2001 Pa. Super. 357 - Bey v. Sacks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Harman, the Court. ..set forth an additional dual-pronged analysis for our appellate review of a trial court’s determination to grant or deny 2 a new trial. First, the appellate court must examine the decision of the trial court to determine whether it agrees that a mistake was, or was not made. If the appellate court discerns that a mistake was made at trial, it must analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the motion for a new trial. Our Supreme Court held in Harman that in applying the appropriate standard of appellate review of an order denying a new trial [], if the alleged mistake at trial involved a discretionary act, the appellate court must review for an abuse of discretion. The Court reiterated that a trial court abuses' its discretion by rendering a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, or has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. If the alleged mistake involved an error of law, the appellate court must scrutinize for legal error. If the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s determination that there were no prejudicial mistakes at trial, then a decision by the trial court to deny a new trial must stand and we need not reach the second prong of the analysis. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that we must consider, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, whether a new trial would produce a different verdict. Moreover, we consist”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2005 Pa. Super. 103 - American Future System, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Eastern Pennsylvania

2. ““Dr. Sacks relies on Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, supra, contending that lack of informed consent claims in Pennsylvania now are ‘grounded in negligence, while claims of consent are grounded in battery.’ (Appellant’s brief at 23.) Therefore, he argues, because under this interpretation a lack of consent claim is now considered to be under a negligence theory, a jury instruction on comparative negligence should have been given. We disagree. “In Montgomery, this court alluded to the apparent distinction between informed consent cases grounded in negligence and those that are based on a battery theory. Montgomery, 742 A.2d at 1130 . There, the plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging, based on both a lack of informed consent and negligence, that the surgeon had impermissibly expanded a surgical procedure to which the plaintiff had consented to one of vastly different outcome and magnitude. Based on those very different facts, this court concluded that the case was one of battery ‘grounded on the lack of consent to the procedure itself, not a negligence case grounded on the act of inadequately advising the patient of the risks of or alternatives to the procedure (an “informed consent” case).’ Id. at 1131 . “Dr. Sacks now argues that this court’s statement in Montgomery acknowledging the possible existence of an informed consent theory grounded in negligence supports the theory that he was entitled to a comparative negligence charge to the jury. However, in light of”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 64 Pa. D. & C.4th 21 - In re Silicone Breast Implant Litigation

3. ““In order for a consent to be considered informed it must be shown that the patient was advised of ‘those risks which a reasonable man would have considered material to his decision whether or not to undergo treatment.’ ... The determination of what is material is a jury question, and in making that determination the jury must be supplied with expert information as to the nature of the harm attendant to the procedure, and the probability of that harm occurring. Thereafter, the jury must determine whether the type of harm and the probability of its occurrence is information which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding whether to undergo the medical procedure.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 64 Pa. D. & C.4th 21 - In re Silicone Breast Implant Litigation