[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
91 Ohio St.3d 1237.]
THE STATE OF OHIO v. SCOTT.
[Cite as State v. Scott, 2001-Ohio-61.]
Criminal procedure—Death penalty—Execution date set by Supreme Court of
Ohio—Motion for funds for independent psychiatrist to determine
competency to be executed filed by defendant in federal court—State’s
motion to require trial court to complete statutorily prescribed process for
competency review so that defendant can be executed on date set by
Supreme Court denied.
(No. 85-1209—Submitted March 13, 2001—Decided March 21, 2001.)
ON MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE AND SCHEDULING ORDER.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jay D. Scott, was convicted of the aggravated murder of
Vinnie M. Prince and sentenced to death. Scott appealed, and the court of appeals
affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Scott (May 23, 1985), Cuyahoga
App. No. 48609, unreported, 1985 WL 9047. We also affirmed Scott’s conviction
and death sentence. (1986),
26 Ohio St.3d 92, 26 OBR 79,
497 N.E.2d 55.
{¶ 2} Scott’s state postconviction proceedings concluded on January 12,
1994, when we refused to accept jurisdiction. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 1426,
624
N.E.2d 1064, certiorari denied, Scott v. Ohio (1994),
512 U.S. 1213,
114 S.Ct.
2694,
129 L.Ed.2d 825. Finally, the federal courts denied Scott’s application for
habeas relief in Scott v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2000),
209 F.3d 854, certiorari denied
(2000), ___ U.S. ___,
121 S.Ct. 588,
148 L.Ed.2d 503. We last set Scott’s
execution date for April 17, 2001. State v. Scott (2001),
91 Ohio St.3d 1424,
741
N.E.2d 535.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 3} The cause is now before this court upon a motion by the Ohio
Attorney General to direct the common pleas court to hold a status conference and
issue a scheduling order with respect to Scott’s competency to be executed.
{¶ 4} On February 14, 2001, Scott’s attorneys filed a motion in federal court
seeking funds for an independent psychiatrist to determine Scott’s competency to
be executed. See, generally, Ford v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 399,
106 S.Ct.
2595,
91 L.Ed.2d 335. The state claims that it expects Scott to initiate an inquiry
into his competency prior to his scheduled execution date of April 17. The state
seeks to require the trial court to complete the statutorily prescribed process for
competency review so that Scott can be executed on April 17.
{¶ 5} The state argues that State v. Steffen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399,
639
N.E.2d 67, sets forth our authority to fashion the relief it seeks in this case. In
Steffen, we recognized that when a criminal defendant has exhausted his statutory
and Murnahan1 appeals in state court, any further action a defendant files in a state
court is likely to be interposed for delay and would constitute an abuse of the court
system.
Id. at 412,
639 N.E.2d at 77. However, Steffen has no direct application to
this case. Questioning a defendant’s competency to be executed does not involve
repeated direct or collateral attacks on the defendant’s conviction or sentence, the
issue that Steffen concerned.
{¶ 6} R.C. 2949.28 and 2949.29 specify procedures for reviewing the sanity
of a convict sentenced to death. This review can be initiated by “[t]he warden or
the sheriff having custody of the convict, the convict’s counsel, or a psychiatrist or
psychologist who has examined the convict.” R.C. 2949.28(B)(1).
{¶ 7} R.C. 2949.28 and 2949.29 set forth no deadlines for filing a
notification of a convict’s apparent insanity. Those statutes neither authorize nor
contemplate the state’s request to accelerate the specified procedures. Moreover,
1. State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60,
584 N.E.2d 1204.
2
January Term, 2001
R.C. 2949.28 and 2949.29 provide the exclusive statutory framework to follow if
an issue arises concerning a convict’s competency to be executed. We continue to
have the responsibility to review and decide any request for a stay of execution in
such cases. See R.C. 2949.28(B)(4).
{¶ 8} Thus, the state’s request is premature. In making their request for
funding to hire a psychiatrist, Scott’s attorneys are not asserting his insanity.
Moreover, since no notice of apparent insanity has been given, there is no case
pending before the trial court that can be accelerated.
{¶ 9} Moreover, there is no need to artificially speed up competency
proceedings, should there be any. R.C. 2949.28(B)(3) contemplates prompt
resolution of competency proceedings. The statute requires the trial court’s final
decision on competency “no later than sixty days from the date of the notice.”
Further, if the date set for execution passes, R.C. 2949.29(B) accelerates
appointment of a new execution date “effective fifteen days from the date of the
entry of the judge’s findings in the hearing” if a convict is found competent to be
executed.
{¶ 10} For the foregoing reasons, the motion is denied.
Motion denied.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
__________________
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, State
Solicitor, James V. Canepa, Assistant Attorney General; William D. Mason,
Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. Christopher Frey, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for movant, the state of Ohio.
Gold, Schwartz & Co., L.P.A., and John S. Pyle; Law Office of Timothy
Farrell Sweeney and Timothy F. Sweeney, for respondent, Jay D. Scott.
__________________
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