discretionary bindover under R.C.
2151.26(C) following an amenability hearing. While Johnson may indeed be
subject to a discretionary bindover in the future, see Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d at 93-
94,
728 N.E.2d at 1065, she is entitled to release from prison now because her
sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
try, convict, and sentence her for the charged offenses. See Larsen v. State (2001),
92 Ohio St.3d 69, 69,
748 N.E.2d 72, 73 (“Habeas corpus is generally appropriate
in the criminal context only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from
prison”).
Conclusion
1. For purposes of R.C. 2151.26, involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery are Category
Two offenses. R.C. 2151.26(A)(2). Effective January 1, 2002, R.C. 2151.26 will be repealed and
it will be amended and recodified as R.C. 2152.12. 2000 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, Section 3.
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January Term, 2001
{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in denying the
writ. Under the court’s holding in Agee,2 Johnson was entitled to have the court of
appeals apply our decision in Hanning retrospectively to her collateral proceeding
in habeas corpus. In addition, Johnson established her entitlement to the writ.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ.
Judgment reversed
and writ granted.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶ 22} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
{¶ 23} The majority holds that the failed bindover deprived the common
pleas court of jurisdiction to accept Johnson’s plea and to impose sentence, and
therefore a writ of habeas corpus should issue, resulting in her immediate release.
I disagree.
{¶ 24} Typically, where a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to convict
an individual, habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy. See Rash v. Anderson
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 349, 350,
686 N.E.2d 505, 506. Consequently, this court has
determined that “[a] habeas corpus petition which alleges that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the petitioner due to an improper bindover states a potentially good
cause of action in habeas corpus.” State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson (1996),
76 Ohio
St.3d 193, 195,
667 N.E.2d 1, 2; see, also, Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995),
74 Ohio
St.3d 149, 151,
656 N.E.2d 1282, 1284.
2. In Agee, 92 Ohio St.3d at 548, 751 N.E.2d at 1050-1051, the court limited Hanning to mandatory
bindover cases under R.C. 2151.26(B)(4)(b), which is the bindover provision used by the juvenile
court here to support the transfer of jurisdiction over Johnson to the general division of the common
pleas court.
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{¶ 25} However, contrary to the typical habeas corpus case where a
defendant seeks immediate release because the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to convict the defendant, I believe that a failed bindover should not
result in the juvenile’s immediate release pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. A
writ of habeas corpus will issue only where an individual is unlawfully restrained
and there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Holloway v.
Clermont Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 128, 130,
684 N.E.2d
1217, 1219. I agree that where the bindover was improper, continued incarceration
of the juvenile for the conviction rendered in the general division of the court of
common pleas is void ab initio. However, I believe that when the bindover fails,
jurisdiction over the juvenile reverts to the juvenile court for the alleged criminal
acts.
{¶ 26} In State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40,
652 N.E.2d 196, Wilson
was convicted of grand theft and sentenced to imprisonment. Subsequent to the
completion of his sentence, Wilson sought to vacate his judgment of conviction.
Wilson alleged that at the time of the grand theft, he was a juvenile, and thus his
conviction for grand theft was void. The trial court denied Wilson’s motion.
However, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded
the cause with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction. “The court
explained that the bindover procedure described in R.C. 2151.26 provides the only
way in which a juvenile court can relinquish its exclusive original jurisdiction over
a juvenile.” (Emphasis added.) Wilson,
73 Ohio St.3d at 42,
652 N.E.2d at 198.
On appeal, this court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, holding “that absent
a proper bindover procedure pursuant to R.C. 2151.26, the juvenile court has
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is
alleged to be a delinquent.” (Emphasis added.) Wilson,
73 Ohio St.3d at 44,
652
N.E.2d at 199. Thus, if the bindover to the court of common pleas fails, the juvenile
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January Term, 2001
court has technically never relinquished jurisdiction over the original delinquency
allegations.
{¶ 27} A juvenile court has the authority to detain that juvenile pending
disposition of his or her case. See, e.g., R.C. 2151.31. Thus, a failed bindover
should result in a remand of the juvenile to the custody of the juvenile court for
further disposition of the case, including the possibility of a subsequent
discretionary bindover. See State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 94,
728
N.E.2d 1059, 1065.
{¶ 28} Thus, I would hold that while a juvenile may no longer be subject to
incarceration for a conviction that was the result of an improper bindover to the
general division of the court of common pleas, the juvenile court, pursuant to its
exclusive jurisdiction, may detain the juvenile consistent with applicable law and
constitutional requirements until it takes action to dispose of the case. Therefore,
because a failed bindover should result in a remand of the juvenile to the custody
of the juvenile court, a writ of habeas corpus should not issue. To the extent that
my dissent conflicts with the view that an improper bindover states a potentially
good cause of action in habeas corpus, I would overrule State ex rel. Harris v.
Anderson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 193,
667 N.E.2d 1.
{¶ 29} In the case at bar, because the bindover was improper, Johnson’s
conviction is void ab initio. However, because the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over Johnson, it has the authority to detain Johnson subsequent to her
release from incarceration from her void conviction pending disposition of her case.
Therefore, I cannot say that continued detention pursuant to the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction would be unlawful, and thus I do not believe that a writ of habeas corpus
should issue. Accordingly, I dissent.
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
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David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and John Fenlon, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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